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Abstract
Financial markets are subject to sentiment from within and beyond their nation’s borders. Fund
flows either flood markets with liquidity, or drain them to the point of asset fire sales. This
typically occurs in accordance with investors’ beliefs and risk preferences and ultimately renders
markets unstable. This thesis serves to establish the implications of investor behaviour to financial
markets. Chapter 2 proposes macro sentiment as a leading indicator for financial instability
within the Early Warning Framework of Borio & Lowe (2002). This signalling method identifies
imbalances within the financial system. Key indicators include real equity and property prices,
and private credit. Macro sentiment is then shown to display excess pessimism prior to systemic
crises and therefore, is a relevant leading indicator.
US institutional investor sentiment is measured through the demand for portfolio insurance in
Chapter 3. Shefrin (1999) advocates index option markets as the manifestation of institutional
investor sentiment. A decrease in index option skewness is associated with bearish sentiment.
This chapter applies a non-parametric method to extract the risk-neutral distribution to gauge
sentiment based on the 30-day probability of the underlying reaching the at-the-money futures
level, and the third moment. These measures are examined in relation to the VIX, the put–call
ratio, the slope of the implied volatility function and the Bakshi, Kapadia & Madan (2003) skew.
Chapter 4 proposes a theory of sentiment propagation and examines the link between global
and investor sentiment within the US. An extensive literature review of mutual fund flows and
sentiment within the broad context of the macroeconomy affirms the use of cross-border fund
flows as the channel through which sentiment propagates. The empirical section then establishes
congruency between global sentiment, as measured by dedicated USA equity and bond fund flows
of US and non-US domiciled investors and sentiment within the US.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
‘Action is Eloquence.’
William Shakespeare
Behavioural finance has emerged to rationalise those anomalies within financial markets that
may appear irrational. Although it is often associated with investor psychology at the individual
level, the breadth spans research which pertains to behaviour in the aggregate; the latter of
which is relevant to this research. Ultimately, it is the synchronicity of the collective that spawns
widespread panic during moments of extreme uncertainty, and ‘irrational exuberance’ in boom
periods. These bipolar phenomena are neither novel nor confined to any particular market. Yet
the means to contain either remains an enigma. Central banks are autonomous in their endeavour
to maintain a range of financial stability. The increasingly integrated nature of financial markets
renders this task more challenging. Domestic economies are therefore susceptible to the behaviour
of investors both within and beyond their domicile.
Sentiment within financial markets remains illusive with respect to definition and quantification.
Therefore, scepticism pertaining to its incorporation into traditional asset pricing models re-
mains. Debating market efficiency is superfluous as evidence that suggests otherwise is plentiful.
Divergence from this theory results in predictability, excess volatility and asset price bubbles,
within financial markets. Hence the pertinence associated with the accurate specification and
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measure of sentiment is addressed. In particular, this thesis distinguishes between frequency and
therefore, applicability to a reference group. The proposition that consumer confidence is a mea-
sure of macro sentiment is addressed in Chapter 2. The assumption that institutional investor
sentiment is a manifestation of their behaviour is central to both Chapters 3 and 4.
Contrary to research which attempts to forecast aggregate market returns using proposed senti-
ment measures, this thesis reconciles both the localised and global effects of sentiment. A unifying
theory of sentiment which extends both the domain of influence as well as the associated impetus,
is the quintessence of the combined chapter contents. The apprehension of financial instability
and its contagion is a fundamental endeavour which should embrace the inclusion of sentiment,
considering its prominence as a facilitating factor.
In order to proceed, clarification of the term sentiment is required.
Definition 1.1 Macro Sentiment refers to the survey-based measures of consumer sentiment,
reported monthly. This is an aggregation of responses to questions posed to a representative
group of society, referenced as the consumers of the relevant country.
Within financial markets, the group of investors that will be of relevance are the institutions.
Investor sentiment refers to the outlook of investors that participate within financial markets.
This is further decomposed into retail and institutional investor sentiment.
Definition 1.2 Institutional investor sentiment reflects the current and near-term perceptions
of the aggregate stock market performance. The measurement thereof is to be deduced from trade
decisions regarding portfolio insurance using index options. This has been substantiated by Shefrin
(1999). Thus, the acquisition of portfolio insurance, using equity index put options, is regarded
as a bearish sentiment as investors fear markets may fall at the option expiry.
A 30-day forward-looking measure will be constructed in 3; the nearest maturity option series
are used in 4. This is done to capture the more immediate outlook of the investor group.
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1.2 Contributions
1.2.1 Macro Sentiment as a Leading Indicator for Financial Instability
Chapter 2 proposes the use of macro sentiment, synonymous with consumer sentiment, as a
leading indicator for financial instability within the United States and the United Kingdom.
The Early Warning System (EWS) of Borio & Lowe (2002) is the reference framework which
monitors the buildup of imbalances in a given economy as a means to forewarn against impending
instability. Justification for inclusion is broached by reviewing the merits of macro sentiment
with regards to both the real economy and aggregate equity market. By reviewing bilateral trade-
related data in conjunction with macro sentiment, a channel through which macro sentiment may
be ‘exported’ is revealed. Furthermore, macro sentiment within the context of the EWS displays
excess pessimism prior to the identified systemic crises. Thus, sentiment here is a measure which
primarily encompasses current and expected opinions with respect to the real economy. Financial
markets affect this measure insofar as expected labour income and, to a lesser extent wealth, is
concerned.
This chapter contributes to the literature by establishing a link between macro sentiment of
individual countries indirectly via trade strength examining Granger-causality over the relevant
time period. The main contribution is the validation of the use of macro sentiment as a leading
indicator within the EWS. Thus, this chapter establishes the significance of sentiment as a means
to forecast financial instability, pertaining to banking crises. Contagion between countries is also
addressed as sentiment contagion is shown to be affected by significant bilateral trade relations.
1.2.2 Institutional Investor Sentiment: The Options
Chapter 3 examines sentiment within financial markets which is specific to institutional investors.
Shefrin (1999) discusses inefficiencies which persist within index option markets as a consequence
of heterogenous beliefs. Given that index put options are tantamount to portfolio insurance,
increases in demand tend to increase the cost of the associated hedge portfolio and consequently,
the implied volatility of that option. Index options are therefore the primary market wherein
sentiment can be gauged due to the attributes of limited liability, leverage and upside. The
information to be gleaned from the option-implied risk-neutral density of the underlying index
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renders it suitable for the construction of a forward-looking investor sentiment measure: The daily
30-day forward measures of the cumulative probability attached to the index reaching the current
at-the-money futures level, the risk-neutral skew and the smirk (the difference between the out-
the-money put and the at-the-money call implied volatilities) are extracted on a given trading
date. The United States (US) aggregate equity market – the S&P 500 index and associated
European index options – is the reference market; the implied measures are then examined with
respect to the CBOE VIX, the model-free risk-neutral implied skew of Bakshi et al. (2003) and
the weekly Investors Intelligence institutional investor sentiment survey. The relationship to the
daily return completes the analysis as a means to decipher the dynamics of the related measures.
This chapter contributes to existing sentiment literature by asserting that daily institutional
investor sentiment can be measured by examining the demand for portfolio insurance. The fully
non-parametric method of Bondarenko (2003) is then applied to index options to extract the
risk-neutral distribution of the underlying index at maturities that are conducive to finding the
30-day forward measure. The interpolated distributional measures are identified as the sentiment
of institutional investors: The implied skew and probability measure are explored with reference
to other related variables over the period January 2005 to October 2010. Particular emphasis is
placed on the turbulent market regime that characterised the latter half.
1.2.3 Sentiment Propagation and Portfolio Insurance
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature by proposing a Theory of Sentiment Propagation. The
premise to be established is that sentiment propagates via cross-border fund flows. A broad litera-
ture review, which encompasses empirically established relationships between the macroeconomy,
financial markets and the integration thereof, and fund flows, constitutes the justification thereof.
Chapter 2 alludes to the means through which sentiment diffuses between the macroeconomies of
countries. The lag effect embodied within trade relationships deems macro sentiment ineffectual
with respect to high-frequency financial markets.
The positive feedback effect between mutual fund flows and the returns of both the aggregate
equity market and associated funds has been studied extensively for US funds. Variations in the
source data and therefore, investor group, the time period as well as data frequency, have led to
conflicting results. Regardless, it is the action of allocating funds to cash, bonds or equity (or
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alternative asset classes not discussed here) that embodies the subjective risk preferences and
beliefs of expected performance.
Limited research exists which explores cross-border fund flows due to data constraints; access
to a global fund flow dataset permits such analysis. This chapter incorporates the use of the
Emerging Portfolio Fund Research dataset which will be further discussed in the empirical section.
Fratzscher (2011) documents both global and country-specific factors which account for equity
and bond fund flows specific to the global financial crisis of 2008, with the insight of this data.
Distinguishing between advanced and emerging economies, the author documents that global
factors were accountable for a sizeable portion of fund flows during the crisis regime. Global
common shocks included the TED spread, the VIX and macroeconomic news.
The second contribution of this chapter associates institutional investor sentiment within the US,
as measured by the option-implied skew derived in Chapter 3, and global sentiment. Here, global
sentiment refers to both equity and bond fund flows of US and non-US domiciled institutional
investors, derived from this dataset. The hypotheses which are empirically proven relate increases
in bond fund flows to that of portfolio insurance, and positive continued performance of equity
funds to a reduction in the demand for insurance.
The integration of financial markets is accompanied by enhanced capital mobility; Laeven &
Valencia (2008) and Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999) decree that financial crises have often arisen
due to velocity of fund flows. Emerging market economies are particularly susceptible to these
forces. Sentiment may well appear to be nebulous in concept; yet in context, it is definitive.
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Chapter 2
Macro Sentiment as a Leading
Indicator for Financial Instability
2.1 Introduction
Financial crises are not unique to any particular period of time; history is replete with episodes
of banking and currency crises. The severity is usually determined by the associated cost as
measured by loss in output and fiscal outlays required to restore the financial sector health.
Often, contagion effects cannot be avoided as spillovers to other countries occur via capital flows;
financial contagion has been particularly relevant in the most recent subprime crisis. Market
crashes and bank failures adversely affect the real economy as funds are diverted to contain
further spillover rather than being allocated efficiently within the real economy. Sharp equity
market declines result in the erosion of corporate wealth as represented by listed equity, due to a
loss in confidence (investor sentiment) which may or may not be associated with fundamentals.
Borio (2006) cites financial liberalisation (increased integration of global financial markets) as
well as innovation as being responsible for the more recent episodes (since the 1990s). Financial
liberalisation facilitates the access to credit which thereby creates a perception of wealth and is
often supported by external funding. In particular, cross-border fund flows may either be directed
at equity markets, particularly those emerging economies which have output growth in excess of
developed markets, or bond funds which, due to sovereign credit ratings and inflation, yield higher
nominal returns. Monetary and foreign exchange policy is highly relevant as a determining factor
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in the ability to attract funds. Fund flows are indicative of the confidence associated with the
fundamentals as well as ability to generate returns. This will be further explored in Chapter 4.
Globalisation has created an environment whereby investors’ risk appetite has a critical effect
upon emerging markets as capital repatriation manifests in the flight to dollar-denominated assets,
resulting in large-scale losses and currency depreciation during financial crises. Investors have the
ability to either drain liquidity or create excess demand, thereby inflating prices to unprecedented
levels, both within and across borders. Doing so not only affects the immediate financial sector;
the onset of widespread panic and a loss of confidence filters through to the real economy as a
result of wealth depreciation. Ultimately, it is the self-reinforcing cycles which then lead to inflated
asset prices, loose external financing constraints, increased output and reduced perceptions of
risk. For a prolonged period of time, this cycle reinforces and amplifies imbalances within the
domestic economy and so too strain within the financial system. The requirement for regulatory
intervention may lead to such an instance being deemed one of financial instability.
It is imperative to have a well-defined notion of financial stability in order to facilitate the iden-
tification of weakness within an economy and ultimately, direct policy towards obtaining such an
objective (Schinasi 2004). Thus stability is determined by the indirect adverse affects on the real
economy. At first blush, one might be persuaded that stability refers to a low-volatility environ-
ment within financial markets and relatively benign inflation rates. However, finance as a sector
is composed of many interlinked elements which include infrastructure, institutions, and markets.
Consequently, financial stability is determined by the aggregate condition associated with each
of the constituent parts, conditional of those relationships; Schinasi stipulates it is determined
by ‘the soundness of financial institutions, financial markets conditions, and effectiveness of the
various components of the financial infrastructure’.
Definition 2.1 A financial system is in a range of stability whenever it is capable of facilitating
(rather than impeding) the performance of an economy, and of dissipating financial imbalances
that arise endogenously or as a result of significant adverse and unanticipated events.
This definition is subject to the context of a monetary economy wherein (fiat) money is used
as a means of exchange for goods and services. Additionally, Schinasi notes that money may
not in general be the most efficient store of value, with the exception of the imminent future
or periods of financial distress. Thus, financial engineering has created preferred substitutes
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that oblige with ‘temporary and reversible intertemporal means-of-payment and store-of-value
services’. Schinasi acknowledges that ‘finance enlarges society’s opportunities for, and efficiency
in, intertemporal economic processes such as trade, production, wealth accumulation, economic
development and growth, and ultimately social prosperity’. It is the universal acceptability of
money and the existence of a smooth-functioning financial system that creates an environment
conducive to social prosperity. Implicit in the field of finance is the inherent risk associated
with the counterparty and therein, that of default. This is precluded in a fiat system (assuming
the government has backed the currency). Hence, finance has evolved to facilitate the use of
fiat money. However, it is trust and the betrayal thereof which is alluded to as an origin of
financial instability, thereby affecting both individual and social welfare. In particular, Schinasi
asserts that the propagation of the lack of trust may ultimately lead to systemic and widespread
financial instability. Containment is subject to this process which may then spill over into the
real economy. Yet disturbances within financial markets need not lead to financial instability;
closing of financial institutions, the increase in volatility or turbulent conditions within markets
may arise from competitive forces. Thus, in the absence of contagion and systemic effects, such
developments may be favourable.
The range of stability in this definition refers to the continuum of quantifiable variables that reflect
the efficiency of finance with respect to ‘savings and investment, lending and borrowing, liquidity
creation and distribution, asset pricing, and ultimately wealth accumulation and growth’. Facili-
tating the performance of an economy specifically refers to the promotion of efficient allocation of
real resources, the rate of growth of output, and the processes of saving, investment, and wealth
creation. This definition clearly indicates the financial system may impede the performance of
the economy endogenously, through the ‘accumulation of imbalances which may be a result of
asset mispricing or other imperfections’. In particular, the author notes that banking systems
are proven to be vulnerable to such imbalances (credit-risk concentrations or illiquidity).
In contrast to price stability, financial stability cannot readily be quantified. Developments in
financial instability are inherently difficult to forecast due to contagion effects and nonlinearities in
the relationships between certain variables. Therefore, a forward-looking approach is required to
establish the buildup of imbalances. Hakkio & Keeton (2009) propose the Kansas City Financial
Stress Index (KCFSI) which may signal the requirement for central bank intervention during
periods of financial stress. A clear definition thereof remains illusive as each occurrence is unique.
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However, the disruption to financial markets is associated with some of the following phenomena:
Increased volatility reflects the increased level of uncertainty of market participants pertaining
to expected future cash flows. This is then considered Knightian uncertainty as risk cannot
accurately be determined. Uncertainty regarding the behaviour of other investors contributes
to market volatility as market participants are forced to act based on ‘what average opinion
expects average opinion to be’, as John Maynard Keynes had discussed in his 1936 book ‘The
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money’. Hence asset prices become distorted and
further disconnected from fundamentals as investor sentiment dominates trading activity. The
‘flight-to-safety’ also characterises such episodes as risk appetite decreases and investors’ are less
likely to want to be in possession of relatively risky assets. This may be due to an altered sense
of the inherent risk. The requirement for liquidity to meet margin calls or increase cash holding
results in portfolio rebalancing as investors are forced to sell illiquid assets. 1 This will be further
addressed in Chapter 4.
According to IMF World Economic Outlook (1998), there are a number of different categories
of crises which all have common origins: The buildup of unsustainable economic imbalances
and misalignments in asset prices or exchange rates. A currency crisis is characterised by a
devaluation, or if the authorities are forced to defend the currency by expending large amounts
of foreign reserves or raising interest rates relatively high. A banking crisis refers to an instance
wherein potential or actual bank runs or failures induce banks to either suspend the internal
convertibility of their liabilities or which compels the government to intervene to prevent this
on a large scale (contagion thereof). This may assume systemic proportions. Systemic financial
crises are severe disruptions of financial markets that impair the market’s ability to function
effectively and may have extreme adverse effects on the real economy. ‘A systemic financial crisis
may involve a currency crisis, but a currency crisis does not necessarily involve serious disruption
of the domestic payments system and thus may not amount to a systemic financial crisis.’ A
foreign debt crisis is a situation in which a country cannot service its foreign debt, whether
sovereign or private. The magnitude of the imbalances and ultimately the correction thereof,
determine whether a crisis will ensue. Crises are often triggered by a sudden loss of confidence
in the banking or currency sector. Indicators thereof may be able to forewarn against such
1The variables included in the KCFSI are: three-month LIBOR/three-month T-bill spread (TED), two-year
swap spread, off-the-run/on-the run 10-year Treasury spread, Aaa/10-year Treasury spread, Baa/Aaa spread, high-
yield bond/Baa spread, consumer ABS/five-year Treasury spread, negative value of correlation between stock and
Treasury returns, implied volatility of overall stock prices (VIX), idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) of bank stock
prices and cross-section dispersion (CSD) of bank stock returns.
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occurrences. Thus, such measures are of interest in the determination of decreasing confidence
or extreme levels of optimism associated with boom periods.
The monetary regime that reigns, the level of government regulation and the participation of
investors and consumers, ultimately determine the configuration of the economy at any partic-
ular point in time. This is likely to be influenced by both trade and capital flows to varying
degrees, relative to the strength of those relationships. Monetary policy has evolved to main-
tain price stability as a primary concern and in some cases contain and reduce unemployment
levels whilst promoting output growth. This is therefore attuned to the facilitation of financial
stability, insofar as the remit allows, which results in the effective operation of the real economy.
Avoiding references to detailed economic theory, one can speculate that at a minimum level of
unemployment and inflation and acceptable productivity, the economy is deemed to operate at
an equilibrium level, quantified by output, the consumer price index, unemployment and various
other macroeconomic data. However, it is the collective behaviour and participation of those
agents within the economy and financial markets which ultimately yields this equilibrium. The
term animal spirits was proposed by Keynes, as one of the fundamental determinants of economic
prosperity. Confidence is indicated to resemble ‘na¨ıve optimism’. Thus, the remit of central banks
is ultimately to ensure that the citizens of the country at large are confident about the current
future course of the economy. One may then assert that confidence is likely to be a key deter-
minant of the future course of the economy, and therefore a key qualitative measure to establish
the likelihood of future economic activity.
Consumer sentiment is a qualitative survey-based measure of confidence which reflects on aggre-
gate, the current and expected future developments of the relevant economy. 2 Monthly surveys
are conducted in most developed (and some emerging) economies as a means to gauge the general
mood of society. Questions are directed to ascertain levels of well-being pertaining to both self,
and the economy at large. Katona (May 1968) developed the consumer sentiment survey in 1946
which was based on a rationale from psychological economics: this proposes that a household’s
response to a change in income or wealth depends upon its attitudes at the time. This measure
of sentiment was intended to capture consumers’ willingness and ability to buy. Spending refers
to discretionary purchases, whilst willingness refers to consumers’ assessments of their future in-
come prospects. Discretionary purchases are those items than can be postponed such as homes,
2In particular, the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index address concerns which pertain to personal
finances, business conditions, and buying conditions.
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vehicles and household durables. These are large, infrequent, usually planned and involve credit.
He suggested that spending increases with optimism whilst precautionary saving increases with
pessimism. Katona notes that confidence represents the uncertainty associated with future in-
come streams, and therefore encompasses both the expected level and variance of future income.
Katona argues that the attitudes that enter into consumer sentiment are more than a reflection
of the current state of the economy and are not necessarily related to current economic variables
in any stable way. Attitudes may be influenced by political and economic events that are not
quantifiable. Additionally, similar economic or financial developments may be perceived differ-
ently under different circumstances. Particularly at turning points, consumer willingness to buy
may be a significant and unpredictable independent factor which determines spending.
One interpretation of the index is that it unequivocally measures consumers’ perceptions of
the probability of financial distress (Mishkin, Hall, Shoven, Juster & Lovell 1978). Consumer
durables are perceived as illiquid assets, and therefore any apprehension of financial distress
implies a reduction of such purchases. A decline in the index might suggest that consumers have
perceived a rise in the likelihood of financial distress and would prefer holding liquid financial
assets rather than illiquid consumer durables. The illiquid aspect of consumer durables, and not
their discretionary nature, is likely the reason why consumer sentiment may indeed be useful for
forecasting such distress. In particular, the assertion is such that sentiment can be used as a
leading indicator of financial instability within that country. Curtin (2007) notes that ‘surveys
are based on the premise that data on consumer expectations represent a leading indicator of
future changes in the macro economy’. The current research will be primarily concerned with
the consumer confidence indices of the United States (US) and the UK as a measure of macro
sentiment. Contagion between countries is not to be dealt with.
To further substantiate the relevance of macro sentiment, section 2.2 addresses literature which
empirically establishes that financial asset price inflation which reflects boom periods within
these markets, leads to increased optimism via a confidence channel. This is in addition to the
traditional wealth effect, the strength of which tends to differ between countries and regions.
The relationships between the macroeconomy, confidence and financial markets is also addressed
in Chapter 4 in the Theory of Sentiment Propagation. Pertinent to the current research are
the relationships between confidence and real estate, and between confidence and the aggregate
stock market. Having mentioned the implications of confidence to discretionary spending, it then
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follows that private credit provides the liquidity to aid such purchases. The easier the access, the
more likely the possibility of a boom associated with those purchases is. Hence real estate is an
asset class that may manifest the consequences of consumer confidence.
Given that financial instability is often associated with exuberant financial market valuations –
which may appear to be disconnected from fundamentals at times – and the subsequent rever-
sal thereof, consumer sentiment may be an apt measure to capture the momentum of market
appreciation. These themes are closely tied to the debate regarding the extent to which mon-
etary policy should intervene in asset markets, if at all. As mentioned by Crockett (2003), ‘In
a monetary regime in which the central bank’s operational objective is expressed exclusively in
terms of short-term inflation, there may be insufficient protection against the build up of financial
imbalances that lies at the root of much of the financial instability we observe’. Hence, benign fi-
nancial conditions, which are considered low-inflation environments, do not preclude the buildup
of imbalances. Thus, in a framework which serves as an early warning system for impending
instability, it is instrumental to incorporate signals which pertain not only to the identification of
imbalances (credit, asset price inflation) which reflect fundamentals, but also that which measures
the macro sentiment of the aggregate market.
The current research references the early warning system (EWS) of Borio & Lowe (2002) (BL)
to detect periods of financial instability up to three years in advance of impending episodes,
which are signalled by the level of imbalances. This is conducted using historical episodes of
instability which have been identified. The EWS is an adaptation of the signalling approach laid
out in Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999) (KL) in which leading indicators are selected as a means to
forewarn against the ‘twin crises’ – banking and currency crises. The objective is to identify the
accumulation of financial imbalances which can, and do, occur in a low-inflation environment.
Financial distress accompanies the unwinding of financial imbalances that build up during benign
financial conditions. The financial cycle can amplify, and is amplified by, the business cycle, as
booms and busts in asset prices as well as rapid credit expansion can lead to future instability.
BL note that price stability may promote financial stability yet it also increases the likelihood
of excess demand pressures which may appear in credit aggregates and asset prices, rather than
goods and services. In addition to this, the credibility of the policymakers’ commitment to
price stability in a low-inflation environment obviates the need to tighten monetary policy which
permits such a buildup of imbalances. Therefore, the ex ante identification of the cumulative
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process of financial and real imbalances may then forewarn against future financial distress.
There is an undeniable urgency to research financial instability; Central banks, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) have
published numerous reports dedicated to the advancement of the topic. Leading indicator models,
which are either qualitative response models or of the signalling approach, have been proposed
from both microeconomic and macroeconomic perspectives.
The extension to the BL EWS for each country includes the imbalance associated with house price
inflation, and the effect of macro sentiment. BL discuss both commercial and residential property
booms within their analysis, however do not include relevant indices in their assessment. 3 Given
that the growth in private credit and the (residential) property boom in the US have been ex
post oft-cited signals associated with the recent subprime crisis, the inclusion of both private
credit and the house price index for the US and UK will be relevant leading indicators. This
research therefore contributes to the EWS macro framework by incorporating macro sentiment
as a leading indicator. Data to be examined to detect imbalances for each country are the ratio
of private credit to GDP, real credit (private credit deflated by the consumer price index, CPI),
real aggregate asset prices which are the inflation adjusted nominal indices of the S&P 500 (US)
and the FTSE 100 (UK), real house price indices and macro sentiment.
The hypothesis asserts that the addition of macro sentiment into an EWS for the relevant coun-
try improves the signal which forewarns of financial instability up to three years in advance.
Sentiment has marked effects within both the real economy and financial markets as consumers
and investors are the active participants. The performance of the economy is therefore a mani-
festation of sentiment to some extent. Financial markets also affect the real economy indirectly
through the macro sentiment of the population; the stock market shifts prospects for employ-
ment income as well as the values of nonfinancial and financial assets. Therefore, including macro
sentiment may yield a better and more complete portrayal of the macroeconomy. Diamond &
Dybvig (1983) incorporate the role of sentiment within a model of bank runs: shifts in investors’
risk expectations explain irrational behaviour of consumers running on banks. In the model, the
instability results from the existence of two equilibria: the continuation of the status quo of an
unimpaired relationship between depositors and the fundamentally sound bank, or that of a bank
run due to ambient fear contagion and consequently, simultaneous withdrawals. Individual bank
3In a slightly updated version, Borio & Drehmann (2009) do include these assets.
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failure may spread due to contagion associated with asymmetric information and, hence, bank
crises are systemic (Davis & Karim 2008).
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 explores macro sentiment within the US and
UK. A digression into the means by which macro sentiment of economies may be linked is also
addressed in section 2.2.3. Thereafter, the relationship to the aggregate market in the relevant
countries is discussed with references to related literature. A literature overview conveys the
significance of macro sentiment as an indicator (coincident or leading) within both economies.
Concluding remarks render macro sentiment useful as a signal within the EWS to forewarn against
impending financial crises. Section 2.3 further examines financial instability. Section 2.3.1 briefly
reviews the BL EWS. Empirical results are presented in section 2.4: the US and the UK are to
be treated as separate entities as contagion is not addressed within the framework. It can be
noted that imbalances that are identified may be due to the influence of externalities which likely
do reflect the systemic nature of crises. Data sources herein discussed analysed within the EWS.
Section 2.5 concludes and establishes the usefulness of macro sentiment.
2.2 Macro Sentiment
The analysis that follows is restricted to the US and UK. Therefore the University of Michigan
Consumer Sentiment Index for the US and the UK Consumer Confidence Barometer, which
is conducted by GfK (Growth from Knowledge) NOP on behalf of the European Commission,
will be the reference indices. Prior to examining the time series properties in sections 2.2.1
and 2.2.2 respectively, further motivation for the hypothesis which asserts that macro sentiment
may be a viable signal as a leading indicator within the EWS is explored below. The case will
be shown to be plausible in so far as the effects on the macroeconomy can be established as well
as the information content therein; there is naturally a vast amount of research which explores
these relationships. Some papers make use of alternative indices such as the Conference Board
Consumer Confidence Index for the US and the Gallup Poll in the UK.
Throop (1992) analyses the causes and effects of consumer sentiment within the US, referencing
the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (CSUS henceforth). Throop notes that the
index has previously led business cycles, and three of its components are included in the Commerce
Department’s Index of Leading Economic Indicators. Addressing whether sentiment contains
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unique information (in relation to that of economic variables) which may forecast consumption
spending, Throop finds that changes in sentiment are generally caused by purely economic factors.
Sentiment bears a stable relationship to just a few economic variables; these include expenditures
on consumer durables, spending on nondurables and services, personal disposable income, and
interest rates as represented by the six-month commercial paper rate. Consumer sentiment
reflects economic adversity or prosperity and reinforces rather than initiates business cycles.
The index can however move independently from current economic conditions during abnormal
circumstances, such as the Gulf War.
Three main views on consumer sentiment which have emerged in the literature are mentioned.
The first is the original opinion of Katona which states that sentiment is an important predic-
tor of spending on discretionary items (consumer durables). However, as a measure it is not
believed to be adequately represented by responses to any single question or to bear any sta-
ble relation to aggregate economic variables. Thus, the survey of a set of questions is deemed
necessary to accurately forecast consumer spending on durable goods. The second view is that
sentiment mainly measures optimism or pessimism about future economic conditions. In ‘per-
manent income’ theories of consumption, current spending on nondurables and services, as well
as on durables, depends on expected future income. The sentiment index may provide a better
measure of this than conventional modelling based on past observations of incomes. The third
view is considered the most useful aspect of the index as a measurement of the uncertainty or
risk, associated with the likelihood of job loss and/or severe income loss and attendant financial
distress. A higher probability of financial distress would lead an individual household to save
more in liquid form and less in illiquid form to cover a possible future shortfall in future income.
The most effective way to do this would be to postpone expenditures on consumer durables rather
than on nondurables and services. In this view, the most important dimension of the index is its
measurement of confidence or mistrust, rather than optimism or pessimism.
Fuhrer (1993) seeks to determine whether sentiment in the US has the impetus to influence the
fate of the economy, this is, can consumer optimism spur prosperity from the depths of recession
or alter the course of the economy, regardless of fundamentals. Recalling the 1990 invasion in
Kuwait, consumer confidence plunged, as did the desire to spend, irrespective of income and
access to credit. Hence, it appears that sentiment independently led to the onset of a recession.
The possibility that sentiment either accurately forecasts, or provides an accurate measure of
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consumers’ forecasts, of economic activity is also addressed. Either of these instances is relevant
as it is the expectation that will determine consumption behaviour. Sentiment may be merely a
reflection of other relevant economic variables which include income, unemployment, inflation and
real interest rates, or may be enhanced due to private knowledge of the respondents. Examining
data between 1960 and 1992, the author concludes that the index largely reflects macroeconomic
aggregates and has a minor role in forecasting one-quarter ahead variation in consumption expen-
diture. Contemporaneous observations did not yield improved results. However, over the 30-year
period, the predictive ability is systematic, and therefore significant and reliable. This arises
from the ability to forecast income growth, rather than the direct link between consumption and
sentiment.
Matsusaka & Sbordone (1995) present a class of models which exhibit multiple equilibria in which
output fluctuates according to expectations; self-fulfilling prophecies may be responsible for or
contribute to recessions. Given that this appears to be the case for post-war recessions in the
US economy between 1953 and 1988, they seek to establish causality between fluctuations in
output as measured using gross national product (GNP) and consumer sentiment. The authors
disentangle the relationship in a vector autoregression, including relevant fundamentals. Their
assumption is that if ‘consumer sentiment can forecast GNP movements even after controlling
for fundamentals and other publicly available predictors of output. . .’ then sentiment may in
fact affect output. Control variables include government spending, money supply and sensitive
material prices, components of the leading indicators, and a default risk variable. Their findings
suggest that Granger causality runs from sentiment to GNP. The significance of this result gives
credence to the use of sentiment as a macro leading indicator.
Based on surveys of consumers’ perception of inflation conducted in the US, Germany and Brazil,
Shiller (1997) documents that inflation lowers households’ expectation of real income and in-
creases the uncertainty of real income. Households are uncertain of whether or not they will be
compensated in the future and this explains the negative relationship with the sentiment index.
Housing wealth directly affects households’ physical wealth, and hence has a positive impact on
sentiment. The precautionary savings explanation of consumption behaviour suggests that the
stochastic nature of interest rates directly impacts the uncertainty of future income streams, as
it affects households’ access to capital markets. This result further signifies that the information
contained in macro sentiment as expectations pertaining to income, savings, spending and ulti-
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mately wealth, in aggregate, determines the future course of the domestic economy at a given
point in time. Naturally, extraneous and unexpected circumstances alter the viewpoint as time
elapses.
Delorme Jr, Kamerschen & Voeks (2001) make a comparison between the UK (measured by
the Gallup Poll) and US with respect to the relationship between sentiment and the Rational
Expectations Permanent Income Hypothesis. This assumes that it is only unexpected shocks
which have an effect on future income growth, and consequently further consumption. They find
that in the UK, sentiment is affected by current real interest rates, inflation and change in housing
wealth. Current real interest rates and inflation have a negative affect on the index, whilst an
increase in housing wealth affects it positively. They also find that the measure of sentiment for
the US is only significantly negatively dependent on current inflation and the change of current
unemployment: unemployment, or the prospect of it, lowers households’ expectation of income.
Both the US and UK indices take into account prevailing economic conditions which would affect
their expected income.
Pain & Weale (2001) examine the information content of consumer surveys in the US and UK
(survey conducted by the European Commission which is the seasonally adjusted time series).
Examining the UK data, they find there is a tendency for confidence to be weaker in times of
subdued growth. The long-run average is below zero which suggests bias in the survey, inappro-
priate weighting or innate pessimism. They also point to times where sentiment has provided a
misleading signal. The index declined (to a level below that of the previous two recessions) in the
latter part of 1992 when the UK withdrew from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism even
though the forced devaluation of sterling brought about economic recovery. Running regressions
to assess the relationship between current expenditure and survey responses in both countries,
a significant positive correlation was found between the time series. The CSUS contains infor-
mation which helps predict future expenditure growth in the US; this was not the case for the
UK. This is consistent with the above findings. The significance of consumer spending cannot
be ignored – according to Curtin (2007), this accounts for between one half and two-thirds of all
spending in market-based economies. Therefore, changes in consumer spending behaviour will
dramatically affect output. Specifically, in 2005, consumers spent more on homes, vehicles and
other durables than firms invested in equipment.
Empirical evidence for the US and for the UK confirms that consumer confidence determines
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household consumption behaviour over and above the effect of income. Easaw & Ash (2004) state
that the aggregate index is deemed a proxy for future income growth. They have also argued
that such indices contribute to economic cycles via the impact on cyclical consumption behaviour
and, therefore, are of particular interest to monetary authorities when pursuing counter-cyclical
policies (Easaw & Ghoshraya 2008).
Berry & Davey (2004) assess the incremental information that may be deduced from UK macro
confidence using the GfK barometer (CSUK), in addition to household spending-related data,
particularly consumption, over the most recent 30-year period. They find that the correlations
between economic variables and confidence generally have the signs expected: positive for income
variables, asset prices and GDP growth, and negative for interest rates and changes in unem-
ployment. The effects of standard economic determinants of consumption (earnings growth, the
change in the unemployment rate, interest rates, changes in the cost of living as measured by the
tax and prices index (TPI), house price inflation, and equity price and exchange rate changes)
are filtered out to extract the residual information content; this is perceived to be the reaction
to non-economic events. Alternatively, it may reflect the complexity of the aggregate thought
process, additional to fundamentally explained results. Examining the residual component, sharp
movements in this component are often, but not always, concentrated around key events. Exam-
ples include the build-up to the Gulf War (early 1990s), the UK exit from the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism and the period following 11 September 2001, and the build-up to the war in
Iraq. In some instances, weakness did not pertain to economic fundamentals and the index may
have captured concerns relating to a slowdown in house price inflation or an expectation regard-
ing interest rates. They find that it is only the component of confidence in the UK that can be
ascertained from the related variables (income, wealth, interest rates), that has any explanatory
power for consumption behaviour (spending). Hence, additional information may or may not be
discernable given that CSUK on occasion reacts to events unrelated to economic data.
Berry and Davey compare CSUS and CSUK to find that although the questions are similar,
their short-term movements differ, which may reflect economy-specific factors. With respect to
consumption in the US, the results of both explained and unexplained components appear to be
significant with respect to consumption, after controlling for income and growth. Results vary
according to the methodology of the referenced papers.
Curtin (2007) discusses the process by which surveys are formed and what they in fact represent.
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Examining survey measures with respect to their relationship to objective economic measures
has taken one of two forms: testing what sources of information consumers used to form their
expectations (the inputs of the decision process), and what measures consumer expectations are
able to predict (the outputs of the decision process). Whilst most have assumed that these
two processes are independent, with expectations typically formed in advance of their use in
decision-making, consumers may be more likely to simultaneously form and use expectations.
Thus, Curtin asserts that expectations about prospective economic changes should incorporate
information about the past as well as provide information about the future. Surveys are critical
to the future course of the economy as they access private information, in addition to that which
is publicly available and may be incorporated into the survey results. Curtin states that ‘...it
is this private information that represents the independent additional information that is the
unique contribution of survey measures of consumer sentiment.’
A series of VAR regressions to test Granger causality between the sentiment index (of the 45
countries included in the sample) and a range of objective economic measures were performed by
Curtin; the variables included are thought to be determinants of sentiment such as the unemploy-
ment rate, inflation rate, interest rate, and personal income, as well as measures of outcome which
include consumption of durables, vehicle registrations, retail sales, total personal consumption
and GDP. Variables are defined as the year-to-year percentage change in the price adjusted se-
ries, with the exception of unemployment, inflation, and interest rates, which were defined as the
year-to-year percentage point change. Five lags of all variables were entered into the regressions.
The selection of the variables covers a broad range of both informational inputs and behavioural
outputs, and is consistent with previous research. Results indicate that sentiment is statistically
significantly related to past changes in economic variables, as well as providing predictive infor-
mation about future changes in those same variables. Thus, sentiment captures both backward-
and forward-looking information. The analysis focused on assessing the overall information con-
tent of sentiment, its sensitivity to differences in measurement methodology, and its applicability
across a wide range of countries and cultures. Consumers view changes in employment, GDP, or
even retail sales as indicators of strength or weakness in the economy and hence influence their
level of economic sentiment, and in turn changes in sentiment forecast future changes in those
same variables.
In 50% of all countries, there is a significant predictive relationship running from changes in
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Table 2.1: Proportion of Granger-Causality tests that indicated a significant relationship for the US and
UK (five lags), as reported in Curtin (2007).
Country Variable predicts Sentiment Sentiment predicts Variable
UK 33% 44%
US 89% 56%
the unemployment rate to changes in consumer sentiment, controlling for past changes in the
sentiment variable. This indicates that unemployment is a powerful determinant of changes in
consumer sentiment. It is also the case that in 62% of the countries, a change in sentiment
proved to be a significant predictor in forecasting a future change in the unemployment rate,
controlling for past changes in unemployment. This result further supports the notion that
consumer sentiment largely reflects income expectations as well as the uncertainty about future
wage income. The next most significant variable is GDP: Past changes in GDP had a significant
impact on sentiment in 59% of the countries, while past changes in sentiment were significantly
related to future changes in GDP in 54% of the countries. Given that consumer spending accounts
for over half of GDP, these relationships are expected. Regarding the US and the UK, the ability
of the macro variables to be predicted by and to predict sentiment appears far greater in the US
than in the UK. This can be seen in 2.1.
Thus sentiment contains information about future trends in the macroeconomy. Curtin (2007)
states that measures to capture consumer expectations were intended for short-term forecasting;
sentiment data is available prior to the remaining macroeconomic data releases and provides
independent information about the future course of the economy.
Whilst income and employment prospects are still the main driving force, there is now a greater
range of economic variables on which consumers base their decisions. The borders of nation
states no longer restrain information flows nor limit the direct purchase of goods or services by
consumers. The economic sophistication and knowledge of the population have increased sub-
stantially in recent decades. Consumers incorporate extensive information into their expectations
that originates outside the domestic economy. The demographics of an aging population has ne-
cessitated the shift from the acquisition of consumer durables and the accrual of debt toward
the accumulation of assets and the preparation for retirement. Thus, the composition of cyclical
changes in spending and saving behaviour are undergoing fundamental shifts. Research on how
expectations should be measured involves both the question wording as well as the format in
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which the interviews are likely to take place. The evolving nature of the consumer therefore
requires an updated methodology to yield these measures.
The differences that have been shown to exist between the US and UK indices may be sufficient
to distinguish between the behaviour of the respective consumers. The implications thereof are
likely to be evident in the underlying time series properties and in particular, the stationarity
thereof. Easaw & Ghoshraya (2008) compare the symmetry of the oscillation between optimism
and pessimism of the two countries, thereby indicating whether consumers’ aspirations tend to
persist optimistically or pessimistically. Persistent aspirations imply persistent consumption as it
has been shown that sentiment predicts growth of household consumption in addition to income
for both the US and UK. If sentiment evolves separately from the business cycle, the index would
not reflect that of the business cycle and underlying economy. Asymmetry occurs if either troughs
are more pronounced than peaks (this is referred to as deepness) or if contractions are steeper
than expansions (this is steepness), in relation to the relative slopes of the series.
Easaw and Ghoshraya investigate the physical properties of the respective indices. Applying the
Dickey–Fuller test which assumes a symmetric adjustment process to assess the order of inte-
gration, it was found that CSUK is I(1), whilst CSUK is I(0), as shown above. This test is
misspecified if the underlying adjustment is asymmetric, and therefore a TAR (threshold autore-
gressive) model is applied to the respective indices. Under the TAR model 4 specification using
a constant and a trend, both the CSUS and the CSUK indices are non-stationary. The test was
repeated by using only a drift term yielding the results qualifying the CSUS to be non-stationary.
In the case of CSUK , the null hypothesis was rejected at the 5% significance level indicating that
the series is stationary. These results were consistent with the Dickey–Fuller tests.
4The Dickey–Fuller test for determining the order of integration of a time series process is of the following kind:
∆mt = γmt−1 + t,
where t is a white noise error term. If t is not white noise, an augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test may be
used where lagged values of ∆mt may be added to the right hand side. The null hypothesis (H0 : γ = 0) is
non-stationarity is tested against the alternative (H1 : −2 < γ < 0) of stationarity. An alternative specification,
the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model, is such that
∆mt = Itγ1(mt−1 − c) + (1− It) γ2(mt−1 − c) + ωt,
where It is the Heaviside indicator function such that
It =
{
1 if mt−1 ≥ c
0 if mt−1 < c.
This specification allows for asymmetric adjustment. If the system is convergent then the long-run equilibrium
value of the sequence is given by mt = c. The sufficient conditions for the stationarity of mt are −2 < γ1 < 0 and
−2 < γ2 < 0.
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The CSUK series exhibited no asymmetry (deepness) whilst the CSUS adjusted to the attractor
asymmetrically; the series exhibited more momentum in the upward direction (when the series
is increasing) than the downward direction. Both series, to a large extent, represent information
contained in other current economic indicators. They also have the ability to forecast certain
time series. There are some differences in this regard. From a statistical perspective, the time
series differ in that the CSUS is I(1) and the CSUK series is I(0).
The results show the differences in the underlying time series properties of the respective indices.
The household aspirations for the UK exhibit reversion to a mean level whereas this adjust-
ment does not occur in the case of the US. Asymmetric behaviour is identified in the case of US
household aspirations which is contrary to the nature of economic cycles in which one expects
contractions to be steeper than expansions. The empirical evidence suggests that expansions
are steeper than contractions. They also find that the cyclical nature of household aspirations
for both the US and UK is contrary to that of economic cycles, even if consumers account for
prevailing economic conditions when forming their sentiments, which is a possibility according to
Katona. This rationalises why sentiment is able to explain households’ consumption behaviour
(willingness), in addition to households’ ability. The persistence of US household aspirations,
which is contrary to prevailing economic conditions, suggests that consumers exhibit ‘irrational
exuberance’. Thus a spontaneous increase in household consumption would persist. Such asym-
metry is not evident for the UK.
Sentiment cannot be ignored as a candidate leading indicator within the EWS framework of BL.
The possibility of using such a measure, in addition to the imbalances that have been highlighted,
may enhance the method of forecasting financial instability. Macro sentiment has been shown to
contain information pertaining to various current and expected economic data. The relationships
vary as sentiment causes and/or is caused by the variable in question. Consumer spending, a
variable clearly associated with sentiment, constitutes a large proportion of total spending and
is therefore a crucial determining factor of economic developments. On aggregate, the timing of
decisions to purchase homes as well as incur debt influences the course of the entire economy.
Large and infrequent spending and saving decisions are often associated with planning and de-
liberation rather than with impulse or habit. These decisions are not based solely on consumers’
current economic situation, but also depend on their expectations about household income, em-
ployment, prices, and interest rates. Economic optimism and confidence exerts great influence
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on the course of the aggregate economy. The following sections examine the CSUS and CSUK
survey construction and time series properties. Macro sentiment and the aggregate stock market
has been briefly mentioned in the introduction; further dissemination thereof with respect to each
country will be explored in section 2.2.4.
2.2.1 The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index
CSUS – Thomson, The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (not seasonally ad-
justed), Key Mnemonic UMCSENT – has proven to be an accurate indicator of the future course
of the national economy. Consumers have the ability to predict interest rate changes, unemploy-
ment, changes in CPI, GDP and home sales; the predictive content of such surveys cannot be
disregarded (Survey Research Center 2010). Fisher & Statman (2003) note that occasionally,
the index diverges from such data and reacts to news of political content. They also find that
consumers tend to be confident about the future when confident about the present. The CSUS
is based on the following five questions: 5
x1 We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say
that you (and your family living there) are better off or worse off financially than you were
a year ago?
x2 Now looking ahead – do you think that a year from now you (and your family living there)
will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same as now?
x3 Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole – do you think that during
the next twelve months we’ll have good times financially, or bad times, or what?
x4 Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely – that in the country as a whole we’ll
have continuous good times during the next five years or so, or that we will have periods
of widespread unemployment or depression, or what?
x5 About the big things people buy for their homes – such as furniture, a refrigerator, stove,
television, and things like that. Generally speaking, do you think now is a good or bad
time for people to buy major household items?
5http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/documents.php?c=i
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The relative scores (the percentage giving favourable replies minus the percentage giving un-
favourable replies, plus 100) for each of the five index questions is first computed. Each relative
score is rounded to the nearest whole number. The formula shown below is applied to provide
the CSUS – the five relative scores are added, divided by the 1966 base period total of 6.7558,
and a constant 2.0 is added to correct for sample design changes from the 1950s: 6
CSUS =
∑5
i=1 xi
6.7558
+ 2.0.
Quarterly survey data for months 2, 5, 8, and 11 begin in November 1952; monthly data begins
in January 1978. The results are released on the last business day at the end of every month. A
preliminary result is released mid-month. To obtain monthly values for the initial quarterly series
from January 1960 until December 1977, an interpolation in Eviews is performed. An alternative
bimonthly index from the Conference Board is also available which has been published since
1967. Figure 2.1 graphically depicts sentiment – the index follows business cycle peaks and
troughs, as dated by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), and tends to follow
a cyclical pattern, with a strong tendency to lead economic downturns and a lesser tendency
to lead upturns. The series below is monthly and not seasonally adjusted, with the index first
quarter 1966 = 100. Thus, the application of sentiment within the Index of Leading Economic
Indicators renders the information content of the CSUS non-redundant.
Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation for CSUS are in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 in the Appendix;
the monthly data appear to be highly autocorrelated. This decays very slowly which is often the
case with non-stationary time series. Partial autocorrelations assist in identification of the order
of an autoregressive model; the partial autocorrelation of an AR(p) process is zero at lag p+1
and greater. If the sample autocorrelation plot indicates that an AR model may be appropriate,
6Another means to express this is as follows:
CSUS =
5∑
j=1
(
P fjt − Pujt
)
100 + 100,
where P fjt = the sample proportion giving favourable replies to the jth question at time t and P
u
jt = the sample
proportion giving unfavourable replies to the jth question at time t. In terms of individual responses,
CSUS =
5∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
xijt
n
100 + 100,
where xijt = 1 if favourable response to jth question by ith respondent at time t,n xijt = –1 if unfavourable
response to jth question by ith respondent at time t and xijt = 0 for all other responses to jth question by ith
respondent at time t.
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Figure 2.1: University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St
Louis.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for the (seasonally unadjusted) monthly CSUS for the period January
1960 to December 2008.
Summary statistics CSUS
Mean 87.60
Median 90.9
Maximum 112
Minimum 51.7
Std. dev. 11.99
Skewness –0.66
Kurtosis 2.89
Jarque–Bera 43.12
Probability 0
then the sample partial autocorrelation plot is examined to help identify the order. Within a 95%
confidence interval, Figure 5.2 indicates that the CSUS monthly data is an AR(1) process. Data
used are not-seasonally adjusted. Summary statistics for the period (588 observations) are in
Table 2.2; the kurtosis here is not excess of the standard normal distribution of 3. If the kurtosis
exceeds 3, the distribution is peaked (leptokurtic) relative to the normal; if the kurtosis is less
than 3, the distribution is flat (platykurtic) relative to the normal.
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Performing an ADF unit root test over the period, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The
monthly CSUS has a unit root in the instance of constant, and constant with linear trend. The
hypothesis of a unit root is accepted at the 1% confidence interval. The test statistic obtained
tc = −3.04 (p-value 0.03), and 1% critical value t1% = −3.44 for both intercept, and intercept
and trend. This coincides with the result stated in Easaw & Ghoshraya (2008). Examining the
first difference time series, the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root is not accepted at
the 1% significance level for both trend, and trend plus intercept; the test statistic of tc = −23.6
is far less than both test critical values at all confidence levels. Thus the series is first difference
stationary.
2.2.2 The GfK NOP Consumer Confidence Barometer
CSUK – Thomson, UK GfK Consumer Confidence Barometer, not seasonally adjusted (NADJ),
Key Mnemonic UKGFKCCNR – is the arithmetic average of the balances (in percentage points)
of answers pertaining to the financial situation of households, the general economic situation, un-
employment expectations (with inverted sign) and savings, all over the next 12 months. Balances
provided for the European Commission (Thomson Key Mnemonic UKCNFCONQ) are seasonally
adjusted (SADJ). The monthly question and answer selections are as follows:
x1 How has the financial situation of your household changed over the last 12 months? It has
. . . ++ 1 got a lot better, + 2 got a little better, = 3 stayed the same, – 4 got a little worse,
– – 5 got a lot worse, N 9 don’t know.
x2 How do you expect the financial position of your household to change over the next 12
months? It will ... ++ 1 get a lot better, + 2 get a little better, = 3 stay the same, – 4 get
a little worse, – – 5 get a lot worse, N 9 don’t know.
x3 How do you think the general economic situation in the country has changed over the past
12 months? It has ... ++ 1 got a lot better, + 2 got a little better, = 3 stayed the same, –
4 got a little worse, – – 5 got a lot worse, N 9 don’t know.
x4 How do you expect the general economic situation in this country to develop over the next
12 months? It will ... ++ 1 get a lot better, + 2 get a little better, = 3 stay the same, – 4
get a little worse, – – 5 get a lot worse, N 9 don’t know.
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x5 How do you think that consumer prices have developed over the last 12 months? They have
++ 1 risen a lot, + 2 risen moderately, = 3 risen slightly, – 4 stayed about the same, – – 5
fallen, N 9 don’t know.
x6 By comparison with the past 12 months, how do you expect that consumer prices will
develop in the next 12 months? They will ++ 1 increase more rapidly, + 2 increase at
the same rate, = 3 increase at a slower rate, – 4 stay about the same, – – 5 fall, N 9 don’t
know.
x7 How do you expect the number of people unemployed in this country to change over the
next 12 months? The number will ... ++ 1 increase sharply, + 2 increase slightly, = 3
remain the same, – 4 fall slightly, – – 5 fall sharply, N 9 don’t know.
x8 In view of the general economic situation, do you think now it is the right moment for
people to make major purchases such as furniture, electrical/electronic devices, etc.? ++ 1
yes, it is the right moment now, = 2 it is neither the right moment nor the wrong moment,
– – 3 no, it is not the right moment now, N 9 don’t know.
x9 Compared to the past 12 months, do you expect to spend more or less money on major
purchases (furniture, electrical/electronic devices, etc.) over the next 12 months? I will
spend ++ 1 much more, + 2 a little more, = 3 about the same, – 4 a little less, – – 5 much
less, N 9 don’t know.
x10 In view of the general economic situation, do you think that now is ...? ++ 1 a very good
moment to save, + 2 a fairly good moment to save, – 3 not a good moment to save, – – 4
a very bad moment to save, N 9 don’t know.
x11 Over the next 12 months, how likely is it that you save any money? ++ 1 very likely, + 2
fairly likely, – 3 not likely, – – 4 not at all likely, N 9 don’t know.
x12 Which of these statements best describes the current financial situation of your household?
++ 1 we are saving a lot, + 2 we are saving a little, = 3 we are just managing to make
ends meet on our income, – 4 we are having to draw on our savings, – – 5 we are running
into debt, N 9 don’t know.
Quarterly questions (January, April, July and October):
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q1 How likely are you to buy a car over the next 12 months? ++ 1 very likely, + 2 fairly likely,
– 3 not likely, – – 4 not at all likely, N 9 don’t know.
q2 Are you planning to buy or build a home over the next 12 months (to live in yourself, for a
member of your family, as a holiday home, to let etc.)? ++ 1 yes, definitely, + 2 possibly,
– 3 probably not, – – 4 no, N 9 don’t know.
q3 How likely are you to spend any large sums of money on home improvements or renovations
over the next 12 months? ++ 1 very likely, + 2 fairly likely, – 3 not likely, – – 4 not at all
likely, N 9 don’t know.
Results for CSUK are available on the last working day of each month. Of note is that in the
case of the CSUS index the first three and fifth questions are similar. The fourth question in the
CSUS index asks what the consumer thinks will happen to the general economy during the next
five years (instead of the next 12 months). Figure 2.2 displays the CSUK and current seasonally
adjusted GDP quarter-on-quarter (QoQ) percentage changes. The mid-1970 recession due to the
oil crisis in 1973 is apparent. The 1974 Q1 growth of –2.5% was preceded by two successive period
of negative growth followed by 1975 (Q2–Q3). Following this, recession dates include 1980–1981
(Q1–Q1), 1990–1991 (Q3–Q3) and 2008–2009 (Q1–Q3). Figure 2.3 displays the positive and
negative QoQ GDP growth with CSUK in order to observe this clearly.
Summary statistics for the SADJ and NADJ monthly time series for the period (420 observations)
are in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Summary statistics for monthly CSUK over the period January 1974 to December 2008.
Summary statistics EU consumer confidence (SADJ) GfK NOP (NADJ)
Mean –9.1576 –7.1643
Median –7.15 –7
Maximum 12 21
Minimum –32 –39
Std. dev. 9.0549 10.3969
Skewness –0.1995 –0.247
Kurtosis 2.3794 3.3775
Jarque–Bera 9.5252 6.7646
probability 0.0085 0.0340
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Figure 2.2: The quarterly SADJ (UKEC) and NADJ (GfK NOP) CSUK for the UK with GDP QoQ %
changes (seasonally adjusted).
In order to establish time series properties and compare this to the CSUS , the NADJ monthly
time series will be used over the period January 1974 to December 2008. Performing an ADF
test using a constant, the test statistic of tc = −3.27 (p-value 0.02) is less than t5% = −2.87
at the 5% level. Thus the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root is rejected. This is in
agreement with Easaw & Ghoshraya (2008). In the instance a linear trend is included to the
constant, the test is rejected at the 10% level. The critical value tc = −3.23 (p-value 0.08) is
less than t10% = −3.13. Applying a Dickey–Fuller test, the presence of a unit root is rejected at
the 1% critical level with t1% = −2.57, tc = −3.01. The Appendix contains the corresponding
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation in Figures 5.3 and 5.4.
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Figure 2.3: The quarterly SADJ UKEC) and NADJ (GfK NOP) CSUK with GDP QoQ % changes
(seasonally adjusted), alternative representation.
2.2.3 Macro Sentiment Trade Links
There are notable differences between the methodologies used to construct each country’s macro
sentiment index. The relationship between these measures may prove insightful, contingent on the
dependencies that exist between the respective countries. Hence, establishing whether causality
exists or whether CSUS can be used to forecast CSUK might imply there are underlying relation-
ships that deserve further investigation. Granger causality (including four lags) is then explored
using the NADJ monthly indices between January 1974 and December 2008.
Granger-Causality using j lags are bivariate regressions of the form, and are evaluated for all
pairs of series (x, y):
yt = α0 + Σ
j
k=1αkyt−k + Σ
j
i=1βixt−i + t,
xt = α0 + Σ
j
k=1αkxt−k + Σ
j
i=1βiyt−i + ωt.
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The reported F -statistics are the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis β1 = β2 = · · · = βj = 0
for each equation. The null hypothesis is that x does not Granger-cause y in the first regression
and that y does not Granger-cause x in the second regression. Correlation does not imply
causation; y is said to be Granger-caused by x if x helps in the prediction of y, or equivalently if the
coefficients on the lagged x are statistically significant. Granger causality measures precedence
and information content but does not imply causality in the more common use of the term.
Although some results imply causality across asset class and fund group, in general it appears
that performance Granger-causes flow. The two-way causality between institutional bond funds
and performance is unique to the dataset yet ‘performance Granger-causes flow’ is stronger.
Results in Table 2.4 reveal that CSUS Granger-causes CSUK . The ordinary (Pearson) correlation
is 0.43 for this period.
Table 2.4: Granger causality for monthly CSUK and CSUS over the period January 1974 to December
2008 using j = 2 lags. The null hypothesis is stated in column 1.
Null hypothesis F -statistic Prob.
CSUK does not Granger cause CSUS 1.3446 0.2527
CSUS does not Granger cause CSUK 3.4619 0.0085
Macro confidence is influenced by expected income and wealth; those assets which reflect a portion
of that wealth are the aggregate financial market held by households, and residential real estate
market. These values are determined by fundamentals, macroeconomic current and expected
conditions and investor sentiment. High-frequency cross-border capital flows are likely to impact
financial markets and allude to a means by which sentiment is propagated. Lower-frequency
macro sentiment may diffuse across economies by alternative means. The real economy of a
country that generates a large proportion of output from trade is likely to be subject to the
influence of macro sentiment from its significant trade partners.
To determine whether this is feasible, the export–import bilateral trade relationship between
the US and UK are explored with respect to macro sentiment. Monthly bilateral import and
export trade data for both the US and UK is obtained from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
(IMF DOTS) Database, World Bank (2011): World Development Indicators, ESDS International,
University of Manchester. Lagged information pertaining to the strength of bilateral trade may
be detected within macro sentiment. As a brief digression, the compelling question of whether
macro sentiment is ‘exported’ is first examined.
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Given that the difference between total exports and imports is included in the calculation of
GDP, the significance of trade can be determined by the ratio of this difference to GDP, per
quarter. The larger in absolute value this number is, the more significant trade becomes for
that country. Bilateral trade strength is determined by the ratio of exports minus imports with
respect to the trade partner, and GDP. In USD, one would expect these values to be equal
in magnitude with opposite signs. However, inconsistencies between exports from the source
country to the trade partner, and the partner’s recorded imports from the source country are due
to differences in classification concepts and detail, time of recording, valuation, and coverage, as
well as processing errors. 7
Let ejk,t represent the value of exports to country k from country j (source country), and i
j
k,t be
the import value from country k to country j at time t, where j = {US, UK}, k = {US, UK}
and j 6= k. Total exports and imports of the source country j at time t are denoted by eˆjt and
iˆjt respectively. Define total and bilateral trade strength at time t for country j with respect to
country k as
T jk,t = x
ejk,t − ijk,t
GDP j
, (2.1)
T jt = x
eˆjt − iˆjt
GDP j
, (2.2)
where x = {3, 1} if the period is monthly (average GDP in national currency) or quarterly
respectively. The GDP of country j serves as the denominator as this is the reference variable
that reflects current economic activity. Over the period of monthly data (x = 3) between 1974 and
2008, the relationship between macro sentiment, total trade strength and bilateral trade strength
is examined. Figure 2.4 shows the monthly trade strength relationships as defined above. The
right (left) hand axis refers to US (UK) trade strength. The more recent period, from January
1990 to December 2008. The UK is clearly negligible for the US as a trade partner. The US
is importing more as a percentage of GDP over time. The UK appears to be exporting slightly
more to the US, whilst total trade strength has decreased, thereby indicating a slight increase in
exports as a percentage of GDP.
7http://www.esds.ac.uk/international/support/user_guides/imf/dots.asp#fob: ‘Each individual coun-
try’s export data is shown f.o.b. (free on board) whereas the import data is usually shown c.i.f. (cost, insurance,
freight). UN guidelines recommend that imports be valued at the c.i.f. transaction value at the frontier of the
importing country. For exports, the guidelines recommend valuation at the f.o.b. transaction value at the frontier
of the exporting country.’
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Figure 2.4: Monthly total and bilateral trade strength for both the US (right) and UK (left) from January
1990 to December 2008, calculated using equations (2.1) and (2.2).
Granger causality results using six lags are in Table 5.1 in the Appendix. Due to the lag effect
of trade on an economy which is akin to lagged momentum, it is likely more useful to include
a greater number of lags. Only those relationships which are significant and informative are
reported. Results are for the entire period (January 1974 to December 2008) and for the more
recent period (January 1990 to December 2008). Two-way Granger causality exists between the
bilateral and total trade strength relationships in all possible combinations with the exception
that TUK did not Granger-cause TUS in either time period. The significance of trade variables
running from the US to the UK appears to increase in the more recent period for all cases. The
reverse occurs for the UK – the significance of UK bilateral trade for the US decreases. This is also
the case with macro sentiment and bilateral trade strength: TUSUK Granger-causes CS
US , however
significance decreases. In general, trade strength Granger-causes macro sentiment; this may
reflect the increased significance, reflected in macro sentiment, with which each country views
economic-related data of the partner country, irrespective of bilateral trade strength. CSUK
Granger-causes TUK in the more recent period. Correlations are in Table 5.2 in the Appendix for
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the latter period. CSUK is slightly negatively correlated to all trade variables with the exception
of TUK and- TUKUS .
These relationships alter over time due to globalisation, financial market integration and prevail-
ing conditions with respect to both the monetary 8 and fiscal policy. Should trade reflect a small
proportion of output, it then seems plausible that the effect of a diminished strength of trade will
be less remarkable and therefore, macro sentiment of the source country may be affected pro-
portionally over time. Thus, regardless of a country’s status of being a significant trade partner
(accountable for a large fraction of the exports from the source country), the effect of an adverse
development in the trade relationship is likely to be relevant in the instance trade is significant
to the source country, ceteris paribus. Thus, the ratio of total net trade to GDP is of relevance.
To conclude this section, results have shown that it may be the case that macro sentiment is
‘exported’ due to bilateral trade relations. The qualitative effect has not been fully established,
however correlations do clarify synchronous effects. Within financial markets, high-frequency
capital cross-border fund flows render themselves more suited as a measure of investor sentiment.
This will be addressed in Chapter 4. The next section reviews literature which establishes the
relationship between the aggregate equity market and macro sentiment.
2.2.4 Sentiment and the Aggregate Equity Market
Consumer sentiment has been used as a measure of investor sentiment as a means to forecast
reversals in financial markets. These inefficiencies persist due to the limits of arbitrage. From a
theoretical perspective, the behavioural model (De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann 1990)
posits the existence of noise (irrational) traders which, due to ‘correlated errors in beliefs’, drives
prices away from fundamentals for prolonged periods. Empirical validation of expected reversals
based on the model requires a measure of sentiment which may be used to forecast or perceive
market corrections. As financial market assets, and consequently personal wealth appreciates,
consumers become more optimistic; so too do the prospects for the economy. Macro sentiment is
therefore amenable to such research as it appears to incorporate the information of equity market
movements as well as expected macro conditions.
8Currency fluctuations as a result thereof are not included in this research. The trade strength relationships
for the UK are determined using IMF DOTS monthly trade data, IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS)
Dataset to find the end-of-period GBP-to-USD conversion factor.
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Otoo (1999) examines the effect of changes in equity prices on macro sentiment (University of
Michigan and The Conference Board indices) in the US using monthly data from June 1980 to
June 1999. Otoo examines whether sentiment increases due to the direct increase in wealth, or
indirectly through the expectation of enhanced economic activity, and consequently labour income
growth. Given that a more favourable current financial situation raises future sentiment levels,
factors which may increase current or future wealth will likely increase sentiment. Therefore,
positive changes in equity prices are likely to have a positive effect on sentiment. Greater wealth
is also likely to lead to increased consumption. Results indicate that households use changes in
stock prices as a leading indicator of future labour income; an increase in sentiment is positively
contemporaneously related to an increase in stock prices, using the Wilshire 5000 as a measure
for the aggregate market. Stock prices movements Granger-cause changes in sentiment, however
the reverse relationship did not hold. Lagged sentiment did not affect stock prices. The direct
effect of stock prices on the net worth of households was of less significance than the leading
indicator effect.
Schmeling (2009) has examined the role of investor sentiment, proxied by consumer sentiment,
in the aggregate stock market across 18 industrialised countries. His findings suggest that sen-
timent negatively forecasts aggregate stock market returns on average across countries. Periods
of high investor optimism are followed by low stock market returns. Jansen & Nahuis (2003)
examine aggregate financial market and confidence data for 11 countries (including the UK) over
the period January 1986 to August 2001. The authors decompose the confidence indices into
their components to establish whether the traditional wealth effect is significant, or whether an
independent confidence channel exists. No long-run relationship between stock prices and senti-
ment was perceived. For the UK, they detect Granger causality running from the stock market to
sentiment at both the one-month and the two-week lag – stock returns and changes in sentiment
are positively correlated. They conclude that a stock market–confidence relationship exists due
to macroeconomic expectations, as opposed to the wealth effect. Thus, the confidence channel is
derived from the leading indicator property of stock prices.
Of relevance to financial instability are the extreme levels of exuberance perceived in markets.
In these instances, excessive optimism might signal a reversal to be due based on the disconnec-
tion between market prices and fundamental values. With reference to the observed asset price
inflation at that time, the phrase ‘irrational exuberance’ conveys the concern of the US Federal
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Reserve Bank and the Chairman, Greenspan (1996):
Clearly, sustained low inflation implies less uncertainty about the future, and lower
risk premiums imply higher prices of stocks and other earning assets. We can see that
in the inverse relationship exhibited by price/earnings ratios and the rate of inflation
in the past. But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated
asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as
they have in Japan over the past decade?
Hence, regardless of the prevailing low-inflation environment, prevailing asset valuations called
into question the rationality of those driving prices. CSUS measured at 91.8 in December 1996;
the index continued to steadily increase until January 2001, dropping off to 86.4. The recession of
the early 2000s in the US has been dated by the NBER, 9 as lasting from March 2001 to November
2001. The NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee specified the peak in business activity to
have occurred in March 2001. The peak of the business cycle expansion which had lasted 10 years
was coincident to the onset of a recession. Confidence here had declined prior to this date. With
respect to the aggregate market which is represented by the S&P 500 price index, Figure 2.5
graphically depicts the co-movements in the time series. Hence, macro confidence within the US
both indirectly and directly appears to be related to the aggregate market.
The effect of macro sentiment cannot be ignored within the framework of Borio & Lowe (2002).
Using this measure in addition to the domestic imbalances that have been highlighted may
enhance the method of forecasting financial instability. The University of Michigan Consumer
Sentiment Index and the GfK NOP Consumer Confidence Barometer will be used within the
EWS framework to be described below.
2.3 Financial Instability – Banking Crises
Considering that this research is primarily concerned with the addition of macro sentiment into
an existing EWS to detect impending crises, the motivation to substantiate the additional vari-
able is based on the information content that cannot be gauged by examining other benchmark
indicators. Macro sentiment in both the US and UK is a reflection of the expectations pertain-
9http://www.nber.org/cycles.html
53
Figure 2.5: The monthly CSUS and S&P 500 price index series from January 1990 to December 2008.
ing to that economy and possibly, may be influenced by that emanating from closely associated
countries, via strength of trade relations. Financial instability and macro prudential policy is
both evolutionary and highly complex, as in some instances it involves the anticipation of aggre-
gate behaviour that may arise due to the spread of fear or a shift in risk appetite, unrelated to
fundamentals; thus macro sentiment may be instrumental to perceive these developments. In the
context of the BL EWS, sentiment may address the inadequacies related to macro expectations.
Bell & Pain (2000) discuss the weakness of existing leading indicator models with regards to
detecting banking crises. Individual bank failures, which may be due to microeconomic (bank
specific) factors can take on systemic proportions, causing severe disruptions within the financial
system. In the instance of market or credit risk exposure, an individual bank may be classified
as technically insolvent if the value of liabilities exceeds that of assets. Information asymmetry
between borrower and lender denies the ability to completely eliminate all related risks. However,
the propensity to provide credit during market upswings naturally increases the risk associated
with interest rate hikes as the difference in between asset and liability payments can lead to
developments such as that of the Savings and Loans crisis in the US. Banks are also subject to
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liquidity risk – mass withdrawals are a result of a coordinated run on the bank.
Failure in the banking system may reflect a common fundamental weakness of individual banks or
the susceptibility of all banks to a common shock. Thus systemic risk is closely related to financial
contagion. Direct exposure between financial institutions is likely a transmission mechanism.
Pure contagion, that which is independent of fundamentals, is also responsible for widespread
bank runs. In this rare instance, Bell and Pain assert that the search for a leading indicator
model may be futile. The application of a macro approach to identify system-wide vulnerability
is not superfluous in general. The leading indicator approach of BL is an EWS which selects key
variables to identify the associated imbalances within the banking system which therefore lead
to financial instability.
2.3.1 The Borio–Lowe Early Warning System
BL assert that financial imbalances can be identified ex ante in what may appear to be ‘be-
nign financial conditions’ due to low and stable inflation. Examining real asset prices (equity,
commercial property and residential property) 10 from 1960 to 1999 in a range of developed and
developing countries, 11 BL find that equity prices are the most volatile, followed by commercial
property, and then residential property. Cycles occur in tandem with real economic activity and
appear to be growing in amplitude and length. Peaks in equity prices tend to lead by one to
two years those in the real estate market. Residential property prices are normally those that
turn last. BL discern a relationship between large swings in asset prices and subsequent strains
in the financial sector or the real economy which, in some cases, is accompanied by widespread
financial distress. Laeven & Valencia (2008) find that a boom in real housing prices in the period
preceding a crisis is followed by a decline, starting in the year of the crisis.
BL note that booms and busts in asset prices have tended to be a common feature of financial
distress in both industrial and emerging economies. Examples in recent decades include Latin
America in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Nordic countries in the late 1980s, and East
Asia in the mid- to late 1990s. Yet, the sparsity of datasets restricts incorporation into such
10BL include investment in their framework, however it did not prove to be useful and therefore is omitted here.
11Countries are limited to those that had a ratio of credit to GDP in excess of 35% any time between 1960 and
1999; had GDP per capita in 1995 in excess of US$ 4000 (at PPP exchange rates) and had total GDP in 1995 in
excess of US$ 20 billion. Moreover, only countries with credit data and an equity price series since at least 1980
were considered.
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studies. Thus, establishing a robust cross-country econometric link between asset price cycles
and financial stability is not possible, and at best limited to equity prices. BL cite Kaminsky &
Reinhart (1999) (KR) who find that equity prices decline in the nine months preceding a crisis
and rise strongly in the nine months prior to that. BL state that ‘. . . it is unclear whether the
fall in equity prices contributes to the crisis, or simply reflects the market’s expectation that a
crisis is more likely’. This statement essentially impels the use of macro sentiment as a means
to account for expectations. Limitations naturally arise due to data availability. Yet, in order to
assess whether it may be feasible, the use thereof in markets where it has a long-standing and
stable history may generate discussion regarding future incorporation into an EWS framework.
Henceforth, the aggregate equity market for the US refers to the S&P 500 price index as it is
regarded as the best single gauge of the large-cap US equities market. It includes 500 leading
companies in leading industries of the US economy, capturing 75% coverage of US equities. For
the UK, equity prices refer to the FTSE All-Share Index which represents 98–99% of UK market
capitalisation and is an aggregation of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap Indices.
Residential property is included using the US S&P/Case–Shiller house price index and the UK
Nationwide house price index.
BL cite domestic credit growth as a factor (imbalance) which increases the risk of financial
instability (systemic banking crises). Bell & Pain (2000) find that property-related lending is
associated with an increased risk of failure. BL emphasise the interactions between asset and
credit imbalances which pose a threat to the stability of the financial system. Thus, ‘it is the
simultaneous occurrence of rapid credit growth, rapid increases in asset prices and, in some cases,
high levels of investment - rather than any one of these alone - that increases the likelihood of
problems’.
Their approach builds on the work of KR in which a threshold value for each of the relevant
indicator series is identified through an optimisation search programme. If the indicator value
exceeds that of the threshold value, this is classed as a ‘boom’ which may signal an impending
crisis. The approach of BL differs as they focus on cumulative processes rather than growth rates
over just one year. This is enforced by the use of the one-sided Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter,
addressed below. BL also limit the analysis to banking crises, and therefore to a few significant
indicators. The following definitions are relevant in the empirical analysis.
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Definition 2.2 A credit boom is a period in which the ratio of private credit to GDP deviates
from its trend by an identified threshold value. The deviation is termed the credit gap.
A gap may develop either through excessive growth over one year or as the result of a number
of years of above-trend growth. Credit is specific to claims on the private sector of the domestic
economy. The private credit-to-GDP ratio gauges the relative size of credit in the economy. By
dividing credit by GDP in nominal terms, price effects are expunged.
Definition 2.3 An asset price boom is a period in which real asset prices, nominal prices deflated
by the consumer price index (CPI), deviate from their trends by an identified threshold value. This
deviation is the asset price gap.
The gaps are the indicator values which are used to determine whether a boom exists. The
threshold value for the credit gap is defined in terms of the deviation in percentage points of the
actual credit ratio from the trend ratio. For the asset price gap, the threshold value is expressed
as the percentage deviation from the trend. This is a non-parametric approach which assesses the
behaviour of single variables prior to and during crisis episodes. If unusual behaviour of a variable
can be quantitatively identified and thereby defined based on past tranquil market conditions,
then that deviation forewarns against an impending period of instability. This is then identified
as an imbalance of the relevant series.
Formally, let i reflect the indicator time series which pertains to real assets, credit or macro
sentiment; j = {US, UK} refers to the country; X denotes a binary signal. It follows that the
ith indicator variable which pertains to country j at time t is denoted by ijt . The associated
trend, gap and threshold values are denoted iˆjt , iˆ
j
g,t and iˆ
j
T . The signal which relates to indicator
i and country j is Xji . Thus, X
j
i = {0, 1}, contingent on whether the indicator exceeds the
threshold value. A signal is ‘on’ if Xji = 1. Thus,
Xji =
 1 if |i
j
t | > |ˆijT |
0 otherwise.
According to Definitions 2.2 and 2.3, the following notation will be used to estimate ijt at time t,
where i refers to one of the following indicator series. The aggregate equity index is denoted St,
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and associated returns for the preceding period (quarterly or annual) Rt:
pjt =
Private Creditjt
GDPjt
, (2.3)
ejt =
Sjt
CPIjt
, (2.4)
hjt =
HPIjt
CPIjt
, (2.5)
cjt = CS
j
t . (2.6)
Consequently, associated trends are pˆjt , eˆ
j
t , hˆ
j
t and cˆ
j
t respectively. The gaps are determined from
these values:
pjg,t = p
j
t − pˆjt , (2.7)
ejg,t =
ejt − eˆjt
eˆjt
, (2.8)
hjg,t =
hjt − hˆjt
hˆjt
, (2.9)
cjg,t =
cjt − cˆjt
cˆjt
. (2.10)
The concept of an imbalance is not necessarily relevant to sentiment, however the deviations
from trend can be interpreted as either extreme optimism (pessimism) in the instance the gap is
positive (negative). Only ex ante information is required in determining whether a boom exists.
Accordingly, a rolling one-sided HP filter is applied to the individual series to estimate the gaps:
The threshold values that define the existence of a boom can be determined without reference to
the entire history of the relevant series. This also has the effect of accounting for the cumulative
process, not just the growth rate over a specified period. The first 10 years of data are used to
find an initial trend. A lead of two years is applied in the instance of the real equity price gap:
at time t, to ascertain whether the equity price gap exceeds a particular threshold, the level of
the equity price gap two years earlier is used. The condition at time t checks |ejg,t−2| > |ejT |.
Equity markets are considered to be a fairly accurate leading indicator of economic activity and
financial instability, with the lead being one to two years. Additionally, often a boom in equity
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precedes one in property markets with a lead of roughly two years. Thus, in the absence of data
on property prices, BL introduced this convention.
BL consider combinations of indicators, rather than individual thresholds which may provide the
most useful signals. As it is extremely precarious to predict the exact timing of a crisis despite the
certainty of it, the search is conducted over multiple horizons of one to three years. An indicator
is judged to successfully signal a crisis if it switches to being ‘on’ either prior to, or in the year
of the crisis. BL use crisis dating from Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, Martinez-Peria & Rose
(2001). A similar optimisation procedure to that of KR12 is employed over the dataset. BL find
that the best combination appears to be for a credit gap of 4%, and an asset price gap of 40%.
The methodology outlined above is adhered to as closely as possible, limiting the analysis to the
US and the UK. Data examined is both annual and quarterly from 1960 until 2008 for the US
and from 1974 to 2008 for the UK, to be discussed in section 3.5.1. Data 10 years prior to the
starting dates are used to obtain the initial trend. Prior to this period, it is either unavailable
or patchy. The definition and classification of banking crises have been derived from historical
episodes. Indicators thereof vary considerably across the related literature in the attempt to
identify crisis start and end dates and the severity of the crisis. Government intervention and
broad responses of institutions are crucial in the identification process using information gleaned
from bank regulators and/or central banks. Boyd, De Nicolo` & Loukoianova (2009) conclude
that ‘In virtually all cases, what is measured is, effectively, a government response to a perceived
crisis – not the onset or duration of an adverse shock to the banking industry’. Thus, there is
a discrepancy about crisis dating, duration and whether it may be considered systemic or not.
They amalgamate banking crisis-related data from four of the main sources: Laeven & Valencia
(2008), Caprio & Klingebiel (1999), 13 Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Detragiache (2005) and Reinhart &
Rogoff (2008). Due to the inability to find a common source agreeing about specific dates and
duration, the focus will be on the year in which the banking crises have been dated in Laeven
& Valencia (2008). According to this source, a Type I crisis is systemic and Type II is a case of
financial distress. The following section reviews the HP filter and the application to detrending
12This involves minimising the noise-to-signal ratio: The noise-to-signal ratio is defined as the ratio of the size
of Type II errors (the percentage of non-crisis periods in which a crisis is incorrectly signalled – a false alarm) to
one minus the size of Type I errors (the percentage of crises that are not correctly predicted). When searching for
the optimal threshold values, the noise to signal ratio should be minimised to ensure the number of crisis correctly
predicted is optimal. A Type I error occurs when the null hypothesis is mistakenly rejected and a Type II error
occurs when the null hypothesis is mistakenly accepted.
13http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/html/database_sfd.html
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time series data.
2.3.2 The Hodrick–Prescott Filter
Hodrick & Prescott (1997) 14 propose a linear filter to decompose non-stationary macroeconomic
time series into a stationary business cycle component and a non-stationary trend component
which is the long-run path. Macroeconomic time series often have an upward drift or trend
which renders them non-stationary. Since many statistical procedures assume stationarity, it is
often necessary to transform data prior to analysis; a number of familiar transformations include
deterministic detrending, stochastic detrending and differencing. The HP filter is a two-sided
symmetric moving average filter and has been shown to transform series which are integrated of
order 4 I(4) or less into stationary series. It is assumed that the data are seasonally adjusted. 15
Prior knowledge is that the growth component varies ‘smoothly’ over time.
A time series yt is then the sum of a non-stationary trend component gt, and a cyclical stationary
component ct:
yt = gt + ct
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T . The measure of the smoothness of the {gt}t=Tt=1 path is the sum of the squares
of its second difference. The ct are deviations from gt; over long time periods, their average is
near zero. Thus, the following programming problem determines the growth components:
min
gt
{ T∑
t=1
(yt − gt)2 + λ
T−1∑
t=2
[(gt+1 − gt)− (gt − gt−1)]2
}
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T . The first term is the goodness of fit whilst the second term is the penalty
for roughness. λ is a smoothing parameter: as λ → 0, the trend approximates the actual series
and as λ→∞, the trend becomes linear. The values for this parameter are the subject of much
debate, with the standard value of 100 for annual data, 1600 for quarterly data and 14 400 for
monthly data. The authors find that if ct and the second difference of gt, ∆
2gt, are identically
and independently distributed (iid) normal random variables with mean zero and variances σ2c
and σ2∆2g respectively then the best choice is λ = σ
2
c/σ
2
∆2g. As in the case of GDP in which
14The original article was printed in 1981 as a Working Paper, by Carnegie-Mellon University.
15BL did not adjust the data for seasonality to allow for the accumulation of imbalances.
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the natural logarithm is applied to the series and trend, λ can be interpreted as a penalty on
movements in the growth rate of the trend component.
The method proposed in Borio & Lowe (2002) is the use of a rolling one-sided HP filter; as new
data become available, the HP filter is applied to the entire series with the final time T trend
value being used for that end point T . This is in contrast to the standard application whereby
one applies the HP filter to the entire time series. In doing so, all data at any time t < T , rather
than using currently available information, are required. Another slight modification is the use of
λ = 1600 for annual data. This has the effect of accounting for the accumulation of imbalances.
Kydland & Prescott (1990) discuss the purely statistical decomposition into trend and cycle with
respect to real business cycle theory. The trend should be a linear transformation of a time
series; lengthening the time series should not alter the deviations too much (apart from towards
the end). The use of the HP filter is applied to the natural logarithm of GNP data ensuring
that the data are positive. They find that the filter leads to spurious cycles and/or distorts
unrestricted estimates of the cyclical component. Thus, Kydland and Prescott recommend using
a framework which presents the stylised facts associated with trend and cycle, and which fits
both components at the same time.
Harvey & Jaeger (1993) also show that the uncritical use of mechanical detrending can lead
to spurious cyclical behaviour. Structural time series models provide a better means to report
stylised facts of such data. The HP filter fits a smooth curve through a set of points and is
equivalent to a structural time series model, imposing certain restrictions. Applying the HP
filter to the quarterly real natural logarithm of US GNP data, they find that it is equivalent to
estimating the structural time series model. The coincidence between the estimated business cycle
component and the HP estimated cycle suggests that the HP filter is tailor-made for extracting
the business cycle component from US GNP. However, this is certainly not always the case for
all macroeconomic time series.
Cogley & Nason (1995) distinguish the HP filter’s effects on trend- and difference-stationary
time series (TS and DS, respectively). Previous results rely on theorems which assume that the
original data are stationary. When applied to stationary data, the filter operates like a high-pass
filter, damping fluctuations which last longer than eight years per cycle (in quarterly data) and
passing shorter cycles without change. The filter is typically applied to non-stationary data. In
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the case of TS data, HP filtering is conceptually equivalent to a two-step operation: linearly
detrend the data and then apply the HP filter to deviations from trend. Thus the HP filter
operates like a high-pass filter on deviations from trend. When the data are DS, the HP filter is
equivalent to a two-step linear filter: difference the data to induce stationary, then smooth the
differenced data with an asymmetric moving-average filter. The smoothing operation amplifies
growth cycles at business cycle frequencies and damps long- and short-run fluctuations. As a
consequence, the filter can generate business cycle periodicity and comovement even if none are
present in the original data. In this respect, applying the HP filter to an integrated process is
similar to detrending a random walk. Cogley and Nason state that since the filter can generate
spurious cycles when applied to integrated processes, it is not clear whether the results should be
interpreted as facts or artifacts. They conclude that if the data are assumed to be DS, stylised
facts about periodicity and comovement primarily reflect the properties of the filter and very
little about the dynamic properties of the underlying data.
Ravn & Uhlig (1997) study how one should adjust the filter according to the frequency of data.
They survey literature which has argued that the filter might lead to spurious cycles if the data is
DS. Further to this, the filter is only optimal (in the sense of minimising the mean square error)
in a certain instance and may produce extreme second-order properties in the detrended data.
Ravn and Uhlig conclude that none of the detected short-comings or undesirable properties are
particularly compelling. Thus, the HP filter will remain the standard method for detrending time
series.
The literature which surveys the use of the HP filter is extensive, particularly in the application
to detrend GDP data. Use is often cautioned, however it remains one of the most distinguished
methods.
2.4 Empirical Section
2.4.1 Data
US data span the period from 1960 to 2008; UK data are examined from 1974 to 2008. Macro
sentiment data has been described in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. Both annual and quarterly data
will be employed, however sentiment will only be examined in the latter instance. Having clarified
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the exact data series used in the reference paper, 16 the following time series are obtained for the
US in Table 2.5 and the UK in Table 2.6. The property price index as well as macro sentiment
are novel to the EWS. No seasonality adjustments are performed, in line with the original work;
some data has been seasonally adjusted by the IMF International Financial Statistics (IMF IFS)
prior to publication. 17 Private credit may represent slightly different groups for the US and UK
as the data sources vary. Consistency has been maintained according to BIS sources.
Table 2.5: Data for the US to be examined from January 1960 to December 2008. Both source and data
series are provided. These data are quarterly frequency.
US data
Variable Source Series
Private credit – the sum of:
Nonfinancial business credit market instruments,
excluding corporate equities liability;
Federal Re-
serve Board
Z1/Z1/FL144104005.Q
Households and nonprofit organisations credit
and equity market instruments liability
Federal Re-
serve Board
Z1/Z1/FL154102005.Q
Seasonally adjusted GDP IMF IFS 99B.CZF GDP billions
USD
CPI 1 IMF IFS 64...ZF CPI Index
S&P500 composite index Thomson
Datastream
S&PCOMP
Case–Shiller national HPI (1987–2008) Thomson
Datastream
USCSHP...F
Nominal HPI (1960–1987) Robert J.
Shiller 2
PHCPI
1CPI = 100 in the year 2005.
2www.irrationalexuberance.com/Fig2.1Shiller.xls
2.4.2 US Crisis Prediction
The US suffered from two systemic banking crises during the selected period:
1. 1988 – Savings and Loans (S&L) crisis. This resulted in the failure of over 1400 savings and
16Jakub Demski, Statistical Analyst, Monetary and Economic Department at the Bank for International Settle-
ments (Jakub.Demski@bis.org).
17http://www.esds.ac.uk/international/support/user_guides/imf/Introduction.pdf
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Table 2.6: Data for the UK to be examined from January 1974 to December 2008. Source and series is
provided; quarterly frequency is applied.
UK data
Variable Source Series
Claims on private sector IMF IFS 32D...ZF billions GBP
Seasonally adjusted GDP IMF IFS 99B.CZF billions GBP
millions GDP
CPI IMF IFS 64...ZF CPI Index
FTSE All Share Price Index Datastream FTALLSH
Nominal HPI (1973–2008) Nationwide HPI
loan institutions and over 1300 banks; the estimated cost is 3% of GDP. These bailouts can
be incomplete or misspecified as the fiscal costs cannot always be accurately apprehended.
The share of non-performing loans at peak was 4.1%. Bell & Pain (2000) attribute the crisis
to the inability to determine or hedge against interest rate risk as the S&L institutions had
substantial fixed-interest assets when market interest rates, and consequently their funding
costs, rose sharply.
2. 2007 – Subprime mortgage crisis. This crisis was initially manifest in liquidity difficulties
within the banking system as demands for asset-backed securities declined. Those hard-to-
value derivatives which were sought after during the boom were marked down dramatically.
Credit losses and writedowns worsened as mortgage foreclosures increased in 2006, 2007 and
2008. By June 2008, subprime-related and other credit losses by global institutions were
roughly $400 billion. Although not addressed here, direct transmission occurred through
ownership of mortgage debt.
Both pUSt and pˆ
US
t , as well as annual real credit growth, are displayed in Figure 2.6 for the United
States from 1960 to 2008. Real annual credit growth18 peaked in 1984 at 10.8% followed by 10.1%
in 1973, 8.5% in 1965 and 8.1% in 1999. Three noticeable minima occurred: –4.2% in 1975, –3.9%
in 1991 and –3.1% in 1982. These correspond to business cycle troughs as dated according to the
NBER. The recession from November 1973 to March 1975 was marked by the 1973 oil crisis and
18Credit was converted to a real value using the CPI (base year = 2005).
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the 1973–1974 stock market crash. The period is remarkable for rising unemployment coinciding
with rising inflation (stagflation). The recession from July 1981 to November 1982 has been
attributed to tight monetary policy required to control inflation, resulting from the associated
energy crisis in 1979 (Iranian revolution). The recession from July 1990 to March 1991 was a
combination of weakened growth due to interest rate hikes between 1986 and 1989 required to
curb inflation, the 1990 oil shock, debt accumulation of the 1980s, and new banking regulations
following the S&L crisis. Consumer pessimism has also been cited as one of the determining
factors. Peaks in the credit gap occurred in years t = 1974, pUSg,t = 5%, t = 1987 p
US
g,t = 13% and
t = 2007, pUSg,t = 17%.
Figure 2.6: The series pUSt , pˆ
US
t (left axis) and real annual credit growth (right axis). This graph depicts
the fluctuations in real annual credit growth relative to the private credit-to-GDP pUSt and the associated
trend pˆUSt thereof.
The hUSt and hˆ
US
t indicate that steady growth followed by rapid increases in real house prices
started from 2000 onwards, as shown in Figure 2.7. There are three noticeable maxima displayed:
1979, 1989 and 2006. Thus, using hUSt as an indicator appears to be beneficial as h
US
g,t > 0 prior
to both the S&L and subprime 2007 crisis. Figure 2.8 displays the annual pUSg,t , e
US
g,t and h
US
g,t .
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Figure 2.7: The real HPI hUSt and real HPI trend hˆ
US
t for the US calculated using the Case-Shiller HPI
and the CPI over the selected period.
In Table 2.7, the gaps are provided five years prior to and for the year corresponding to identified
crises; eUSg,t refers to current data and does not reference e
US
t−2 as property prices are available too.
The pUSg,t is the most reliable indicator. The h
US
g,t is a more reliable indicator for the subprime
crisis than the S&L crisis. The movements in eUSg,t are opposed to those of the h
US
g,t . The annual
simple returns are included as a comparison. Evidently, equity market appreciation requires a
number of years to accumulate gains after a decline in trend following multiple years of negative
returns. Therefore, even though 2003 produced a large annual return, the previous crash and
subsequent negative returns resulted in a negative gap.
Quarterly results are in Table 5.2 in the Appendix which includes macro sentiment indicator cUSt .
In this instance, the HP filter is applied with smoothing parameter λ = 14 400 to capture the
cumulative process. The first 40 observations (10 years) are used to find the initial trend. The
results display a similar pattern, however data frequency clearly affects gaps. The pUSg,t is slightly
positive prior to both episodes. BL assert a threshold value of 4% indicates impending instability
– this is in 1986Q4 prior to the S&L crisis and remained below this prior to the subprime crisis.
For real asset price gaps, 40% was the suggested threshold value. In the results here, eUSg,t remains
below 20% prior to both crises, however does tend to peak in the years preceding the events. The
hUSg,t is smaller than e
US
g,t in general. In the case of the subprime crisis, the gap peaks two years
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Figure 2.8: The annual gaps corresponding to credit, equity and house prices as given by pUSg,t , e
US
g,t and
hUSg,t .
Table 2.7: Indicator gaps and nominal annual equity returns Rt five years prior to and during the year
of the crises within the US. No decimals are omitted.
Year pUSg,t e
US
g,t h
US
g,t Rt
1983 4% 10% –8% 10%
1984 6% 10% –6% –2%
1985 11% 29% –4% 19%
1986 14% 34% –1% 10%
1987 13% 28% 5% 0%
1988 12% 29% 7% 8%
2002 12% –28% 13% –29%
2003 12% –12% 17% 22%
2004 13% –8% 20% 6%
2005 14% –9% 25% 0%
2006 15% –3% 24% 9%
2007 17% –5% 9% 0%
prior to the crisis. Quarterly data have a slightly different result to annual results and are
likely more useful. Figure 2.9 displays the quarterly time series of cUSt , e
US
t and h
US
t . Macro
sentiment appears not to have increased markedly in response to the house price index. Given
that residential property is a substantial portion of wealth for many consumers, the positive
effect of such an increase does not seem to filter through to the sentiment measure. Thus, it may
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be that equity markets have a psychologically greater effect on future expected wealth than an
appreciation of property.
Figure 2.9: Quarterly data pertaining to equity, house prices and consumer sentiment given by eUSt (left
axis), hUSt and c
US
t (right axis), respectively.
All quarterly gaps are shown in Figure 2.10. Up until the early 1980s, eUSg,t and c
US
g,t seem to
move in lock-step. Thereafter, the gaps are divergent until the early 2000s. Empirical results
have suggested that contemporaneous aggregate equity market returns and changes in sentiment
are positively correlated and statistically significant. However, different time periods suggest
different factors possibly taking precedence. Macro sentiment appears to reflect different factors
at different times, contingent upon macroeconomic conditions. With respect to the 1988 crisis,
cUSg,t declined from 1986Q2, becoming negative in 1985Q1; a minimum of –10% in 1987Q4 is
recorded. In the second crisis, the cUSg,t < 0 in the second half of 2005, and in the second and
third quarter of 2006.
Examining the gaps over the period, the following notable correlations arise: eUSg,t and c
US
g,t are
positively correlated (0.52), pUSg,t is negatively correlated to c
US
g,t (–0.36) and e
US
g,t and h
US
g,t are
positively correlated (0.30). These correlations are significant and reflect that excess credit tends
to be negatively related to macro sentiment within the economy. Granger causality in Table 5.2
indicates two-way causality between eUSg,t and c
US
g,t , the significance from equity to sentiment
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Figure 2.10: All time series data gaps for US quarterly data are displayed over the entire period.
is slightly greater. It is also the case that cUSg,t Granger-causes p
US
g,t which implies that macro
sentiment affects private credit. This is an additional affirmation of the impact of sentiment on
consumption behaviour. Granger causality runs from hUSg,t to c
US
g,t but not in the reverse direction.
eUSg,t Granger-causes both p
US
g,t , and to a lesser extent h
US
g,t . Thus, sentiment appears to be a useful
leading indicator in the EWS in this instance.
2.4.3 UK Crisis Prediction
According to Laeven & Valencia (2008), the UK suffered a systemic banking crisis in 2007.
Northern Rock received a liquidity support facility on 14 September 2007 from the Bank of
England due to difficulties associated with the subprime mortgage crisis. The bank experienced
a run until a government bank guarantee was issued three days later. According to the updated
version of Caprio & Klingebiel (1999), a secondary banking crisis occurred during 1974–1976,
another in the 1980s and then in the 1990s. Notable bank failures included Johnson Matthey
(1984), Bank of Credit and Commerce International (1991), and Barings (1995). Annual data
can be seen in Figure 2.11: real credit growth reached a maximum of 83.9% in 1983. This was
next followed by 18.3% in 1988. The pUKt and p
UK
T had been increasing steadily since the early
1990s. pUKg,t peaked at 29% in 2008, followed by 28% in 1986 and 23% in 1989.
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Figure 2.11: Annual ratio of private credit to GDP and trend (left axis), real credit growth and the credit
gap (right axis) for the UK over the period.
Figure 2.12 shows the pUKg,t , e
UK
g,t and h
UK
g,t gaps. Prior to 2007, p
UK
g,t and h
UK
g,t were both elevated.
The eUKg,t was minimal and would not have been an indicator for this crisis. e
UK
g,t tends to peak
before hUKg,t . In 2004, the h
UK
g,t measured 34% which subsequently dropped to 25% in 2005. e
UK
g,t
peaked at 24% in 1999. pUKg,t reach a 15% in 2007 followed by 29% in 2008. The only other
comparable year was 1986 when it reached 28%. From the gaps in Table 2.8, one can see that
pUKg,t was not as large as was for the case in the US. h
UK
g,t and the p
UK
g,t are both useful indicators
in this instance. Once again, even though the annual returns are positive, the eUKg,t is ineffective.
Given the fact that the crisis was a result of asset price inflation which pertained to property,
this is not unexpected. The results for quarterly data which include macro sentiment are in the
Appendix in Table 5.2.
Table 2.8: Indicator gaps and nominal annual equity returns Rt five years prior to and during the year
of the crisis within the UK.
Year pUKg,t e
UK
g,t h
UK
g,t Rt
2003 –1% –34% 33% –17%
2004 2% –23% 34% 9%
2005 6% –17% 25% 18%
2006 10% –5% 19% 13%
2007 18% 2% 15% 2%
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Figure 2.12: The UK annual credit, real equity and real HPI gap from 1974 to 2008.
Increasing the frequency to quarterly, the data yield a slightly different result to that seen in the
case of the US. The difference in construction between the CSUS and CSUK requires the latter to
be adjusted by adding 100 to shift the series on the y-axis to ensure positivity for the application
of the HP filter. pUKg,t is far in excess of the 4% suggested in BL. h
UK
g,t peaked at 18% in 2003,
and declined thereafter. eUKg,t was at a maximum of 19% in 2006, half of the suggested 40% for
the asset gap. Figure 2.13 shows quarterly gaps for all series. One can see there are certain gaps
that appear to move synchronously; taking this one step further, the positive correlation between
hUKg,t and p
UK
g,t is 0.43 for this period, e
UK
g,t and c
UK
g,t are also positively correlated (0.41). p
UK
g,t and
cUKg,t are negatively correlated (–0.26). Granger causality using two lags indicated that there is
two-way causality between hUKg,t and the adjusted c
UK
g,t (both p-values were less than 1%). Thus,
this is a simple illustration of the interaction between these gaps that may be instrumental for
future developments within the macroeconomy and sentiment.
2.5 Conclusion and Practical Applications
The contribution of this chapter has been to merge macro sentiment, defined as consumer sen-
timent, with other significant macro data releases as a means to forecast financial instability.
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Figure 2.13: UK quarterly gaps for all series between January 1974 and December 2008.
An additional contribution is the use of the inflation-adjusted Case-Shiller HPI for the US, and
Nationwide HPI for the UK, as a reflection of the residential property market for the respective
countries. Previous research has focussed solely of data-driven time series. This chapter has
extended an existing EWS by including an additional unexamined variable. Additionally, the
contagion effects which have not been addressed within the framework, may be considered given
the contribution based on sentiment contagion via bilateral trade relations, as discussed in §2.2.3.
Central to this research is the relevance of macro sentiment as a leading indicator pertaining to
systemic crises. Quarterly data for the US and UK has been incorporated into the BL EWS
to yield results to affirm the hypothesis. In addition to this, the research has shown bilateral
relationships between macro sentiment and trade. In section 2.2.3, it has been established that
US sentiment Granger-causes UK sentiment. This is extended by considering strength of trade
– both total and bilateral. Results confirm that trade-related variables Granger-cause macro
sentiment. The strength of the bilateral trade relationship appears to increase over time from the
US to the UK. That is, the US is a dominant factor and has influence on the UK beyond that
of a financial nature. Two-way Granger causality was shown to exist in the UK between macro
sentiment and total trade strength. This was not the case for the US.
The BL framework is a non-parametric signal extraction method which monitors the buildup of
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imbalances within an economy. It is an intuitive approach which establishes the relative stability
of a given economy to predetermined threshold values. The quarterly data frequency limits the
suitability to systemic crises, and hence it will likely not be able to forecast contagion which
may arise from bank runs. The framework also fails to account for linkages between countries
which are of consequence. Empirically, the application of the HP filter is slightly controversial as
the annual and quarterly results tend to differ substantially when examining credit, equity and
property variables.
Considering sentiment data, the HP filter accounts for the buildup of an imbalance in sentiment;
although it has been shown that sentiment in both the US and the UK represents information
contained in other economic variables, there is an unexplained component which may be at-
tributed to emotions based on other factors. Quarterly results confirm that the macro sentiment
gaps, which are deviations from what may be perceived as ‘rational’ sentiment, may assist in the
early detection of financial instability. Excess pessimism in the quarters (between one and three
years) leading up to identified banking crises indicate that instability can be more thoroughly
gauged by examining deviations of sentiment from trend.
Extending these findings, the time series of quarterly indicator gaps for the US and UK are ex-
amined. The real equity and macro sentiment gaps are positively correlated thereby validating
the results considering the positive contemporaneous relationship between aggregate market re-
turns and sentiment. The credit gap and sentiment gaps are negatively correlated; in the case
of the US, sentiment Granger-causes the credit and equity indicator gaps. In the UK, sentiment
significance is limited to two-way causality with reference to the house price gap.
There are limitations to results pertaining to the EWS. The sample size of both countries and
crises identified imply one cannot assert that these results will hold out of sample. In addition
to this, limited macro sentiment data are available to allow for this extension to other developed
countries or emerging markets. In the latter instance, the relevance of macro sentiment may be
less plausible as crises may be a result of spillover effects from other countries within the region or
possibly from currency markets due to shifts in risk appetite. This will be explored in Chapter 4
as a Theory of Sentiment Propagation is proposed. Given the sentiment–trade relationships in
section 2.2.3, one possible channel through which macro sentiment may diffuse between countries
is trade links. Financial markets are a more immediate manifestation of sentiment as capital
flows are the means by which asset allocation is achieved to adjust for shifts in risk appetite.
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Laeven & Valencia (2008) cite international capital mobility as a cause of international banking
crises. Financial liberalisation also tends to increase the conditional probability of banking crises;
this tends to be followed by increased capital flows.
This chapter has depicted the contribution of consumer sentiment to the determination of finan-
cial instability. Thus in practice, the general signalling approach may be extended to incorporate
macro sentiment. Survey-based sentiment has been shown to forecast consumers’ perceptions of
future economic activity. The use thereof within the EWS has consistently shown to exhibit pes-
simism prior to the identified periods of financial instability. In practice, this information should
be incorporated to more accurately identify future episodes of financial instability. Additionally,
the contagion effects that arise between countries may be captured by the causality of sentiment,
as observed in §2.2.3. Given that financial market integration has often been associated with
spillover effects, those bilateral trade relations which form a significant part of a country’s GDP
have been shown to affect sentiment of the countries involved. Therefore, examining financial
instability of a country in isolation may be flawed. Macro sentiment appears to reflect contagion
effects between countries, based on trade. The effect of high-frequency fund flows to such insta-
bility shall be discussed in chapter 4. The information content therein, is too highly relevant to
contagion.
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Chapter 3
Institutional Investor Sentiment: The
Options
3.1 Introduction
Investor sentiment should necessarily refer to the active participants within financial markets. The
title ‘consumer sentiment’ renders macro sentiment ill-suited to capture investors’ perceptions of
current and expected aggregate market movements. However, congruous opinions are expected
when examined at the same granularity given the relationship between the aggregate equity
market, the macroeconomy and macro sentiment. The exact definition of sentiment is contextual
as the notion on its own is vague. The applicability in all instances is subject to the select
group of investors. Extensive ongoing analysis with respect to the aggregate market and popular
culture have both contributed to the endurance of a select few measures. This will be addressed
in section 3.2. Behavioural models hypothesise that sentiment can be gauged as a correction
to under- or over-reaction of noise traders’ aggregate errors in beliefs, and therefore empiricists
seek out a contrarian relationship between returns and the identified sentiment measure over
varying time horizons ?. Controversy often arises in the instance of returns predictability. Short-
run predictability would lead to trading strategies that may generate abnormal returns, and is
therefore an unlikely scenario assuming there are limits to arbitrage. The lack of predictability in
the near-term, however, does not imply that sentiment is ineffectual. Sentiment may drive asset
prices away from intrinsic value for extended periods of time, which is likely to be evident in
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the correction. Additionally, but not to be discussed here, sentiment effects are predicted in the
cross-section of stocks. This research is primarily concerned with the measurement of sentiment,
both direct and indirect, which pertains to institutional investors within the US equity markets.
Derivative securities provide a rich source of information to gauge market sentiment (Bahra 1997).
Academic researchers and central banks have used implied risk-neutral distributions to discern
market expectations pertaining to the distribution of the underlying at the relevant maturity.
Option prices capture forward-looking risk-neutral probabilities of the underlying and thereby
provide an ex ante measure of investors’ beliefs (Alonso, Blanco & Rubio 2006). Shefrin (1999)
argues that options markets are particularly vulnerable to investor sentiment which leads to
inefficiencies. As the strength of bullish sentiment is equivalent to that of the bearish sentiment,
bulls overbid prices of index call options whilst the bears overbid the prices of index put options. 1
This then leads to the observed implied volatility smile. Derivatives are used for both risk
management as well as speculation due to the advantage of leverage. The high potential returns
and limited liability, as well as the frictions associated with hedging by liquidity suppliers, suggest
that investor sentiment influences trading and, consequently, prices of options on both large and
small stocks. Index options are deemed particularly susceptible to the sentiment of institutional
investor whereas retail investor sentiment is manifest in single stock options.
Since there is a rich cross-section of options traded on the same underlying index for numerous
maturities, sentiment-driven mispricing in option prices may be identified. Bullish investors tend
to take long positions in index calls, while bearish investors take long positions in index puts (in
general stock options). In contrast, they may partially cancel each other in the stock market. It
is easy to create and destroy contracts in the option market while the supply of stock is fixed (at
least in the short run). Thus, option markets can provide a clearer picture of different groups
of investors’ absolute sentiment while the stock market reflects investors’ relative demand. The
no-arbitrage relation between stock and options, and the extensive literature on rational option
pricing models provide a benchmark for the fair value of options. In the stock market, the fair
value is more subjective and harder to accurately determine (Han 2007).
European options of a particular maturity and range of strikes can be used to calculate the
implied risk-neutral probability distribution. The difference in price between two call options
1Shefrin mentions the argument proposed by Fama (1997) stating that investors’ under-reaction and over-
reaction is cancelled out, resulting in efficient markets.
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of the same maturity written on the same underlying, which have adjacent strikes, reflects the
value attached to the ability to exercise the options when the underlying asset lies between their
strikes. This depends on the probability of the asset ending up in this interval at maturity. Thus
prices of these options are related to weights attached by the representative risk-neutral investor
to the possible outcome for the terminal value of the asset. A suitable combination of European
call options can then be used to infer Arrow–Debreu (state-contingent) prices.
The idea of risk-neutrality is pervasive in finance literature. It forms the basis of the pricing
argument behind the indifference between an option and the hedge portfolio (delta units of the
underlying and the risk-free asset). Investors are risk-neutral if they are indifferent to risk. Risk-
neutrality is tantamount to an expected return on all assets of the risk-free rate of interest. Thus,
investors require no risk premium for their investments. An investor is risk-neutral if he/she has
a linear utility function. The risk-neutral distribution of an underlying asset is equal to the
market’s beliefs regarding the distribution of the asset’s return, adjusted for risk aversion. It
is determined by the investor’s subjective probability density of the underlying asset’s future
returns and the investor’s risk preferences.
The slope of the implied volatility function for index options has been related to the survey-based
measure of institutional investor sentiment (Han 2007, Lemmon & Ni 2008). If sentiment about
the stock market shifts to bearish or less optimistic regarding future equity performance, a greater
demand for portfolio insurance and equivalently, out-the-money index put options, should follow.
Bollen & Whaley (2004) show that demand pressure in option markets affects prices, thus a
more bearish sentiment may lead to more expensive out-the-money index puts, evidenced in the
steeper implied volatility smile. This also implies that the index risk-neutral skewness decreases
which is tantamount to a decrease in the slope of the pricing kernel. This is further explained in
section 3.2.2.
Gemmill & Saflekos (2000) investigate the usefulness of the risk-neutral distribution of FTSE-
100 index options over the period 1987–1997 for forecasting, hedging purposes or to determine
the current sentiment of investors. They find that it may reveal market sentiment which could
be useful for the policy stance of monetary authorities or contrarian investors. Their analysis
indicated that the distribution reflected market sentiment during elections. Generally, the implied
distribution is left-skewed and its shape changes frequently. The authors conclude that a plausible
explanation is portfolio-insuring behaviour which reflects both recent moves in the stock market,
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and investor preferences.
This research seeks to affirm the use of sentiment-related measures derived from the aggregate
equity market index option-implied returns distribution. The assumption is that the beliefs of
institutional investors can be gauged by both the risk-neutral probabilities, and third moment
(skew) associated with the index returns distribution at the relevant maturity. The cumulative
probability measure at time t, associated with the index ending at or below the at-the-money fu-
tures level for some maturity T , denoted pRNDt,T is to be examined. That is, p
RND
t,T = P[ST ≤ Ft,T ]
is constructed, where ST refers to the index at maturity date T and Ft,T is the current time
t futures level for maturity date T . Additionally, the implied skew denoted η3t,T , based on the
fully non-parametric method applied to extract the RND, will be examined. Here, T refers to
a 30-day period and therefore necessitates interpolation using appropriate maturity options; the
S&P 500 index reflects the aggregate equity market. The implied risk-neutral distribution is
inferred from the associated European index options (SPX) using a fully non-parametric method
(Bondarenko 2003). This is briefly discussed in section 3.3.3. This method gives rise to a prob-
ability distribution of the underlying index for a given maturity; once converted to a returns
distribution, the skew which is termed the ‘third robust moment’, can be calculated. Further
details are in section 3.4.
In order to assess performance, weekly regressions are performed using these measures as well
as that of institutional investor sentiment (bull–bear spread); daily data using other related
measures are also examined: The CBOE Volatility Index, a modified version of the CBOE put–
call option volume ratio, the model-free option-implied skew of Bakshi et al. (2003) (BKM) and
the smirk of Xing, Zhang & Zhao (2008). These are introduced in section 3.2.2. The relationship
to the underling index is also discussed when appropriate. The proposition is such that the
daily probability measure pRNDt,T is the true reflection of institutional investors sentiment. The
frequency deems the use thereof more current than the analogous survey measure. It is necessarily
dependent on the numerical method applied to index option prices; however, the method applied
here is superior to other methods, as discussed by Bondarenko (2003).
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses investor sentiment measures with an
emphasis on those which are of relevance here; section 3.3 is a concise yet pertinent exploration
of risk-neutral option pricing. The means to extract the distribution is introduced followed by
an explanation of those methods employed to calculate η3t,T , the BKM skew, and the smirk.
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The empirical analysis follows in section 3.5: data used are detailed in section 3.5.1, the process
applied to ‘clean’ the index options follows in section 3.5.2. This is then followed by daily and
weekly results. For each variable included in the analysis, section 3.6 provides an interpretation
of the relationships that are shown to exist. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Investor Sentiment
Financial market (investor) sentiment is either a direct survey-based measure, or an indirect
quantification of trade-related data which aggregates the collective behaviour of those partici-
pants. These measures often pertain to either retail or institutional investors and are available
at varying frequencies. Indices derived from surveys of both investor groups are usually available
weekly; financial market data are available at much higher frequencies and therefore, likely more
relevant. The monthly macro sentiment index is lagged with respect to financial markets and is
therefore inappropriate to gauge current investor sentiment. Having explored the link between
aggregate equity markets and macro sentiment, it appears that the sentiment index is a mo-
mentum variable and the stock market is a leading indicator. However, further investigation in
Schmeling (2009) finds that macro sentiment does in fact forecast aggregate market returns in
the long run: consumer sentiment is a contrarian indicator. Results in general are subject to the
empirical method employed and the samples used. Given that the mispricings which arise due to
sentiment are persistent in the instance that limits to arbitrage do exist, a longer unknown hori-
zon may be required to observe the corrections. The indirect measures can be further separated
into stock- and option-derived measures.
Sentiment-related research can be classified as one of four strands: the first examines a contender
variable (or a composite index) with justification, and makes a comparison to other widely ac-
cepted measures, thereby seeking affirmation of its validity and possible superiority. The second
strand of the literature examines the time series relationship of the selected indicator variable
to the aggregate market. The third strand combines the first two. The final strand examines
sentiment effects in the cross-section and attempts to find a stock’s sensitivity to sentiment, ac-
cording to the measure employed. This research is primarily concerned with the first strand, and
therefore reference to the effect of sentiment as a means to forecast returns in the aggregate or
cross-section will not be discussed in detail.
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Consumer sentiment is often the reference sentiment measure with which to determine the relative
performance of an identified sentiment variable, insofar as the latter can be sensibly interpreted
with respect to the sentiment of the investor group. The following section reviews a few notable
direct investor sentiment measures. This research is primarily concerned with institutional in-
vestor sentiment, and therefore the emphasis will be placed on related measures. Institutional
investor sentiment is tantamount to portfolio insurance. The direct survey-based measure to be
used in the empirical section will be the Investors Intelligence weekly measure. In the instance of
the indirect measures, option-related measures will be reviewed; other measures are listed briefly.
3.2.1 Surveys Index Measures
Survey-based sentiment indicators include, but are not limited to, the Gallup Index of Investor
Optimism, the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) Sentiment Survey and the
Investors Intelligence (II) Survey published by Chartcraft. The AAII survey is a direct measure
of retail investor sentiment and the II is corresponding measure for institutional investors. The
latter is of particular relevance to the research given the reference investor group.
American Association of Individual Investors Survey
The AAII polls a random sample of its members each week. 2 The association asks each partici-
pant where they think the stock market will be in six months: up, down or the same. AAII then
labels these responses as bullish, bearish or neutral, respectively. The weekly survey started in
1987 conducted by postal service; it has been replaced with an online version since 2000. Results
are available on the AAII website and are also published in Barron’s. Thorp (2004) shows that
the survey is best used as a contrarian measure as peaks often precede market declines (S&P 500
index). Providing event-specific instances, AAII conclude that ‘Indicators such as this are best
used in tandem with others so that you receive confirming signals of potential market movements.’
In support of this, Fisher & Statman (2000) examine sentiment pertaining to large (Wall Street
strategists), medium (II survey) and small (AAII survey) groups of investors. They find that
individual investors become bullish following the increased bullishness of newsletter writers; this is
not completely synchronous. Monthly data suggests the level of sentiment of individual investors
2http://www.aaii.com/
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is a reliable contrarian indicator of future S&P 500 returns; there is a negative and statistically
significant relationship between the sentiment level of individual investors and S&P 500 returns
in the following month.
Investors Intelligence Survey
The II is a survey based on 150 newsletters (those not affiliated with brokerage houses or mutual
funds) which are classified as bullish, bearish or waiting for correction. The survey was published
monthly from 1963, and then bi-weekly through to June 1969. Thereafter, it shifted to a weekly
schedule. 3
Literature which seeks to use the II survey measure is mixed. Earlier research includes that of
Solt & Statman (1988) and Clarke & Statman (1998). Their results suggest that the II survey,
although considered a contrarian indicator, cannot be used to forecast aggregate market returns.
They find no statistically significant relationship between sentiment and subsequent returns of
the S&P 500. Further, they examined the effect of increased volatility on the index, examining
whether heightened uncertainty result in increased bearishness. Over a four-week period, they
find a positive statistically insignificant relationship between volatility and bullishness: positive
total returns over a period along with high daily volatility of returns within that rendered subjects
slightly less bullish than the same positive total returns with low volatility. Hence, volatility did
not lead newsletter writers into bearishness. Instead, it obscures both positive and negative
returns. Newsletter writers did not alter their ways of forecasting post the 1987 crash; they did
not see declines in stock prices as buying opportunities either before or after the market crash.
Fisher & Statman (2000) find no clear relationship between large-cap stock returns and the level
of sentiment of newsletter writers.
Lee, Jiang & Indro (2002) examine the relationship between market volatility, excess returns,
and investor sentiment for three different market indices, the (DJIA) (Dow Jones Industrial
Average), 4 the S&P 500 Index and the NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation), from the beginning of 1973 through 6 October 1995. They use the II
sentiment index as a direct measure of investor sentiment. Their main findings suggest that
sentiment is a significant factor in explaining equity excess returns and conditional volatility.
3http://www.investorsintelligence.com/x/advisors_sentiment.html
4The DJIA is a price-weighted average of 30 large blue-chip stocks.
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Their results consistently show that sentiment is a risk factor that is priced in. Excess returns are
contemporaneously positively correlated with shifts in sentiment. Furthermore, the magnitude
of the shift in sentiment has a significant impact on the formation of conditional volatility of
returns and expected returns. Bullish (bearish) shifts in sentiment lead to downward (upward)
revisions in the volatility of returns and are associated with higher (lower) future excess returns.
The significance of investor sentiment in explaining the formation of conditional volatility and
expected return is robust across different indices and subperiods.
Brown & Cliff (2005) relate sentiment levels to stock price deviations from fundamental value
and examine the long-run effects of sentiment on stock returns. 5 Brown and Cliff use monthly II
survey data from January 1963 to December 2000 and the returns pertain to the Fama–French
portfolios based on common factors, defining the bull–bear spread as the percentage of bullish
minus bearish newsletter writers. They relate the level of sentiment to market mispricing as
estimated by the Dow Jones Industrial Average pricing errors (Bakshi & Chen 2005).
Brown and Cliff assume that a subset of investors, speculators, are subject to extreme optimism
(or pessimism) and adjust their asset valuations accordingly. The alternative group, the funda-
mentalists, are unbiased in their assessment. Market prices are therefore a weighted average of
these groups with weights reflecting the share of ownership of the respective groups. Limits to
arbitrage hinder the exploitation of perceived asset mispricing. Thus market prices may differ
from intrinsic value for protracted periods of time. Excessive optimism leads to the overvaluation
of assets. Therefore, the reversion to intrinsic values over the long run implies low or negative
returns.
Sentiment is persistent, suggesting that bouts of optimism or pessimism reinforce themselves.
It is also strongly correlated with contemporaneous market returns and not useful in predicting
subsequent near-term returns. 6
Brown and Cliff’s results indicate that for larger firms or low book/market firms, sentiment is
a significant predictor of future returns at the one-, two-, and three-year horizon. Since these
5Solt & Statman (1988),Clarke & Statman (1998),Fisher & Statman (2000),Brown & Cliff (2004) use survey
data but focus on the short-run implications.
6To control for rational expectations, Brown and Cliff use the following variables: the stochastically detrended
one-month US Treasury bill return, the difference in monthly returns on three-month and one-month T-bills, the
term spread as measured by the spread in yields on the 10-year US Treasury bond and the three-month T-bill, the
default spread measured as the difference in yields on Baa and Aaa corporate bonds, the dividend yield for the
value-weighted CRSP index over the past 12 months and the rate of inflation.
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portfolios represent most of the market capitalisation, the market portfolio is also significantly
affected by sentiment (significant at the 5% level for one and two years and at the 1% level for
three years). Their results are consistent with behavioural models that suggest prices under-react
in the short run and over-react in the long run.
Wang, Keswani & Taylor (2006) examine the relationship between returns, volatility and sen-
timent. The noise trader approach to finance implies that sentiment affects returns. Evidence
suggests that returns in fact affect sentiment. Therefore, they propose that volatility possibly
affects sentiment too. Their weekly analysis includes the survey measures of AAII and II, as well
as other option-related sentiment variables. Analysing both levels and first differences, results
indicate that sentiment is caused by returns and also by realised volatility.
The II survey measure is often a reference measure for the performance of other indirect market
sentiment measures. It appears that the individual survey results of AAII tend to lag those
of the II, and therefore the survey respondents of II may either be more informed at a given
time or have the ability to influence the opinions of retail investors. The surveys appear to be
lagged momentum variables and are both considered contrarian. The II bull–bear spread is the
survey-based measure used to represent institutional investor sentiment in section 3.5.4.
3.2.2 Market Measures of Investor Sentiment
These measures for both investor groups are derived from either market performance data, which
are in fact technical indicators, or derivative market data. Market performance indicators include
the ARMS index, 7 the number of new highs to new lows, the ratio of odd-lot sales to purchases,
the percentage change in margin borrowing and the percentage change in short interest (Brown
& Cliff 2004). Mutual fund flows are also an oft-cited measure that will be discussed extensively
in the following chapter. Derivative market indicators include, but are not limited to, the CBOE
put–call trading volume ratio, the CBOE Volatility Index, and the risk-neutral option-implied
skew.
Some research aggregates a selection of such variables to form an index based on the first prin-
cipal component. Composite measures include the sentiment index constructed by Baker &
Wurgler (2006): the index is based on sentiment proxies that have been orthogonalised to several
7This measure is the ratio of the number of advances to declines standardised by their respective volumes.
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macroeconomic variables which are visibly aligned to historical accounts of bubbles and crashes.
Included are: the closed-end fund discount (Lee, Shleifer & Thaler 1990), the NYSE turnover,
equity share in new issues, and number and average first-day returns of IPOs and the dividend
premium.
Sentiment literature that examines one or more of the above measures is voluminous. However,
few examine the merits of information to be gleaned from the associated risk-neutral distribu-
tion. This research is primarily concerned with institutional investor sentiment, and therefore
the review is limited accordingly. Given that index options are a manifestation of the associated
sentiment group, it follows that these instruments are non-redundant with respect to replica-
tion, and consequently sentiment. This research seeks to substantiate the use of option-implied
measures, and therefore those identified sentiment measures will be reviewed below.
Put–Call Ratio
The daily ratio of the CBOE trading of equity puts to calls (PCR) is considered as a bearish
indicator (Brown & Cliff 2004). The CBOE divides the sum of all call options, and the sum of all
put options, that are traded each day on all individual equities as well as on various indices. A
high ratio implies that the market has reached an oversold extreme and a turn might be at hand.
To the contrary, a low ratio indicates that the market has reached an overbought condition and
a price correction is expected. Market participants view the PCR as a fear indicator, with higher
levels reflecting bearish sentiment. According to Bandopadhyaya & Jones (2006), a level of 0.8
is considered normal as calls are traded more frequently than puts. Accordingly, a relatively low
level of the PCR is associated with a lower demand for puts or a greater demand for calls, which
would reflect bullish sentiment (Simon & Wiggins III 2001).
In section 3.5, the PCR is derived using daily data exclusively from S&P 500 index options and
therefore, the above analysis is an illustration of the validity of this measure.
CBOE Volatility Index
The Market Volatility Index (VIX) is a forward measure of expected volatility of the S&P 500
index and is often referenced as the ‘investor fear gauge’ (Chicago Board Options Exchange
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2009). 8 The VIX is implied by the current prices of S&P 500 index options and represents
expected future market volatility over the next 30 calendar days and is available on a real-time
basis. The VIX was intended to provide an index upon which futures and options contracts on
volatility could be written. The CBOE launched trading of VIX futures contracts in May 2004 and
VIX option contracts in February 2006. The SPX option market became the most active index
option market in the US, with the index option market being dominated by portfolio insurers
who routinely buy OTM (out-the-money) and ATM (at-the-money) index puts for insurance
purposes, and therefore the VIX is referenced as the price of portfolio insurance.
Simon & Wiggins III (2001) investigate the predictive power of the VIX, the PCR and ARMS
index (TRIN) 9 for subsequent returns on the S&P 500 futures contract over 10-day, 20-day,
and 30-day horizons from January 1989 through June 1999. Their empirical results indicate
that these contrarian indicators have statistically and economically significant forecasting power.
Periods of extreme fear in the stock market have proven to be favourable buying opportunities.
In particular, they find that the VIX has a significant negative correlation with lagged S&P 500
returns, and when S&P 500 returns over the previous 10 days are in their lowest rather than
highest deciles. This finding is consistent with the leverage effect, in which large negative stock
market returns lead to higher subsequent volatility than equal magnitude positive stock market
returns. In contrast to this, the PCR does not have a significantly negative correlation with
lagged S&P returns or with the VIX and varies little across extremely strong and weak market
environments and extremely high and low levels of the VIX. Weakness in S&P 500 futures leads
to subsequent higher implied volatilities, more so than a greater trading volume in puts relative
to calls.
Simon and Wiggins find that the VIX rises after the market has sold off sharply, which induces
fear of further weakness. The greater level of fear causes market participants to bid up implied
8The generalised formula is given as
σ2V IX =
2
T
∑
i
∆Ki
K2i
erTQ(Ki)− 1
T
[
F
K0
− 1
]2
,
where V IX = 100×σV IX , T is time to expiry, F is the forward index level derived from index option prices, K0 is
the first strike below F , Ki is the strike price of ith out-of-the-money option. For a call, this implies Ki > K0, and
for a put, Ki < K0. ∆Ki refers to the average interval between strikes, r is the risk-free interest rate and Q(Ki)
is the midpoint of the bid–ask spread for each option with strike Ki.
9The TRIN index is calculated as
TRIN =
advancing issues/declining issues
advancing volume/declining volume
.
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volatilities. In this environment, investors raise cash, which creates the fuel for a subsequent
rally. A 1% point increase in the VIX is associated with a 0.2% increase in returns over the next
30 days. As the trading volume of puts rises relative to that of calls, subsequent returns of the
S&P 500 futures tend to be higher.
Giot (2005) assesses the relationship between implied volatility and future stock returns. Specifi-
cally, the author focuses on the contemporaneous relationship between relative changes in implied
volatility and stock market returns, as well as between implied volatility and future returns. In
agreement with Whaley (2008), there is a negative and statistically significant relationship be-
tween the returns of the stock and the VIX. The relationship is asymmetric for the S&P 100
index: 10 negative stock index returns are associated with greater proportional changes in im-
plied volatility measures than positive returns, the former being much stronger in a low-volatility
environment. Giot also finds weak evidence that positive (negative) forward-looking returns are
expected for long positions in the S&P 100 index, triggered by extremely high (low) levels of the
implied volatility index.
Whaley (2008) notes that the VIX spikes during periods of market turmoil: if expected market
volatility increases (decreases), investors demand higher (lower) rates of return on stocks, so stock
prices fall (rise). Thus the relation between rate of change in the VIX should be proportional to
the rate of return on the S&P 500 index. However, increased demand to buy index put options
affects the level of VIX. Hence, the change in the VIX rises at a higher absolute rate when the
stock market falls than when it rises.
The VIX is unequivocally an essential gauge of fear within financial markets. The fact that it is
derived from the deep and active index options written on a large market capitalisation-weighted
index renders it a prudent indication of institutional investor sentiment.
Risk-Neutral Skew
Han (2007) investigates whether investor sentiment (defined as the aggregate error in beliefs) af-
fects S&P 500 index option prices by examining risk-neutral skewness. Using sentiment measures
derived from survey data, market activity and valuation errors, the author relates the variation
in the slope of the index volatility smile to changes in market sentiment. Institutional sentiment
10The VIX was constructed using the S&P 100 index until 2003 after which the methodology was revised.
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measures include the II bull–bear spread, the net position of large speculators in S&P 500 futures
and valuation errors of the S&P 500 index. The paper focuses on the effect of investor senti-
ment on the options market. The empirical analysis examines the time series relation between
sentiment and the risk-neutral skewness of the implied distribution of the monthly index returns
from January 1988 to June 1997. Applying the method of Bakshi et al. (2003), a model-free
estimate of risk-neutral skewness is extracted on a given date from the cross-section of index
option prices. The risk-neutral skewness is determined by the slope of the pricing kernel. The
ratio of the risk-neutral probability density and the empirical probability density, discounted at
the risk-free rate, is referred to as the pricing kernel or stochastic discount factor. Equivalently,
the value of the pricing kernel at a given state is the corresponding Arrow–Debreu state price per
unit probability. The pricing kernel provides a unifying framework for all asset pricing theories.
Thus the study determines whether sentiment affects the slope of the pricing kernel.
Since bearish investors will pay more for state-contingent claims which provide a payoff when
the index level is low, the increased demand leads to a more negatively sloped pricing kernel. A
necessary condition for non-fundamental variables such as investor sentiment to affect the pricing
kernel is that there are limits to arbitrage in the financial markets: these limits exist due to
noise trader risk, trading frictions, a short investment horizon and limited capital on the part of
arbitrageurs. Han finds that the implied risk-neutral distribution for the index return is more
negatively skewed when market sentiment reverts to being more bearish; this can be seen in a
steepening of the option volatility smile of a particular maturity. The results hold after controlling
for a set of rational factors which may affect sentiment.
Bollen & Whaley (2004) have examined the effect of net buying pressure 11 on the shape of the
implied volatility function (IVF) for both index and stock options. Seeing that the volatility pa-
rameter in the Black–Scholes option pricing equation is a function of strike and time to maturity,
there have been various attempts to modify the underlying stochastic process to account for the
non-lognormal return distribution. However, Bollen and Whaley note that the IVF derived from
such procedures cannot account for the time series variation in option prices or equivalently, the
IVF. Therefore, they investigate investors’ supply and demand for different option series. 12 Due
to an upward sloping supply curve and limits to arbitrage, market makers charge higher prices
11The net buying pressure is defined as the difference between the number of buyer-motivated contracts traded
each day and the number of seller-motivated contracts. Trades executed above (below) the bid/ask midpoint are
considered buyer-motivated (seller-motivated).
12An option series is defined by the following three characteristics: call or put, strike and expiry.
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as hedging costs and/or volatility-risk exposure increases. Implied volatility varies according to
public demand for a particular option series. With reference to S&P 500 index (SPX) options,
institutional investors buy index puts as portfolio insurance. Since there are no natural counter-
parties, market makers absorb the imbalance. With an upward sloping supply curve, implied
volatility will exceed actual return volatility – the difference will be due to costs associated with
the hedging portfolio or risk exposure. Their overall results suggest that net buying pressure is
an important determinant of the shape of the IVF, particularly for SPX options where public
order imbalances are greatest. Therefore, prices of SPX options will fluctuate as demand and
supply varies.
Xing et al. (2008) (XZZ) examine the shape of the volatility smirk defined as the difference
between OTM put and the ATM call option-implied volatilities. In the cross-section, they find
that stocks which exhibit the steepest smirks underperform those stocks with the least pronounced
smirks, on a risk-adjusted basis using the Fama–French three-factor model (Fama & French 1996).
The predictability persists for up to six months hence. This is consistent with informed investors
that trade OTM puts as a means to incorporate bad news into prices. Due to the different
characteristics of the stock and options markets, information may be incorporated in one market
more promptly than the other. Hence, a lead–lag relationship may exist between asset markets.
Since options provide leverage, it may be the leading market.
Given that institutional investors trade index options as a means to insure against aggregate
market declines, the use of index option-implied skew as a measure of sentiment follows from
the supply–demand implied volatility curve relation as well as the effect of sentiment on option
prices. Therefore, the research examines the skew and the probability measure pRNDt , which will
be described in section 3.4, in relation to the bull–bear spread of the II survey, the VIX, the
PCR pertaining exclusively to the S&P 500 index options, and the smirk of XZZ. To proceed,
risk-neutrality is briefly discussed in section 3.3.1.
88
3.3 Index Option Theory
3.3.1 Risk-Neutrality
In the absence of arbitrage, the expected payoff of a contingent claim under the risk-neutral
measure is the risk-free rate of return. All physical probabilities are adjusted which translates
into pricing all derivatives under the risk-neutral or equivalent martingale measure. A market is
said to be complete if every claim in the market is attainable (can be replicated). Given complete
markets, in the absence of arbitrage, this measure is unique (Bingham & Kiesel 2004). 13
There are a number of practical issues when one considers risk-neutral valuation in continuous
time. Continuous rebalancing of the hedge is assumed: delta is constantly changing so one is
required to buy or sell the underlying to maintain a risk-free position. The underlying has to
be consistent with certain assumptions, such as being in Brownian motion without any jumps,
and with known volatility. Attempting to specify a stochastic process for the underlying which
is more a reflection of actuality than a requirement for mathematical elegance, often results in
an implied returns distribution which is non-lognormal.
The model assumptions are somewhat unrealistic and therefore the option pricing formula of
Black & Scholes (1973) is viewed more appropriately as a mapping from observed price to the
volatility parameter, or implied volatility. However, to price options which are path dependent,
a model for the underlying process is often necessary. Analogously, the theory also permits
the reverse process of observing the distribution for the underlying – that is, it allows for the
extraction of the implied returns distribution at some terminal date from observed European
option prices. Thus, for some maturity, all available implied volatilities of European options can
be used to infer the underlying distribution process.
Risk-neutral valuation exploits the perfect correlation between the changes in the value of an
option and its underlying asset. As long as the underlying is the only random factor, then this
13A contingent claim X is attainable if there exists a replicating strategy ψ  Ψ such that Vψ(T ) = X. In an
arbitrage free market, the price of a contingent claim is given by the value process of the replicating strategy. The
arbitrage price process of any attainable contingent claim X is given by the risk-neutral valuation formula
piX(t) = β(t)
−1EQ [Xβ(T )|Ft] ∀t = 0, 1, . . . , T,
where EQ is the expectation operator with respect to the equivalent martingale measure Q. Here, β(·) refers to
the risk-free asset.
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correlation should be perfect. Thus if an option goes up in value with a rise in the stock, then a
long option and sufficiently short stock position (delta) should not have any random fluctuations
as the stock hedges the option. The resulting portfolio is said to be risk-free. If one hedges
correctly in a Black–Scholes world, all risk is eliminated, and therefore no compensation for risk
is required. Thus under the martingale measure, assets appreciate at the risk-free rate.
3.3.2 The Risk-Neutral Distribution
Prices of traded options provide an ex ante source of information about the underlying price
process. There are usually quite an extensive number of option contracts for any underlying on
a given day available. The prices of those options encapsulate market sentiment regarding the
distribution of the underlying at the terminal date as well as investors’ risk preferences. Let St
denote the price of the underlying at time t (a trading date), and let Z(ST ) be a European-style
option payoff with maturity date T . In the absence of dividends, the European call Ct,T (K) and
put Pt,T (K) Black–Scholes option price Zt at time t, written on the underlying with asset price
St, are given as
Ct,T (K) = StΦ(d1)− e−rτ τKΦ(d2),
Pt,T (K) = e
−rτ τKΦ(−d2)− StΦ(−d1).
Here K is the strike and τ is the term to maturity and rτ is applicable interest rate over the
period. Φ(·) denotes the cumulative normal distribution and
d1 =
ln StK + (rτ +
1
2σ
2)τ
σ
√
τ
,
d2 = d1 − σ
√
τ .
Implicit in the option prices is the risk-neutral distribution (RND). In a dynamically complete
market, the RND can be recovered from a set of European option prices using the relationship
discovered by Ross (1976) and Breeden & Litzenberger (1978): The RND is proportional to the
second derivative of the call or put option with respect to strike. In the ideal situation in which
we have a continuum of option prices from zero to infinity, the RND could be uniquely and easily
determined. In a dynamically complete market with no arbitrage opportunities, the time t price
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of the option Zt can be found using risk-neutral valuation: the option price is expected present
value of the future payoff under the risk-neutral measure. Therefore
Zt =
1
Rt,T
EQt [Z(ST )]
=
1
Rt,T
∫ ∞
0
Z(ST )ft(ST )dST ,
where
Rt,T := e
∫ T
t rτdτ ,
and ft(ST ) = f(ST , T ;St, t) denotes the risk-neutral transition probability under the probability
measure Q. This can be thought of as the probability of attaining a level of ST at time T , given
St at time t. Here rt is the risk-free rate. Working with a forward price for simplicity, adjust
both St and Zt with the risk-free rate and the asset for dividends:
st :=
Rt,T
Dt,T
St,
zt := Rt,TZt,
where
Dt,T := e
∫ T
t δτdτ .
Thus, st and zt are the asset and option date-T forward prices and δt is the asset’s instantaneous
dividend yield at time t. In particular, forward prices for a European call ct(x) and put pt(x)
with strike x are given as
ct(x) =
∫ ∞
0
max(sT − x, 0)ft(sT )dsT ,
pt(x) =
∫ ∞
0
max(x− sT , 0)ft(sT )dsT
where sT = ST . Forward put–call parity is then
pt(x) + st = x+ ct(x).
The current prices have been adjusted by Dt,T . Differentiating ct(x) and pt(x) twice with respect
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to strike (evaluated at x = sT ) yields the key to using options as a means to obtain the RND:
ft(sT ) =
∂2ct(x)
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
x=sT
=
∂2pt(x)
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
x=sT
.
Puts are usually more liquid than calls thus all references to the above will use pt(x). In the
Black–Scholes model, the underlying is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution with constant
variance. In this instance, a closed-form solution for the RND permits the price of any option to
be easily computed. One requires a cross-section of options with common maturity T to estimate
the RND of the underlying.
3.3.3 Positive Convolution Approximation (PCA)
The fully non-parametric method of Bondarenko (2003) is applied to the cross-section of European
options to extract the probabilities (investors’ beliefs) associated with the underlying ending in
a particular interval at maturity; these values (y-axis) over the range of strikes (x-axis) gives rise
to the RND. A set of admissible densities is constructed from which the optimal density (one
that best fits option data) is selected. This set consists of all functions that can be represented
as the convolution of a fixed kernel and some arbitrary density function. The choice of the kernel
determines the ‘smoothness’ of the candidate densities.
The author justifies the use of nonparametric methods based on their flexibility, and reliance
on the data. There are no strong assumptions made regarding the underlying (data generating)
process. Alternative methods of this class are either implied tree methods (Derman & Kani
1994, Dupire 1994, Rubinstein 1994), or smoothing techniques. The latter rely on averaging
observational errors in sophisticated ways. These methods are not generally suitable for ill-
posed problems which may also involve noise or sparse data. This ultimately distorts genuine
features of the function. There is also a trade-off between smoothness and fit, as the violation
of arbitrage opportunities can lead to negative probabilities or the RND may not integrate to
unity. These issues do not arise with PCA. Examining the performance of both parametric and
non-parametric comparative estimators, the author shows that PCA outperforms the mixture of
three lognormals, which is designated in the experiment as the correct parametric model. The
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method ensures that the no-arbitrage constraints are adhered to since the mean is equated to the
asset’s forward price in the computational program; only available data are used to construct the
RND. This is therefore the choice of method applied based on the comparative performance.
Bondarenko (2000) applies the method to daily S&P 500 Index options (SPX) over the period
1991 to 1995 and finds that the implied RNDs exhibit negative skewness and excessive kurtosis
(based on the robust moments defined in section 3.4). These departures from lognormality become
more pronounced over time. The time series relation between the implied RND and the index
return is also documented. It is shown that the shape changes in a systematic way, depending
on whether the current index level is high or low: On trading days when the index declines, the
implied RND is more skewed and peaked. The second moment is also negatively correlated with
the index return. The interpretation is that investors’ subjective probability density and/or risk
preferences are time-varying and correlated with the index return. Thus, when the index declines,
investors become more pessimistic about future returns and more risk averse. This leads to a
RND with fatter tails. When the index performs well, investors become optimistic and the RND
is less skewed and closer to the historical density.
In order to calculate the RND for a given trading date, the function requires the following inputs:
• A vector of all OTM put option prices, Pt,T (Ki). Given the prevalence of these options,
forward put–call parity is applied to the ITM call options to infer OTM put option prices.
• A vector of the corresponding strikes, Ki.
• The ATM implied futures level, Ft,T .
• The ATM implied volatility, σATMt,T
• A range over which the RND probabilities are to be calculated. This ideally reflects the
range of strikes available.
The means to obtain all these input variables is described in section 3.5.2.
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3.4 Option-Implied Sentiment Measures
3.4.1 The At-the-Money Implied Cumulative Probability pRNDt,T
The RND which is inferred from European index options is given as the y-values of y = f(ST ),
a function which maps the asset price space at maturity T , ST to probabilities f(ST ) such that
the sum integrates to unity, as is required of a density function. The PCA applies the no-
arbitrage constraint to ensure ST = st. By evaluating the probability mass to the left of the
mean on a daily basis, one can see the shift in probability mass across the mean st; this is then
assumed to be tantamount to a shift in investor sentiment. Increased bullishness implies a greater
probability associated with the index exceeding the current ATM futures level. This is subject to
the empirical derivation of the RND. The specification is particularly sensitive to the parameter
choice required for the approximating grid of the x-axis (asset price at maturity). Regardless,
the T -day forward-looking cumulative probability pRNDt,T , where T = 30 in the empirical analysis,
is considered a bearish measure. As more mass accumulates to the left of the mean, investors’
demand for index put options tends to increase in line with their prices and associated implied
volatilities. A decrease in the implies skew is thereby expected. Specifically,
pRNDt,T =
i∗∑
i=1
f(xiT ),
xi
∗
T = st.
3.4.2 The Third Robust Moment η3t,T
This measure of the skew is unique to the method employed to extract the RND. The time series
relationship pertaining to contemporaneous and lagged daily index returns has been established:
Bondarenko (2000) finds the returns to be positively related to η3t,T , regardless of T . When the
index advances, η3t,T became less negative. Since the RND is determined by investors’ subjective
probability of the asset’s future returns as well as their risk preferences, investors’ beliefs as well
as attitude towards risk may vary in response to the recent index movement. Thus, decreases in
the index may induce a more bearish market and investors’ may become more risk averse in the
near future. This may in turn warrant enhanced portfolio insurance which leads to fatter left
tails of the RND. To the contrary, recent good performance may result in less risk aversion and
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a higher degree of optimism. Hence, η3t,T is expected to increase (less negative) and so too a shift
in mass to the right of the mean is expected.
Due to missing option data required for the tails of the distribution, to reliably estimate the
higher moments is subject to scepticism (variance, skewness, kurtosis). Thus, to overcome the
deficiency of data to construct the tails, Bondarenko proposes the ‘robust’ moments approach,
which is defined in terms of percentiles. The distribution for the underlying at maturity T , f(ST )
is converted into the associated returns distribution g(uT ) where uT = ln
ST
st
14 using the change of
variables method15. Since we have that ST = ste
uT , it then follows that g(uT ) = f(ST e
uT )ST e
uT .
Let Un denote the nth percentile of g(uT ). The percentile of the return distribution can be
found by finding the x-value which corresponds to the nth percentile of the cumulative density
function (CDF). Once g(uT ) has been found, the CDF is given by P[uT ≤ X] = Σi=ki=1g(uiT )duiT ,
where k represents the number of points on the approximating grid such that X = ln
SkT
st
and
duT =
d
dST
(
ln STst
)
dST =
dST
ST
. It can be shown that g(UT ) is in fact a probability density
function since
∫ ∞
−∞
g(uT )duT =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(ste
uT )ste
uT
dST
ST
=
∫ ∞
−∞
f(ST )dST
= 1.
Thus, U50 is the median of the return distribution. For the distributions which include U10 and
U90, the first four annualised robust moments are defined as follows:
η1t,T =
1
τ
(
U50 +
1
2
(
η2t,T
)2
τ
)
,
η2t,T =
1√
τ
U90 − U10
2.5631
,
η3t,T =
(U90 − U50)− (U50 − U10)
U90 − U10 ,
η4t,T = 0.4092−
U70 − U30
U90 − U10 . (3.1)
14At this point in the RND evaluation, the futures level Ft,T has calculated as explained in section 3.5.2 and
therefore, st = Ft,T here.
15The change of variables approach for a probability density function (pdf) fX is applied when it is required
to find the pdf of Y = h(X) such that fh(X) = fX . Since |fY (y)dy| = |fX(x)dx|, we then have that fY (y) =∣∣∣ dxdy ∣∣∣ fX(x) = ∣∣∣∣ 1h′(h−1(y))
∣∣∣∣ fX(h−1(y)).
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Here, τ = T−t365 . Bondarenko justifies the definitions above given that the log-return RND for
the Black–Scholes model is normal, g(u) = φσ
√
τ
(
u+ 12σ
2τ
)
, where φ(·) refers to the normal
density function and Φ(·) is the normal cumulative distribution function. The robust moments
for this distribution are all zero. In order to normalise η2t,T , the interdecile spread is divided by
Φ(90)− Φ(10) = 2.5631 and √τ to compare different maturities. The adjustment of 12
(
η2t,T
)2
τ
to η1t,T is applied as the Black–Scholes distribution g(u) is centred at
1
2σ
2τ , not zero. η3t,T takes
values in the range [−1, 1], and measures how the median of the distribution is located, relative to
the extreme deciles. The fourth moment measures the excess peakedness. The constant 0.4092
is selected to ensure that for a normal distribution, it equates to zero. The third and fourth
moments are relative measures and therefore, do not require annualisation. The author notes
that robust moments may be less useful than standard moments for extreme events, given that
we are using the 10th and 90th percentiles.
Bondarenko finds that as the index advances, the first, second and fourth moments decrease
whilst the third increases (became less negative). As the asset price declines, the investors may
become more pessimistic about future asset returns as well as more risk averse. Both effects
contribute to fatter left tails. After increases in the index, investors become more optimistic and
less risk averse. The resultant impact on pRNDt,T is unclear at first blush. If U50 − U10 increases
(U90 − U50 decreases), then η3t,T becomes more negative. The probability pRNDt,T = P[ST ≤ st],
where U10 < p
RND
t,T ≤ U50 may either increase or decrease. What may also occur is the narrowing
or widening of the RND. The denominator may alter, thereby increasing or decreasing this
moment. This will be established and explained in subsequent sections.
3.4.3 The BKM Model-Free Risk-Neutral Skew
In order to ensure that the time series properties of the robust moments are consistent, the risk-
neutral skewness measure of BKM will be used. This is a model-free measure which does not
require any assumptions regarding state variables or the functional form of the RND. Henceforth,
this measure will be identified by MFIS (model-free implied skewness). It is an ex ante measure
of the conditional skewness of the index return as it is inferred from option prices which account
for investors’ expectations of the future level of the index. Bakshi, Kapadia & Madan (2000)
demonstrate that any payoff function with bounded expectations can be spanned by a continuum
of OTM puts and calls. Thus, the prices of the payoffs can be expressed as a linear combination of
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such options. Skewness can be expressed as a function of the current prices of the quadratic, cubic
and quartic continuously compounded return of the underlying asset. Expressing these payoffs
as a linear combination of OTM options, the skewness can then be expressed as a function of
current observed option prices. As before, Rt,T = ln
(
ST
St
)
denote the continuously compounded
return of the asset at time T = t+ τ , then the payoffs under the risk-neutral measure at time t
can be expressed as
Vt,T ≡ EQt
[
e−rτR2t,T
]
,
Wt,T ≡ EQt
[
e−rτR3t,T
]
,
Xt,T ≡ EQt
[
e−rτR4t,T
]
.
Using only OTM European options with non-zero volume on those trading dates, the risk-neutral
skewness for trading date t of the RND of the index return over the period [t, T ] can be obtained
using the following:
MFISt,T =
erτWt,T − 3µ(t, τ)erτVt,T + 2µ3t,T[
erτVt,T − µ2t,T
]3/2 , (3.2)
µt,T = EQt
[
ln
(
ST
St
)]
≈ erτ − 1− e
rτ
2
Vt,T − e
rτ
6
Wt,T − e
rτ
24
Xt,T .
(3.3)
Here, Vt,T , Wt,T and Xt,T are weighted sums of OTM European call prices Ct,T (K) and put prices
Pt,T (K) with time to expiry T and strike K, given the current underlying index price St:
Vt,T =
∫ ∞
St
2
(
1− ln
(
K
St
))
K2
Ct,T (K)dK +
∫ St
0
2
(
1 + ln
(
K
St
))
K2
Pt,T (K)dK,
Wt,T =
∫ ∞
St
6 ln
(
K
St
)
− 3
[
ln
(
K
St
)]2
K2
Ct,T (K)dK −
∫ St
0
6 ln
(
K
St
)
+ 3
[
ln
(
K
St
)]2
K2
Pt,T (K)dK,
Xt,T =
∫ ∞
St
12
[
ln
(
K
St
)]2 − 4 [ln(KSt)]3
K2
Ct,T (K)dK
+
∫ St
0
12
[
ln
(
K
St
)]2
+ 4
[
ln
(
K
St
)]3
K2
Pt,T (K)dK.
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Dennis & Mayhew (2002) have used this method, applying a trapezoidal approximation to es-
timate the integrals. The two sources of bias may be derived from discreteness in strikes and
asymmetry in the domain of integration. Using simulated option prices from the Black–Scholes
model, they found the effects of this to be negligible. 16 The bias introduced from asymmetry was
found to be significant (in the range of ±0.1) but could be mitigated by using the largest range of
strikes available such that the domain of integration is symmetric. Over the period 1986 to 1996,
they found that the average skewness of the SPX options were more negative (–1.6) compared
with that of the individual stock options (–0.24).
Bakshi et al. (2003) examine data between 1991 and 1995 looking at both individual equity
options and that of the S&P 100 (OEX). They provide a theoretical characterisation that links
the risk-neutral skew to risk aversion. They find that the more negatively skewed the return
distribution, the steeper its volatility smile. However, the more fat-tailed the return distribution,
the less the smile is downward sloping. Thus, a higher kurtosis flattens the smile in the presence of
left tails. The differences in the skews of the risk-neutral and physical distributions are attributed
to risk aversion.
Hansis, Schlag & Vilkov (2010) have proposed applying a spline interpolation to implied volatili-
ties, prior to using the option prices. Specifically, since a continuum of option prices are required
to calculate the integrals, a cubic spline is used to interpolate implied volatilities within the
available moneyness range. Outside this range, implied volatilities are extrapolated using the
boundary values to fill 1001 grid points in the moneyness range from 1/3 to 3. Using the risk-free
interest rate, the option prices are then calculated based on the interpolated implied volatilities
for a given maturity. This is the method that will be used here as it has been shown to reduce the
bias considerably. Furthermore, the authors suggest the enhancement may invalidate previous
results which apply a trapezoidal method to the coarse grid of available option data.
3.4.4 The XZZ Smirk
There is a one-to-one mapping between skewness and the slope of the implied volatility smile/smirk.
Negatively sloped curves (higher volatilities are observed for OTM put options than in-the-money
(ITM) put options) correspond to negative skewness in the risk-neutral density function. Bakshi
16Skewness is zero in the Black–Scholes model. Using an interval of $5 and $2.5, they found the bias that was
introduced was roughly –0.07 and –0.05 respectively.
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et al. (2003) find a high correlation between their skewness measure and the slope of the implied
volatility curve. The last measure pertaining to the distribution that will be examined is the
volatility smirk of Xing et al. (2008). This is defined as
σsmirkt,T = σ
OTMp
t,T − σATMct,T ,
where σOTMpt,T refers to an OTM put options and σ
ATMc
t,T refers to an ATM call option at date t
for an option with maturity T . A put option is defined at being OTM when the ratio of strike
price to stock price lies in the range (0.8 0.95), and a call option is ATM when the ratio of strike
price to stock price lies in the range (0.95 1.05). The skew is averaged over a week in the authors’
research, however for purposes of a daily sentiment measure, we look at daily skew for the index.
In the instance that there are multiple options which satisfy this range, the final implied volatility
is a volume-weighted average over all relevant implied volatilities.
3.4.5 The Put–Call Option Volume Ratio
For each day the RND is extracted, the volume of index puts to index calls can be measured.
Analogously to the CBOE put–call ratio mentioned in section 3.2.2, the ratio here is define exclu-
sively for SPX options. The two measures PCRt,T and ModPCRt,T are defined with reference
to the volume of SPX call and put options for a specific maturity T , CVt,T and P
V
t,T :
PCRt,T =
∑
i P
V
t,T∑
j C
V
t,T
,
ModPCRt,T =
∑
i P
V
t,T1OTM∑
j C
V
t,T1OTM
.
The modification in the second instance is more stringent as the requirement is to limit each
sum to the OTM options as opposed to all options, thereby capturing extreme opinions. This
measure is expected to be greater than unity given that portfolio insurance is likely to tilt the
volume towards put options.
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3.5 Empirical Section
This section describes the data required to extract the RND and therefore, the calculate pRNDt,T ,
η3t,T , the BKM MFISt,T , σ
smirk
t,T , PCRt,T and ModPCRt,T . Henceforth, T refers to the 30-day
measure and the subscript will be dropped. This data are to be examined daily. Weekly results
incorporates the use of the II Survey: the bull–bear spread BBSt is the difference between bullish
and bearish investor sentiment of a given week. The RND is extracted in Matlab; regression
results are obtained using EViews.
3.5.1 Data
The following data are used for the period 3 January 2005 to 29 October 2010.
SPX Option Data
Daily SPX index option data are from Option Metrics, Wharton Research Data Services. As
mentioned in section 3.3.3, to calculate the RND on a given date, the function requires input
parameters: a vector of put option prices Pt, the corresponding vector of strikes Ki, the ATM
futures level st, σ
ATM
t and a vector to represent the grid over which the RND is to be estimated.
In order to calculate pRNDt , η
3
t , BKM MFISt, σ
smirk
t , PCRt and ModPCRt, the following are
required for each trading date t: maturity, strike price, index close, dividend yield, put–call
identifier, best bid, best offer, option volume, open interest, implied volatility and the delta of
the option. The data are processed according to the method outlined in Bondarenko (2003); in
the instance of the BKM MFISt, the data is adjusted according to Rehman & Vilkov (2010).
Further clarification is in section 3.5.2.
Risk-Free Rate
The daily zero coupon yield curve is obtained from Option Metrics, Wharton Research Data
Services. The appropriate risk-free rate for the option maturity is interpolated.
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VIX
The daily VIX is from CBOE Indices, Wharton Research Data Services.
Bull–Bear Spread BBSt
The weekly Advisors Sentiment bullish and bearish survey index over the period is from Thomson
Datastream. The data is released on Tuesdays. Key identifiers are USIIBUL (bullish sentiment)
and USIIBER (bearish sentiment).
3.5.2 Option Data Restrictions
Noisy data can pose an issue of over-fitted or irregular estimators for the second derivative. A
solution to this is to impose the estimator to be a ‘smooth’ function which reliably estimates
the data. This achieves better stability for the RND function. To ensure that the RND satisfies
the no-arbitrage conditions – a non-negative function which integrates to unity – many methods
modify the estimator. For any given maturity, there are usually more options traded below the
current spot level than above, implying that options contain more information about the left tail
than the right. OTM options are more liquid than ITM options and puts are more liquid than
calls. In practice, there are various limitations to this process:
• Very low and high strikes are usually unavailable, which then implies there is little infor-
mation known about the tails. Thus it is impossible to calculate higher moments of the
distribution.
• The problem of calculating the function’s second derivative is ill-posed as prices are ob-
served with noise (nonsynchronous/stale trading of options, price discreteness and bid–ask
bounce);
• Prices are observed for a discrete set of strikes ($5 apart for the near-term and $25 for the
longer-term SPX options).
Exchange rules dictate that new strikes are added to span the vicinity of the current price of the
underlying. Data are usually unavailable for the tails of the RND; this then means that it cannot
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be reliably estimated, even over the range of strikes. Thus, if xl and xh denote the lowest and
highest strikes available then the RND cannot contain much more information in the tails above
and below these strikes. Options with longer maturities usually have less available information
in the tails. Many methods assume that the entire range of strikes is available. The tails are
often assumed to be lognormal or require an extrapolation mechanism of sorts. The RND tails
become a result of the assumptions used to generate them and are not a feature of the underlying
data. The RND estimation over the available strikes may also be sensitive to the method chosen
to parametrise the tails.
When applying PCA, one of the inputs is a grid of x-values which represents the possible terminal
values for the underlying asset. The grid need not be equally spaced and is selected to span the
entire range of option strikes and ensure the CDF equates to unity. In the empirical results,
the lower bound is xl = Kl − 300, and upper bound xh = Kh + 100; Kl and Kh are the lowest
and highest available strikes respectively. A spacing of $5 is selected for both near-term and
longer-term maturities in line with the available strikes. When calculating η3t , the transformation
from linear space in the variable ST to the natural logarithm space of uT is required.
The following exclusion filters are applied to the data when calculating the RND to avoid any
micro-structure related bias:
• Eliminate options with zero trading volume and prices below 1/8 (this is the average of the
bid and ask);
• Eliminate options with extreme far-from-the-money strikes if they are separated from the
main group of strikes: The lowest and highest strikes are eliminated if the next closest
available strikes are 25 (40) points or more away for near-term (longer-term) maturity
groups. The near-term options correspond to the first three months, all options thereafter
are considered longer-term maturities.
• Eliminate all options with maturities of seven days or less.
The following steps are employed to clean the options to reduce the impact of real-world imper-
fections due to nonsynchronous trading, bid–ask bounce and discreteness of option prices:
• The RND is estimated using put options as they are more liquid than calls. To exploit
the more liquid OTM options, forward put option prices p¯t(K) (notation refers to the
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price being inferred) are inferred from the forward OTM calls using the put–call parity
relationship, for each strike Ki:
p¯t(Ki) := K + ct(Ki)− st.
Forward option prices are calculated by multiplying the option price by erτ τ where rτ refers
to the risk-free rate calculated from Treasury bills which is applicable over the period τ ,
and τ = (T−t)365 . This reduces the issue of nonsynchronous trading. Thinly traded ITM
puts (which are rarely traded and have higher bid–ask spreads and are more susceptible to
changes in the underlying asset since delta is close to 1) are replaced using the more liquid
OTM call options. The ATM futures level Ft,T = st is required to calculate this relation.
These prices are to be inferred from pairs of actively traded ATM options to avoid imperfect
synchronisation. For the closest to the ATM strikes KATM , pt(KATM ) is replaced with the
average of pt(KATM ) and p¯t(KATM ).
• To obtain the ATM futures level st, 17 consider several of the closest to the ATM strikes
KATM such that |st−KATM | < 15 for near-term maturities or |st−KATM | < 25 for longer-
term maturities. For those strikes which have both call and put option data available, the
average is then taken to obtain the futures level st = ct(KATM ) +KATM − pt(KATM ).
• The forward put prices should satisfy the no-arbitrage restrictions:
– Forward put price pt(Ki) is a convex function of strike Ki;
– 0 ≤ ∂pt(K)∂K ≤ 1 for all strikes Ki.
A daily cross-section is discarded if either there are less than 10 options available with which to
estimate the RND or if substantial violations of the no-arbitrage conditions are detected (if the
square root of the average squared deviation of put prices from the closest arbitrage-free prices
is greater than 0.4).
In order to calculate the T30 30-day measures for all variables selected, the RNDs for maturities
preceding and succeeding T30 are first estimated. For each date t, the maturity dates T1 and T2
are selected such that T1 ≤ T30 ≤ T2. Daily data for the five trading days are calculated using
the available maturities which satisfy all the constraints. In the instance that the first viable
17The ATM futures level is henceforth denoted st.
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maturity Tm closest to T30 satisfies the relation Tm > T30, this will be used as an approximation
for T30. Daily data yields a daily sentiment measure for institutional investors which adjusts
according to portfolio insurance requirements; this is implicit in the probability measure and
skew-related measures. Once all daily inputs are available, the PCA method can be applied. All
Matlab code has been written in accordance with these guidelines with the exclusion of the PCA
function required to evaluate the RND, which is written by Bondarenko (2003).
When calculating the BKM MFISt, the restrictions outlined in Rehman & Vilkov (2010) are
adhered to. The Matlab code provided by the source 18 is used in this implementation. The
following options are removed before implied volatilities and the MFISt is calculated:
• Options with zero bids;
• Options with zero open interest – this is less stringent than removing options with zero
volume however does leave more data available for calculations, regardless of the possibility
of using stale data;
• Options with maturity less than 14 days;
• Options with maturity longer than 200 days;
• Options which have a moneyness less than 0.7 or greater than 1.3;
• Given that only OTM options are required, options with deltas less than 0.5 or greater
than 0.5 are excluded; 19
• Options which have a price (average of the best bid and best offer) less than 0.5.
Verification of the methods is achieved through their application to call and put options that are
priced using the Black–Scholes formula with constant volatility parameter. Applying the PCA
method for a given trading date t, the RNDs for the a range of expiries available can be extracted.
In Figure 3.1 the current date is 15 January 2010 and the expiries are as shown. As previously
mentioned, it is clear that as maturities extend further into the future, the RND displays fatter
tails and are less-peaked, indicating greater uncertainty.
18http://vilkov.net/www/content/code-and-useful-stuff
19Call options have a delta between [0 1]; put options have a delta between [–1 0]. Thus, when call (put) options
are ITM, their delta approaches 1 (–1).
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Figure 3.1: The S&P 500 index RNDs on 15 January 2010 for maturities listed where the index value
(x-axis) is plotted against the corresponding probability (y-axis). The $5 spacing is applied which then
renders the area under the graph equal to one.
Figure 3.2 displays the evolution of the RND over a given number of dates listed below for the
option maturity 20 February 2010; axes are as in Figure 3.1.
3.5.3 Daily Time Series Properties of pRNDt,30
Given that daily data between 2005 and 2010 are used within the analysis, evidence of the
subprime crisis is likely to be detected. Relationships that may exist between variables in times
of normal market conditions may not be evident during market turmoil. The time line of the
crisis 20 mentions that concerns about the subprime market arose during June 2007 when the
Dow industrials plunged 198.94 points and the yield on 10-year Treasury notes rose to 5.10%
amid inflation concerns. The analysis will be carried out over three periods: the entire period,
the pre-crisis period (January 2005 to end of June 2007) and then post-crisis period (July 2007
to October 2010).
The mean value of the series pRNDt,30 which corresponds to the probability of the index reaching
the ATM futures level in 30 calendar days is µ = 0.44, and standard deviation is σ = 0.02. Given
20http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120576387418941803.html
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Figure 3.2: The evolution of the S&P 500 index RND from options with expiry 20 February 2010. Once
again, a $5 spacing is applied.
that the RND is constructed to ensure that the mean equates to st, this is expected. The series
exceeds the range µ + 3σ in November 2007 and February 2009, and dips below µ − 3σ during
August of 2007.
For daily data from 3 January 2005 to 29 October 2010, the pRNDt,30 is autoregressive, and therefore
one lag will be included in all regressions to control for positive autocorrelation. The residuals of
the time series, labeled t, follow an ARMA(1,1) process. The model which appears to best fit
the data is then
pRNDt,30 = α+ βp
RND
t−1,30 + t, (3.4)
where t is an ARMA(1,1) process. Results are in Table 3.1 for daily data over the entire
period. The Durbin–Watson statistic (a test for first-order serial correlation of residuals) 21 is
only applicable when the dependent variable is not on the right-hand side of the equation. For
errors which are AR models, the residual-based regression statistics reported are based on the
21A statistic below 2 indicates positive serial correlation whilst that between 2 and 4 indicates negative correlation.
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Figure 3.3: The daily 30-day probability measure pRNDt,30 over the sample period. The is the cumulative
probability of the index attaining the ATM futures level 30 calender days hence.
Table 3.1: Daily regression results estimated for the pRNDt,30 over the period 3 January 2005 to 29 October
2010, estimated using equation (3.4)
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
α 0.0062 0.0019 3.2871 0.0010
pRNDt−1,30 0.9860 0.0043 231.8230 0
AR(1) 0.3890 0.0287 13.5630 0
MA(1) –0.8650 0.0181 –47.7819 0
R-squared 0.6620 Mean dependent var 0.4431
Adjusted R-squared 0.6615 S.D. dependent var 0.020
F -statistic 1383.776 Durbin–Watson stat 2.0412
Prob(F -statistic) 0
Inverted AR roots 0.39
Inverted MA roots 0.86
one-period ahead forecast errors. 22 In all tabulated regression results, the ‘variable’ column refers
to the coefficient of that listed with the exclusion of the constant α.
The coefficient of pRNDt−1,30 is close to unity due to the frequency of data; both pRNDt,30 its residuals
t are autocorrelated. The null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root is rejected at the 1%
22These residuals represent the forecast errors one would make if one computed forecasts using a prediction of
the residuals based upon past values of the data, in addition to the contemporaneous information. In essence, there
is an improvement upon the unconditional forecasts and residuals by taking advantage of the predictive power of
the lagged residuals.
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critical level using the ADF test.
A brief digression to monthly data reveals how pRNDt,30 shifts in response to movements in the
underlying index. The monthly pRNDt,30 data (both an average of all business day observations and
the end-of-month value which is the last business day observation for that month) are estimated
as a comparison; Figure 3.4 displays how remarkably different the final time series appear. The
probability appears to be declining up to the mid-2007 crisis after which it steadily increases,
conceivably as a result of the demand for portfolio insurance increased. Granger causality with
two lags between the monthly index close and the average pRNDt,30 over the month shows causality
running from the index close to pRNDt,30 (F -statistic 5.04, p-value 0.01). The monthly correlation
between the index and pRNDt,30 is –0.46. This therefore implies that contemporaneous increases
in the index lead to an increase in investor sentiment as the pRNDt,30 decreases. That is, investors
perceive there to be a greater probability of the index exceeding the ATM futures level.
Figure 3.4: The monthly probability measure pRNDt,30 for the period January 2005 to October 2010, both
an average of all business day observations and the end-of-month value.
Henceforth, the 30-day subscript will be dropped and the assumption is such that for all variables
xt,30 = xt. Ensuring multicollinearity of daily data is avoided, the correlations of the variables
pRNDt , η
3
t , ModPCRt, PCRt, MFISt, σ
smirk
t and the VIX are estimated. The entire daily sample
period has been divided into two parts for robustness checks as well as to identify normal and
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Table 3.2: Daily correlations of sentiment variables examined for the entire period, followed by the
pre-crisis and post-crisis periods respectively.
Correlation pRNDt η
3
t ModPCRt PCRt MFISt σ
smirk
t VIX
pRNDt 1
η3t 0.6674 1
0.6098 1
0.7364
ModPCRt 0.0252 0.0109 1
0.02570 0.0376
0.0368 0.0319
PCRt –0.0156 –0.0455 0.9269 1
–0.0827 –0.0321 0.8010
0.0123 –0.0150 0.9463
MFISt 0.2042 –0.2390 -0.0490 0.0067 1
0.3473 0.1883 –0.0442 0.0007
0.2437 –0.2311 –0.0745 –0.0200
σsmirkt -0.2282 –0.1634 0.0701 0.0965 –0.3785 1
–0.2418 –0.2424 –0.0018 0.0400 –0.4428
–0.1761 0.0235 0.0799 0.0951 –0.5384
VIX –0.0701 –0.515 –0.0416 0.0264 0.4372 0.2233 1
-0.4009 –0.5748 –0.1235 0.0809 –0.1682 0.4172
0.1467 –0.2689 –0.0818 –0.0204 0.4248 0.0798
crisis regimes: The pre-crisis (3 January 2005 to 30 June 2007) and post-crisis (1 July 2007 to
29 October 2010). The first value for each variable corresponds to the entire period, the second
to the pre-crisis period and the third is the remainder of the time period.
Examining the results of Table 3.2, the sign alternates for both the VIX and the PCR during
the different market conditions. PCRt has been calculated by dividing all index puts by all
index calls for a particular maturity, after the data have been cleaned. The T30 value is then
interpolated from the relevant maturities. The correlation is insignificant in comparison to that
of the VIX. The volatility index is a 30-day measure derived from SPX options. It tends to
increase when the market experiences periods of fear, and when the market is on a bull run,
albeit less so. From Figure 3.8, one can see that during the crisis period, the VIX starts to
increase substantially. Hence, the negative sign during the pre-crisis period might imply that
the VIX is increasing during positive momentum period however this causes a reduction in the
probability measure as investors expect higher than average returns. During the crisis period
when the market is less confident, an increase in the VIX tends to be accompanied by an increase
in the probability. This can then be interpreted as a decline in the probability of exceeding
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics for the variables over the period January 2005 to October 2010.
Percentile
Variable Mean Std. deviation Max Min 25 50 75
pRNDt 0.4431 0.0203 0.5661 0.3755 0.4298 0.443 0.4569
η3t –0.1787 0.0785 0.027 –0.4113 –0.2358 –0.1707 –0.1187
ModPCRt 2.5956 2.4566 56.7071 0.2707 1.5741 2.1646 2.9557
PCRt 2.1847 2.4507 62.415 0.3127 1.4126 1.8076 2.3863
MFISt –1.7235 0.4251 –0.5664 –4.6322 –1.9847 –1.7227 –1.4113
σsmirkt 0.1013 0.0242 0.2947 –0.1008 0.0846 0.0992 0.1148
VIX 0.2176 0.1178 0.8086 0.0989 0.1291 0.1913 0.2548
the ATM futures level and therefore, a bearish sentiment. To further investigate this, the OLS
regressions in the following sections provide insight to these relationships. All other variables
exhibit the same linear relationships, regardless of the index movement. This will be explored
further in section 3.5.5. Table 3.3 provides the summary statistics for the sentiment variables.
The following section primarily examines the relationship of BBSt with both p
RND
t and BKM
MFISt individually. This is to determine whether survey sentiment and that inferred from
options data are congruent over different market regimes.
3.5.4 Weekly Results
Figure 3.5 displays the weekly data for the bull–bear spread, BBSt . The series has a mean of
0.16 and attains a maximum value of 0.42 and minimum of –0.32. The weeks during which the
index exceeds 90% of the maximum value were 7 January 2005, 12 August 2005, 30 December
2005 and 19 October 2007. The corresponding minimum values occurred during the weeks of
October 2008. The months in which the series was negative occurred during March 2008 and
extended over 2008, with the exception of May, to the end of April 2009. Negative values were
also recorded during July and September 2010.
In order to determine whether BBSt may be a result of past returns, a momentum variable
captured by the six month log-return, mt = ln
St
St−180 is defined. Graphically, the relationship
can be seen in Figure 3.6. Granger causality using two lags is performed to establish direction
of information flow. Results indicate momentum Granger-causes BBSt (F -statistic 14.79, p-value
0.00). The time series BBSt is autocorrelated with lag one, with errors that follow a AR(1) process
(the constant is 0.01). Thus one lag will be included in all regressions that follow, correcting for
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Figure 3.5: The weekly bull–bear spread (right axis) and probability measure pRNDt (left axis) from
January 2005 to October 2010.
serial correlation of errors. Examining the relationship between BBSt and the most recent one
week log-return over the entire period, we find a positive constant (β2 = 0.56) when looking
at the AR(1) equation BBSt = α + β1BB
S
t−1 + β2 ln
St
St−1 + t, which is statistically significant
(t-statistic of 4.27, p-value of 0, standard error is 0.13). Thus, institutional investor sentiment as
measured by the bull–bear spread is related to past S&P 500 returns, as was discussed in Solt &
Statman (1988) and Fisher & Statman (2000).
Table 3.4 contains the correlations of the bull–bear spread BBSt , p
RND
t , η
3
t , ModPCRt, MFISt
and σsmirkt over the entire sample period, followed by the pre-crisis (2005 to mid-2007) and post-
crisis (mid-2007 to 2010) periods. Examining the first column, it can be seen the signs of the
variables pRNDt , MFISt and σ
smirk
t alternate in the sub-periods. Given that the BB
S
t is positive
up to March 2008, one expects the correlations to change signs as trading in the options markets
retains the same level of activity. The exception to this is η3t which is shown below in Figure 3.7.
The third robust moment is a measure of the distribution of weight in the density function of the
returns distribution, as estimated using the PCA method. Hence this measure is closely related
to pRNDt : as the mass in the left-hand side of the distribution increases, from the definition of η
3
t ,
it is clear that this measure will be more negative as U50 − U10 > U90 − U50, where Ux refers to
the x-percentile of the returns distribution, assuming that the denominator is fixed. At a point in
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Figure 3.6: The weekly bull–bear spread from January 2005 to October 2010 graphed with the momentum
variable mt.
time which is fairly close to maturity, the distribution rarely changes width. pRNDt is the mass in
the CDF to the left of the mean of RND, up to a point st, which alters daily. This value is neither
the theoretical forward nor is it determined from the futures market; it is determined from the
options data as explained in section 3.4. The positive correlation implies that the more bullish
the survey responses are, the less negative the third robust moment. The VIX is negatively
correlated throughout which can be interpreted as follows: If the market is on a steady incline,
the VIX will decrease and the bull–bear spread will then increase. Downward-trending markets
result in fear and a subsequent increase in the VIX. The bull–bear spread therefore decreases as
investors become bearish from recent poor market performance.
Regressions involving the PCR and modified PCR do not present any convincing relationships
and therefore, the results are not displayed here. Dennis & Mayhew (2002) did not find any
evidence that skewness was related to the PCR. Given that a low PCR may imply investors are
bullish, this not need be the case; a high volume in call options may also be a result of call-selling
activity that is bearish and the same can be concluded from the put-selling activity with regards
to the market being bullish. This line of reasoning is likely to hold for single stock options. The
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Table 3.4: The correlations of the weekly variables below, over the entire period, followed by the pre-crisis
and post-crisis periods respectively.
Correlation BBSt p
RND
t η
3
t ModPCRt MFISt σ
smirk
t V IXt
BBSt 1
pRNDt 0.0934 1
0.2954
–0.1098
η3t 0.4929 0.6449 1
0.3532 0.5816
0.3517 0.7252
ModPCRt 0.2421 0.0580 0.1733 1
0.1711 0.1445 0.2050
0.2265 –0.1173 –0.0070
MFISt –0.4432 0.2081 –0.2449 –0.1865 1
0.2013 0.3307 0.2115 –0.1097
–0.5958 0.2380 –0.2868 –0.1781
σsmirkt 0.0138 –0.2268 –0.1279 –0.0844 –0.3917 1
–0.0400 –0.3215 –0.3178 –0.0400 –0.4741
0.1781 –0.1398 0.1107 –0.0582 –0.5163
V IXt –0.7057 –0.0745 –0.5137 –0.2783 0.4287 0.2313 1
–0.4463 –0.4825 –0.6015 –0.3118 –0.1289 0.3960
–0.6645 0.1431 –0.2664 –0.2912 0.42213 0.0961
Figure 3.7: The weekly third robust moment η3t for 30-calendar days from date t and the bull–bear
spread, from January 2005 to October 2010.
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Table 3.5: Regression results for the pre-crisis period pertaining to investor sentiment, pRNDt regressed
on BBSt . This is shown in equation (3.5).
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value
α 0.3070 0.0368 8.3434 0
pRNDt−1 0.2899 0.0884 3.2813 0.0013
BBSt 0.0423 0.0209 2.0308 0.0444
R-squared 0.1596 Mean dependent var 0.4471
Adjusted R-squared 0.1462 S.D. dependent var 0.021
F -statistic 11.9622 Durbin–Watson stat 2.0767
Prob(F -statistic) 0
weekly pRNDt is regressed on the BB
S
t :
23
pRNDt = α+ β1p
RND
t−1 + β2BB
S
t + t. (3.5)
The weekly pRNDt series is an AR(1) process, with MA(1) errors. The regression results for
the entire period are statistically insignificant with respect to the independent variable BBSt .
Examining data for the pre-crisis period between January 2005 and mid-2007 (the end of June),
results obtained are in Table 3.5.
Adding this sentiment variable to the weekly AR(1) equation improves the adjusted R-squared
value by approximately 2%. Hence there is a statistically significant, albeit negligible positive
relationship between these two measures. This relationship alters in the post-crisis period, the
relationship alters. The constant β2 remains positive until the end of 2007; from July 2007
to the end of 2008, the coefficient is –0.01 with a p-value of 0.1. Thereafter, the relationship
is statistically insignificant. This may then indicate that in times of uncertainty, surveys and
trading data may be unrelated due to fundamental differences in their representation.
Given that pRNDt is a forward-looking probability estimate based on investors beliefs of where
the underlying is likely to end up at maturity conditional on current data, the possibility of a
relationship between pRNDt−i , where i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and the time t bull–bear spread exists.
Examining regressions up to a lag of four weeks for the pre-crisis period to determine whether
23All regressions have been adjusted to account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of standard errors
according to Newey & West (1987).
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Table 3.6: Regression results for the pre-crisis period, BBSt regressed on p
RND
t , as given in equation
(3.6).
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value
BBSt−1 0.9214 0.0322 28.5893 0
pRNDt 0.0414 0.0196 2.1092 0.0369
R-squared 0.8728 Mean dependent var 0.2430
Adjusted R-squared 0.8718 S.D. dependent var 0.0986
Durbin–Watson stat 1.6367
this may be the case: 24
BBSt = β1BB
S
t−1 + β2p
RND
t−i + t (3.6)
The results in Table 3.6 indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship at time t
which is displayed below. The lagged regressions performed poorly and therefore, the results
have been omitted. The same regression over the entire period results in β1 = 0.94, β2 = 0.02
(t-stats and p-values of 44.0 and 0, 1.6 and 0.11 respectively).
From July 2007, the relationship loses all statistical significance, however the sign of the coefficient
as well as magnitude does not change. The lagged values of pRNDt−i added in independently produce
similar results (as the lagged values are themselves autocorrelated). Adding lags in succession
serves to worsen the results. Thus, during the normal market regime, the contemporaneous
probability measure pRNDt displays a statistically significant relationship with BB
S
t . When the
spread increases, so does the probability. This may imply that recent good performance implies
a reversal may be expected in the near future.
Han (2007) performs an OLS regression where the bull–bear spread is regressed on the BKM
MFISt of the index return over the next month. The regressions employ monthly time series
observations, as evaluated on the last trading day of each month. The sentiment proxies are
measured on or prior to that date, using the latest available data. A lagged-dependent variable is
included as a regressor to control for positive autocorrelation. The sample of data extends from
24The bull–bear spread is an AR(2) process, with constant approximately zero and lag coefficients 1.13 for AR(1)
and –0.16 for AR(2) over the period 2005–2010. The adjusted R-squared value is 0.89. Altering the time period
has a minimal effect upon the coefficients.
115
January 1988 to June 1997. Table 3.7 displays results for the entire period: 25
MFISt = α+ β1MFISt−1 + β2BBSt + t. (3.7)
Table 3.7: Regression results for the entire period pertaining to BKM MFISt as the dependent variable,
and BBSt as the independent variable, as given in equation (3.7).
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
α –0.4590 0.0613 –7.4831 0
MFISt−1 0.6969 0.0378 18.4333 0
BBSt –0.3693 0.0877 –4.213 0
R-squared 0.5986 Mean dependent var –1.7065
Adjusted R-squared 0.5959 S.D. dependent var 0.4092
F -statistic 222.9305 Durbin–Watson stat 2.2361
Prob(F -statistic) 0
The above relationship, when examined over the subperiods, does not hold: the coefficient of
BBSt is 0.65 for the period January 2005 to November 2006.
26 Thereafter, it becomes negative
and is only statistically significant from January 2008 onwards. Regression results for the period
January 2008 to October 2010 are in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8: Regression results for the period January 2008 to October 2010 pertaining to BKM MFISt
and BBSt , as given in equation (3.7).
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
α –0.5182 0.0812 –6.3872 0
MFISt−1 0.6534 0.0536 12.1993 0
BBSt –0.7074 0.1489 –4.7505 0
R-squared 0.7383 Mean dependent var –1.7359
Adjusted R-squared 0.7329 S.D. dependent var 0.3978
F -statistic 136.8389 Durbin–Watson stat 2.2478
Prob(F -statistic) 0
Han (2007) finds a positive coefficient for monthly BBSt . Han surmises that the risk-neutral
skewness of the monthly index return is more negative when the market sentiment becomes more
bearish. Hence to reconcile this, a monthly frequency regression is performed which results; over
the period, β2 = 0.11 (t-statistic 2.75, p-value 0.01). The above regressions indicate that the
relationship between the BKM MFISt and BB
S
t cannot be considered robust across subperiods
25The weekly MFISt for the entire period is an AR(1) process; the errors are also an AR(1) process.
26The standard error is 0.22, t-statistic 2.99 and p-value 0.00.
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or frequency. The η3t measure is also addressed to assess performance. In replacing the BKM
skew with η3t in the weekly regressions, the p-value associated with β2 was in excess of 0.1. Hence
in this instance, the survey results failed to explain any of the residual variance in the third robust
moment. Granger causality runs from η3t to both the BKM MFISt and the BB
S
t . Hence this
indicates the implied skewness may in fact contain forward-looking information which is superior
to that of the BKM skew measure.
Overall, weekly data regressions suggest that an increase in bullish sentiment is contempora-
neously accompanied with an increase in the skew (less negative) and a slight increase in the
probability measure, in the pre-crisis period. These relationships are insignificant thereafter.
The relationship for the entire period when BBSt is regressed on MFISt is contrary to that seen
during the pre-crisis period: the coefficient of –0.37 for BBSt implies that as the survey sentiment
results increase, the skew becomes more negative. This relationship holds for the crisis period
as the bull–bear spread becomes negative. A negative skew implies a longer left tail with the
median of the distribution to the right of the mean. The median divides the distribution into
equal probability weight. The relationship with the VIX is robust across periods and is such
that an increase in the VIX has the effect of decreasing the bull–bear spread (as was seen in the
correlation table).
The bull–bear spread seems to react to recent returns and ultimately declines during bear markets.
The definition of the spread omits the group of investors that believe a correction is due – this
may imply the definition as a measure of institutional investor sentiment is deficient. The BKM
MFISt and p
RND
t are empirically derived and subject to the numerical method used. The
relationships between the bull–bear spread and both the skew and the RND measure may fail to
exist during crisis periods as the survey results capture momentum. This is in contrast to current
option data which yields forward-looking probabilities of index levels at the relevant maturity, and
therefore may not necessarily encapsulate the general malaise of the survey results. Frequency is
also highly relevant as weekly and monthly results varied in the instance of the BKM skew.
The following section examines the daily data which are more relevant given the pertinence of
measuring institutional investor sentiment at a higher frequency.
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3.5.5 Daily Sentiment Results
The following section seeks to understand the relationships between variables over the identified
market regimes.
The Probability Sentiment pRNDt
This section seeks to establish whether the daily residual variance of pRNDt can be explained by
movements in other option-related variables over the identified periods. Having observed the
discrepancies that exist in the weekly survey and option-implied sentiment measures, further
analysis of the pRNDt at a higher frequency may clarify dependencies. Hence, consistency is
required. The PCR and modified version thereof have been omitted as they have performed
poorly. Units are fractions of 100 (pRNDt , VIX, σ
smirk
t ) or as defined by the measurement.
OLS regressions are examined for the three periods identified with pRNDt as the dependent vari-
able, including a lag and ARMA(1,1) errors. All errors will also be accounted for by including
ARMA terms when necessary. The OLS regressions over the subperiods are in Tables 3.9, 3.10
and 3.11. Results are for the following:
pRNDt = α+ β1p
RND
t−1 + β2variablet + t. (3.8)
The regressions indicate that both the VIX and the σsmirkt performed poorly in the second half of
the sample period; the VIX appears to be the variable which has the least significance within the
regressions. The remainder of the variables remain consistent in their relationship with pRNDt .
In particular, η3t improves the adjusted R-squared value considerably, assuming the MA(1) error
term is omitted. Table 3.12 provides the effect of a 0.1 increase in the variables to pRNDt . Both
the MFISt and η
3
t are primarily negative, and therefore the implication is that when the implied
return distribution is less negatively skewed, the probability measure tends to increase. This was
also confirmed for the weekly frequency. σsmirkt > 0 by definition as the OTM puts have higher
implied volatilities than ATM call options. Thus an increase in the smirk implies that either
the OTM put volatilities have increased or the ATM call volatilities have decreased, or both. A
greater smirk is associated with a more bearish sentiment, so the negative coefficient implies that
when the smirk increases and the distribution is more negatively skewed, the probability measure
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Table 3.9: The Newey–West OLS regression results for the entire daily sample period with t-statistics
and p-values. For the regression including η3t , the MA(1) error term has been removed and the adjusted
R-squared of 0.64 refers to the regression prior to adding in the exogenous variable with a lag and AR(1)
error term.
pRNDt variable
2005–2010 α 0.0062 0.0075 0.0081 0.1348 0.0061
t-stat. 3.2871 3.9284 3.8160 16.3636 3.2330
p-value 0.0010 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0012
pRNDt−1 0.9860 0.9846 0.9832 0.7170 0.9861
231.8230 237.4303 218.3894 41.2868 232.1495
0 0 0 0 0
MFISt 0.0004
2.8790
0.0040
σsmirkt –0.0072
–2.0120
0.0435
η3t 0.0527
13.1997
0
VIX 0.0001
0.2414
0.8092
Adj R-squared 0.6620 0.6626 0.6620 0.6677 0.6613
0.6370
decreases. Therefore, the more negative the skew (both MFISt and η
3
t ) and the greater the
smirk σsmirkt , the less positive the probability measure. η
3
t , as defined by equation (3.1), provides
a unique means to identify where the mass within the distribution is concentrated. Since it is
usually negative, it is clear that (U50 − U10) > (U90 − U50). As before, Ux refers to the xth
percentile of the return distribution. The measure pRNDt is the cumulative sum of f(ST ) – the
probability density function derived from the PCA – given by
∑i∗
k=1 fk(ST )∆ST = P[ST ≤ st].
Here, i∗ represents that index such
∑i∗
k=1 ∆ST = st and let the probability measure be such that
U∗ = P[ST ≤ st]. We have that U10 < U∗ < U50. If η3t becomes more negative, the mass of the
distribution moves towards the left and more weight is associated with negative outcomes. As
this occurs, it seems that U∗ tends to move to the left (the probability decreases). The strong
and consistent negative correlation between σsmirkt and MFISt further serves to emphasise the
fact that the RND is more negatively skewed when the smirk is higher. The relationship with
the VIX and the MFISt is not clear from the correlations as the signs differ during the pre-crisis
and crisis periods. This is explored further in the following section.
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Table 3.10: The first half of the sample: January 2005 to June 2007. The MA(1) error term has been
omitted for the regression with η3t , using equation (3.8).
pRNDt variable
2005 to mid-2007 α 0.0076 0.0142 0.0144 0.1800 0.0193
t-stat. 2.1315 3.3450 3.1288 11.5484 3.4741
p-value 0.0333 0.0009 0.0018 0 0.0005
pRNDt−1 0.9830 0.9727 0.9729 0.6241 0.9640
124.0200 114.3261 107.5479 19.0431 88.0886
0 0 0 0 0
MFISt 0.0011
3.0697
0.0022
σsmirkt –0.0246
–2.4470
0.0146
η3t 0.0904
7.8012
0
VIX –0.0254
–3.4804
0.0005
Adj R-squared 0.5538 0.5583 0.5571 0.5721 0.5596
0.5251
The VIX
In order to further understand the relationship between pRNDt , MFISt, σ
smirk
t , η
3
t and the VIX,
these relationships are explored further below in order to establish their reliability as well as
perceived response to market conditions. Figure 3.8 shows is the daily VIX from January 2005
to October 2010; the index attains its maximum value in November 2008.
Examining the relationship between the VIX and the returns using the daily data between 2005
and 2010, the following regression is evaluated with results 27 in Table(3.13):
V IXt = α+ β1V IXt−1 + β2 ln
(
St
St−1
)
+ t. (3.10)
27Looking at the AR(1) for the VIX:
V IXt = α+ βV IXt−1 + t, (3.9)
The adjusted R-squared value increases by almost 10% from 0.87 (2005 to mid-2007), to 0.98 (mid-2007 to 2010),
becoming non-stationary. Over the entire period, the value is 0.99 with β = 0.99.
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Table 3.11: The second half of the sample: July 2007 to October 2010, as in equation (3.8).
pRNDt variable
Mid-2007 - 2010 α 0.0069 0.0088 0.0082 0.1230 0.0070
t-stat. p-value 2.5973 3.0183 2.8423 6.2318 2.6136
0.0095 0.0026 0.0046 0 0.0091
pRNDt−1 0.9843 0.9821 0.9827 0.7469 0.9837
163.7099 159.5284 157.8080 18.6729 158.5262
0 0 0 0 0
MFISt 0.0005
2.0855
0.0372
σsmirkt –0.0056
–1.3471
0.1782
η3t 0.0544
5.1844
0
VIX 0.0005
0.6185
0.5363
Adj R-squared 0.7295 0.7304 0.7297 0.7398 0.7294
0.7120
Table 3.12: The change in pRNDt as a result of a contemporaneous increase of 0.1 for each of the variables
taken independently of each other, for the entire sample period followed by the pre-crisis and post-crisis
periods.
variable ∆pRNDt
MFISt 0.0000428
0.0001053
0.0000513
σsmirkt –0.000717
–0.002463
–0.000563
η3t 0.0052676
0.0090427
0.0054423
VIX 0.0000118
–0.002541
0.0000527
Over the entire time period, the adjusted R-squared valued improves by roughly 1% when the
returns are included. Including additional lagged values serves to worsen the results. Including
dummy variables for days when the index return is negative serves to reinforce the asymmetric
relationship: An index decline is accompanied by an increase in the VIX which exceeds that
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Figure 3.8: The daily VIX January 2005 to October 2010.
Table 3.13: Daily results of the VIX regressed on the index return over the entire period as provided in
equation (3.10).
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value
α 0.0018 0.0005 3.6663 0.0003
V IXt−1 0.9917 0.0028 356.5090 0
ln StSt−1 –1.1304 0.0539 –20.9709 0
R-squared 0.9948 Mean dependent var 0.2177
Adjusted R-squared 0.9948 S.D. dependent var 0.1179
F -statistic 2042 Durbin–Watson stat 1.8991
Prob(F -statistic) 0
which is accompanied by an equal-in-magnitude increase in the index. 28
From Table 3.10 it can be seen that an increase of 1% in the VIX (when the value of the index goes
up by one unit which is equivalent to 0.01) results in a decrease of 0.025 in pRNDt . This occurs
in the pre-crisis period during which the relationship is significant. The interpretation is such
that the probability assigned to the index exceeding the current ATM futures level increases.
Thereafter, the VIX trends upwards until it reaches the maximum, as shown in Figure 3.8.
28Over the pre-crisis period, including dummy variables defined by D1 = 1Rt,t+1>0 and D2 = 1Rt,t+1<0 separately
(where Rt,t+1 = ln
S(t)
S(t+1)
) results in βD1 = 0.001 (p-value = 0.03), and βD2 = −0.001 (p-value = 0.01). Over the
entire period, D1 retains sign and magnitude yet the significance thereof is reduced whilst D2 retains statistical
significance and numerical properties.
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The change in the level of the VIX is negatively related to the contemporaneous index returns
(Whaley 2008), and therefore one may expect that an increase in the index, or equivalently a
positive return, is accompanied by a decrease in the VIX. However, since the relationship is
asymmetric, a decrease in the index will lead to an increase in the VIX by an amount larger
than for the equivalent index increase. For consistency, one may expect to see that a decrease
in the index results in a decrease in pRNDt . This relationship holds for the pre-crisis period as
the coefficient of the log-return is 0.30 (statistically significant, p-value of 0.004; t-statistic of
2.92). Relationships that hold during normal market regimes appear to lose significance in the
post-crisis period – the coefficient of the VIX in Table 3.11 is close to zero. The relationship
between pRNDt and ln
S(t)
S(t+1) over the period mid-2007 to 2010 becomes insignificant.
The Risk-Neutral Skew of BKM
The daily MFISt is an AR(1) process, with errors that are also an AR(1) process over then
entire period. The model in Table 3.14 best fits the daily data, with the following regression
performed:
MFISt = α+ βMFISt−1 + t, (3.11)
Table 3.14: Daily data for the BKM MFISt over the entire sample period; the equation estimated to fit
the data is given in (3.11).
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
α –0.0878 0.0167 –5.2594 0
MFISt−1 0.9492 0.0100 96.8116 0
AR(1) –0.2899 0.1085 –2.6727 0.0076
R-squared 0.8414 Mean dependent var –1.7240
Adjusted R-squared 0.8412 S.D. dependent var 0.4250
F -statistic 5624.818 Durbin–Watson stat 2.0329
Prob(F -statistic) 0
Inverted AR roots –0.29
Regressing the BKM MFISt on the other option-related measures (including an AR(1) error
term), results are in Tables 3.5.5, 3.5.5 and 3.5.5. The regressions are performed over the entire
sample period, followed by the periods January 2005 to July 2008 and August 2008 to October
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2010. The reason for extending the pre-crisis period can be seen from examining Figure 3.8. The
time series trends upwards from mid-August 2008 until it reaches a maximum of 81% in November
2008. This is the highest level recorded during this period. The adjusted R-squared value over
the extended pre-crisis period is much higher. The global financial crisis of September–October
2008 resulted in huge losses in stock markets worldwide. Figure 3.9 displays the S&P 500 index
daily close; a low occurred in early March 2009.
Figure 3.9: The daily S&P 500 index close from January 2005 to October 2010. The
MFISt = α+ β1MFISt−1 + β2variablet + t. (3.12)
The relationship between MFISt and the VIX is much like that between p
RND
t and the VIX,
however the order of significance has been reversed: it is negative and insignificant in the first
period and reverts to being positive and significant in the second period. During the pre-crisis
period, both the S&P 500 index and the VIX were trending upwards. The relationship with
the MFISt during this period is insignificant. In the second period, the VIX reaches a high
of over 80% during November 2008. In this period the S&P 500 index experiences extreme
declines. Therefore, the risk-neutral skewness, being positively related to VIX movements, seems
to increase (less negative). Han (2007) finds the coefficient of the VIX to be positive; the data
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Table 3.15: The entire sample from January 2005 to October 2010. For the regressions involving pRNDt ,
the constant term as its t-statistic and p-value is not significant.
MFISt Variable
2005–2010 α –0.0878 0 –0.0562 –0.1129 –0.1368
t-stat. –5.2594 – –3.6080 –5.4276 –5.7079
p-value 0 – 0.0003 0 0
MFISt−1 0.9492 0.9533 0.9378 0.9447 0.9347
96.8116 106.5709 83.7091 92.2890 80.5733
0 0 0 0 0
pRNDt –0.1816
–5.2917
0
σsmirkt –0.5057
–3.5082
0.0005
η3t –0.0971
–2.6620
0.0078
VIX 0.1117
4.4786
0
Adj R-squared 0.8412 0.8412 0.8422 0.8416 0.8424
consisted of 114 month-end observations of each variable from January 1988 to June 1997. Here,
the positive coefficient is only apparent in the second period. The only relationships that are
consistent in sign and significant across regimes are those with pRNDt and σ
smirk
t .
Table 3.18 provides the effect of a 0.1 increase of each of the variables on MFISt, whilst others
remain constant. What can be seen is that an increase in the probability measure implies a
more negative BKM skewness, and an increase in the smirk is accompanied by a decrease in
MFISt. The relationship with η
3
t is not consistent across the regimes. The relationship between
the MFISt and η
3
t is unclear: The former is derived from the method in Rehman & Vilkov (2010)
and the latter is a purely numerical construct of the RND derived using PCA.
In an attempt to reconcile this observation with the results obtained for pRNDt , Table 3.12 in-
dicates that when both the MFISt and η
3
t are less negative, there will be an increase in the
probability measure. An increase in the smirk, σsmirkt , serves to decrease the probability measure
however this relationship is statistically insignificant in both periods. A decrease in σsmirkt results
in a more negative MFISt. Thus, as the OTM put implied volatility increases, there is more
probability mass in the left side of the returns distribution.
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Table 3.16: The regressions of MFISt on variables, as in equation (3.12) for the pre-crisis sample. Once
again the constant term is omitted for the exogenous variable pRNDt .
MFISt Variable
2005 to mid-2007 α –0.1832 0 –0.0905 –0.1736 –0.1314
–4.1867 – –2.4498 –4.0819 –2.9082
0 – 0.0145 0 0.0037
MFISt−1 0.9034 0.9187 0.8675 0.8994 0.8992
38.7159 45.9229 31.7064 37.6648 37.3733
0 0 0 0 0
pRNDt –0.3435
–4.1085
0
σsmirkt –1.6929
–4.1841
0
η3t 0.1310
1.3937
0.1638
VIX –0.4632
–1.6173
0.1062
Adj R-squared 0.6973 0.6953 0.7038 0.6976 0.6979
Table 3.17: The regressions of MFISt on variables, as in equation (3.12) for the post-crisis sample.
MFISt Variable
Mid-2007 to 2010 α –0.0560 0 –0.0328 –0.0809 –0.0988
–4.4634 – –2.4376 –4.9907 –5.3151
0 – 0.0149 0 0
MFISt−1 0.9651 0.9686 0.9457 0.9613 0.9539
120.9153 133.8201 77.9738 121.8398 106.0824
0 0 0 0 0
pRNDt –0.1133
–4.4084
0
σsmirkt –0.5077
–2.8257
0.0048
η3t –0.0893
–2.0535
0.0402
VIX 0.0882
3.5796
0.0004
Adj R-squared 0.9179 0.9177 0.9187 0.9181 0.9184
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Table 3.18: The change in MFISt as a result of a contemporaneous increase of 0.1 for each of the
variables taken independently of each other, for the entire sample period followed by the pre-crisis and
post-crisis periods.
Variable ∆MFISt
pRNDt –0.01816
–0.03435
–0.01133
σsmirkt –0.05057
–0.16929
–0.05077
η3t –0.00971
0.013099
–0.00893
VIX 0.011173
–0.04632
0.008818
Examining the relationship with contemporaneous returns, the results in Table 3.19 are obtained
when including a lag and accounting for an AR(1) error term:
MFISt = α+ β1MFISt−1 + β2 ln
(
St
St−1
)
+ t. (3.13)
Table 3.19: The BKM skew regressed on daily log-returns over the period specified, as shown in equation
(3.13).
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob. Adj R-squared
2005–2010 α –0.0549 0.0105 –5.2492 0 0.9253
MFISt−1 0.9681 0.0060 162.7513 0
ln StSt−1 –3.8078 0.3912 –9.7327 0
January 2005 to α –0.0751 0.0147 –5.1018 0 0.895365
July 2008 MFISt−1 0.9578 0.0082 116.3959 0
ln StSt−1 –5.8624 0.5267 –11.1303 0
August 2008 to α –0.0457 0.0160 –2.8450 0.0046 0.9575
October 2010 MFISt−1 0.9720 0.0095 102.7698 0
ln StSt−1 –3.3745 0.4719 –7.1515 0
Contemporaneous negative returns give rise to a less negative skew. Han (2007) finds that
momentum, when included as a control variable, is positively related to the risk-neutral skewness:
past good returns serve to increase the skew. Momentum is closely tied to the BBSt , and therefore
past good performance leads to a higher percentage of bullish opinions (positive sentiment) and
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a less negative risk-neutral skewness. However, Chen, Hong & Stein (2002) finds that past
high returns are followed by a more negative conditional expected skewness. Given that the
MFISt has an inconsistent relationship with BB
S
t across regimes, the same is evident when
considering momentum and MFISt. Examining the regression with the daily log-returns, it is
evident that the MFISt here seems to be indicative of a perceived reversal in the market. This
negative relationship holds when looking at weekly regressions for log returns of up to eight weeks.
Thereafter, the results are insignificant.
The Robust Moment η3t
To determine the relationship between the third robust moment η3t and the VIX, an OLS regres-
sion uses the daily data, including an MA(1) error term. 29 The following regression is estimated:
η3t = α+ β1η
3
t−1 + β2V IXt + t. (3.14)
Table 3.20: The third robust moment regressed on the VIX over the period specified, as shown in equation
(3.14).
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob. Adjusted R-squared
2005–2010 α –0.0038 0.0009 –4.2491 0 0.8530
η3t−1 0.9616 0.0061 158.6546 0
VIX –0.01421 0.0034 –4.2330 0
January 2005 to α 0.0046 0.0017 2.6905 0.0072 0.8601
July 2008 η3t−1 0.8962 0.0131 68.5410 0
VIX –0.1430 0.0208 –6.8844 0
August 2008 to α –0.0061 0.0019 –3.1292 0.0018 0.8473
October 2010 η3t−1 0.9278 0.0147 63.2755 0
VIX –0.0238 0.0060 –4.0275 0.0001
An increase in the VIX is associated with a more negative skew, as measured by η3t . Bondarenko
(2000) uses the robust moments approach to generate a time series for skewness, η3t for the
maturity m = 2. Performing an OLS regression of the robust moments on current and lagged
log-returns of daily data over the period of January 1991 to December 1995, Bondarenko finds
that β2 > 0. Negative returns are associated with an implied RND which is more negatively
29The time series follows an AR(1) process with errors that are MA(1).
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skewed, indicating that investors become pessimistic when the index performs poorly. Dennis
& Mayhew (2002) also find that skewness of individual stock options decrease when market
volatility increases. The results for the MFISt time series did not display the same robustness
across periods. Estimating the same regression, including an AR(1) term for the dependent
variable, and an ARMA(1,1) error term over the adjusted periods:
η3t = α+ β1η
3
t−1 + β2 ln
(
St
St−1
)
+ t. (3.15)
Table 3.21: The third robust moment regressed on the daily log-returns over the period specified, as in
equation (3.15).
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob. Adjusted R-squared
2005–2010 α –0.0045 0.0012 –4.1869 0 0.7820
η3t−1 0.9792 0.0050 198.0527 0
ln StSt−1 0.2045 0.0734 2.7844 0.0054
January 2005 to α –0.0032 0.0011 –3.0172 0.0026 0.7940
July 2008 η3t−1 0.9850 0.0051 191.9162 0
ln StSt−1 0.3819 0.1478 2.5842 0.0099
August 2008 to α –0.0071 0.0025 –2.8929 0.0039 0.7590
October 2010 η3t−1 0.9666 0.0110 87.5714 0
ln StSt−1 0.1402 0.0815 1.7198 0.0858
Comparing this to the MFISt, it is clear that these two measures of skewness display contra-
dictory results, the standard error in the latter case being fairly high across time periods. Han
(2007) found that risk-neutral skewness was more negative as investors became more bearish.
The weekly relationship between the BKM risk-neutral skewness and the bull–bear spread is not
consistent across regimes: an increase in bullish sentiment seems to be accompanied by a less
negative skew in the pre-crisis period. Thereafter, the statistical significance breaks down. The
MFISt does not show a consistent relationship with the VIX either. With regard to contempora-
neous returns, the negative coefficient implies that current positive returns serve to decrease the
risk-neutral skew further. This is in contrast to the results reported in Bondarenko (2000) which
indicate that the coefficient of contemporaneous returns is positive, as is displayed in the above
OLS regression with η3t . The results of MFISt with the VIX are inconsistent and agree with
those in Han (2007) during the crisis period. In this instance, an increase in the VIX increases the
MFISt. In comparison, with η
3
t , there is a consistent negative relationship to the VIX and a pos-
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itive consistent relationship to contemporaneous returns. It is also the case that as η3t decreases,
so too does the probability measure. This is rather intriguing; however, accounting for the fact
that the grid is specified using $5 equidistant spacing, it seems to be the case that the futures
level lies slightly to the left of the median. As the grid size alternates, the probability alters,
however not in a systematic way. Therefore, results are always subject to numerical limitations.
In the Black–Scholes case, all grids produce the same results.
In order to disentangle the above results, each variable is listed separately, with corresponding
relationships to other variables.
3.6 Interpretation of Results
Given the numerous regressions performed above over different market regimes and frequencies,
it is crucial to examine each indicator in isolation to determine what relationships can be used
with confidence as a means to establish the supreme indirect measure of institutional investor
sentiment. Sentiment is more appropriately defined with respect to aggregate beliefs based on the
demand for insurance. It may not necessarily refer to other definitions such as the ‘aggregated
errors in beliefs’, or ‘beliefs formed from everything but fundamental value’.
3.6.1 The Bull–Bear Spread
This measure, which is based on the difference between bullish and bearish newsletter writers, is a
survey-based result and serves to provide a weekly institutional sentiment measure. This appears
to be the most suited measure to use when establishing the merits of other possible measures. The
drawbacks of using such a measure is the relationship to momentum: the past six-month index
returns Granger-cause the BBSt time series. Thus, one should caution the use and applicability
as it pertains to historical market performance, and not necessarily current or future sentiment.
Brown & Cliff (2004) find that the recent return is the most important determinant of market
sentiment.
From section 3.5.4, there was very little evidence to suggest that any of the measures derived
from trading activity are consistent with the BBSt or display any significance across sub-periods
considered. Segmenting the entire time period enables the relationships to be explained precisely
130
and within context of market conditions. The bull–bear spread is positively correlated to the VIX
and to η3t . The remainder of the variables alternate in sign across periods. It is also positively
correlated to the modified put–call ratio.
Examined independently, a bullish sentiment increase is accompanied by an increase in the VIX.
Seeing that the bull–bear spread is a weekly measure based on momentum, movements in the
VIX (both values are those that correspond to the date t, the VIX is not an average of the
previous week) could indicate the survey results are a contrarian indicator for current market
conditions. The daily VIX is highly autocorrelated and increases when the market declines.
Regressions whereby the independent variable is the VIX and the dependent variable the BBSt
do not provide any convincing or significant relationships, thus the correlations should be treated
with caution. The correlation of BBSt to η
3
t seems to agree with the result of Han (2007): a less
negative skew is indicative of bullish market sentiment. This relationship, over the sub-periods, is
statistically insignificant when η3t is regressed on BB
S
t . The modified PCR is a weighted average
of the volume of all OTM puts to OTM calls (SPX options). The way such trades may affect
the implied volatility, and consequently the RND, is through the demand and supply thereof.
As discussed in Bollen & Whaley (2004), the upward sloping supply curve results in higher
implied volatility for certain options. However, this parameter displays no clear relationship to
the remaining variables.
Considering the regressions results, none of the variables considered displayed a consistent and
significant relationship to the bull–bear spread. Regarding the risk-neutral skew of BKM, the
results are in contrast to the monthly regressions performed by Han (2007). This may have arisen
as the method employed here interpolated implied volatility, prior to calculating the integrals,
discussed in Rehman & Vilkov (2010). Regardless of what may have been the cause of this, the
results indicate that neither the BKM MFISt or η
3
t contain information relating to survey data.
Nor does the probability measure RNDbt . Thus the question arises: what can be understood
about market sentiment from the information contained in the RND and from that of the higher
moments?
To further answer this, those relationships will be clarified below.
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3.6.2 The Probability Measure pRNDt
Option contracts provide the means with which to hedge the market’s decline and to benefit from
any speculative gains. The probability attached to attaining the current ATM futures level is that
probability which may provide insight into whether the aggregate market perceives an increase
or a decrease. Hence, the cumulative probability derived from the RND has been selected as the
variable of interest, with those of the higher moments: the VIX and the skew (both risk-neutral
MFISt and that of the robust moments approach η
3
t ) and the smirk, σ
smirk
t .
Examining the correlations is a first step to gauge consistent relationships between the pRNDt and
the remaining variables. The PCR and modified PCR are ruled out at this stage as further results
(which have been omitted) serve to confirm their insignificance. Regressions in section 3.5.5 for
both the MFISt and η
3
t (more so in the second instance) display a consistent positive relationship
with pRNDt . That is, an increase in the skew (less negative) results in an increase in the prob-
ability measure. A consistent negative relationship, although insignificant in the crisis period,
exists between the smirk and the probability; as the smirk increases, the probability measure
decreases. In total, the more negatively skewed the distribution, the greater the smirk, and the
less the probability measure. This then implies that pRNDt is in fact a bearish sentiment measure,
assuming the remaining variables are indeed closely related to current market sentiment. If it is
the case that an increase in the smirk and a decrease in the skew implies a decrease in market
sentiment, then one may assume that the overall relationship that exists between these variables
as a combined measure, can be used as reference relative to historical levels, much like the VIX
serves as a ‘fear gauge’.
3.6.3 The BKM MFISt
The most notable and surprising result when establishing the merits of the risk-neutral measure
of Bakshi et al. (2003) is that the relationship to the weekly bull–bear spread does not hold here
using weekly data; monthly data were more in line with Han (2007). Whether the survey result
is indeed an artefact of historical performance is not being questioned, however the applicability
thereof as a sentiment measure that is current should be regarded with caution. This does not
imply that the MFISt should be considered a replacement thereto, however market trades cannot
be superseded by stale data, which is primarily what a survey result may provide. The evidence
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here conflicts with the monthly results of Han (2007) with regard to momentum as well as the
VIX.
Considering the OLS regressions in section 3.5.5, the relationship with pRNDt is such that as the
probability measure increases, the distribution is more negatively skewed. Examining Granger
causality, it is the case that the BKM MFISt Granger-causes the probability measure. The
relationship between MFISt and η
3
t is inconsistent. Seeing that both are skewness measures of
the same data, the relationship that exists is incomprehensible within the context of the regression
data. The relationship with the VIX is inconsistent across sub-periods, and significant in the crisis
period indicating that an increase in the VIX is accompanied by a less negative MFISt. This
seems counterintuitive: as the market experiences severe declines (increases in the VIX), the
perception of pessimistic outcomes is exacerbated. Han (2007) too found a positive coefficient
when the skew was regressed on the VIX. The relationship to the smirk is robust across periods:
an increase in the smirk serves to decrease the skew further which results from more probability
mass in the left-hand side of the distribution.
Considering that momentum is positively related to the skew and the bull–bear spread, it is
perplexing to see that MFISt does not conform to these relationships. In particular, when
examining the relationship with the daily log-returns, it was surprisingly the case that positive
contemporaneous returns were accompanied by a decrease in the risk-neutral skew. This then
implies that current positive returns creates future bearish sentiment, as measured by the skew.
This is at odds with the optimism that usually is accompanied by positive returns; in fact, the
reverse holds true for η3t as there is a positive relationship with contemporaneous daily returns,
as well as momentum.
Examining the above, one can only conclude that the varied and somewhat unexpected rela-
tionships that exist yields the MFISt, as calculated according to the method described in sec-
tion 3.2.2, is indeterminate. Therefore, this raises the question of the validity of previous results.
3.6.4 The Robust Third Moment η3t
The robust moments approach is a purely numerical construct derived as a means to adapt
the moments of the Black–Scholes lognormal returns distribution as determined numerically by
PCA; they are arbitrary in nature. Examining the third of such moments serves to indicate the
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statistical significance and therefore, possible relevance thereof. Consistent relationships that
exist between η3, pRNDt , the VIX and the daily log-returns give credence to such a construct,
irrespective of the insignificance of the relationships with the weekly BBSt or MFISt.
In summary, as η3t becomes more negative, p
RND
t decreases. Granger causality runs in both
directions as the variables are derived from the same construct. Increases in the VIX, which are
accompanied by negative returns, serve to decrease η3t further. η
3
t is statistically significant and
positively related to both contemporaneous daily log-returns, recent market movements (log-
returns of up to two months) and momentum, as measured by the past six-month log-return.
This is in line with the research of Amin, Coval & Seyhun (2004), and with the results found in
Han (2007). η3t also decreases as the smirk increases.
The results here firmly qualify this robust moment as a possible candidate to measure daily
sentiment. Given the statistical significance of the relationship with other variables, the RND
therefore gives rise to a higher moment which is consistent in terms of relationships with relevant
variables.
3.6.5 The Smirk σsmirkt
The smirk is a measure of the slope of the implied volatility function and is calculated as the
difference between the implied volatility of the OTM put options and the ATM call options.
The purpose of inclusion here was as a control for the MFISt: the greater the smirk, the more
negative the skew of the risk-neutral distribution. This holds true for both MFISt and η
3
t . This
agrees with the result in Han (2007) in which index risk-neutral skewness becomes more negative
when there is a higher demand for the OTM index put options relative to the near and ATM
index options. This is consistent with the relation between the relative demand of index options
and the slope of the index option smile.
Regressions involving pRNDt indicated that an increase in the smirk served to decrease the prob-
ability measure; the result was statistically insignificant in the second period. The VIX and the
smirk exhibit positive correlation across periods indicating that increases in fear (VIX) lead to
higher OTM put implied volatility or a lower ATM call implied volatility. No statistically signif-
icant relationship was seen to exist in response to movements in daily returns or momentum.
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3.6.6 The VIX
Han (2007) selects control variables because they are related to the index option volatility smile
skewness, since a negative index risk-neutral skewness is closely related to the index option
volatility smile (Bakshi et al. 2003). The VIX is used as a proxy for the instantaneous volatility of
index return and represents the average implied volatility of the ATM index options 30 days before
expiration. Han finds that index risk-neutral skewness is less negative when market volatility is
higher. The relationship between MFISt and the VIX conforms to this during the crisis period.
Contrary to this, the moment η3t displays a negative and significant relationship with the VIX.
To account for such a discrepancy, one may attempt to explain both sets of results. The VIX
increases as the market index declines. Such uncertainty leads market participants to seek out
those investments which pay out in bad states of the world, driving up the prices of the OTM
put options. Doing so further decreases the risk-neutral skew and increases the smirk. This
is consistent with the daily log-returns, the VIX, η3t and the smirk, σ
smirk
t . The relationship
with pRNDt is not as clear, however η
3
t seems to be a preferable variable in this context. As for
MFISt, it does not display a consistent relationship with the VIX nor seems to coincide with
η3t on various occasions. The results in Han (2007) seem to raise a question, specifically if recent
positive returns (a lower level in the VIX) results in less negative skewness. Based on this, one
should expect that the coefficient of the VIX, as an independent variable in an OLS regression,
should be negative as is the case with η3t .
3.7 Conclusion and Practical Applications
This chapter has contributed to a broad spectrum of sentiment research by assuming that in-
stitutional investor sentiment is extracted from their trade decisions using equity index options.
Further, using a fully non-parametric approach to find the RND, the cumulative probability as
well as third robust moment have been examined in relation to both survey- and market-based
measures. This has been performed using both weekly and daily frequencies (where applicable)
which may render these measures far more suitable as a current measure of such sentiment. Ad-
ditionally, these measures have been examined over different market regimes to find that η3t is the
most consistent measure. Multiple regressions have been performed to find η3t to be the superior
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option-implied sentiment measure which is conditional on current pricing and reflects the outlook
for the aggregate market over the next 30-day period, as measured on date t.
Index option markets are ostensibly a means to insure against equity declines for large institu-
tional investors. Given the depth of these markets, the information content therein is indispens-
able. The RND that can be inferred for a given maturity reflects the beliefs of those investors.
This research has attempted to convey the superior information pertaining to investor sentiment
which is readily available on a daily basis. Extracting the RND using PCA yields both moments
as well as the cumulative probability pRNDt of aggregate investors. This shifts daily as do beliefs.
Hence, pRNDt renders itself suitable as a current forward-looking indirect sentiment measure.
In an effort to establish coherence between the selected variables, evidence suggests that although
derived from a similar source data, some relationships give rise to contrasting results, contingent
on the market regime and frequency of data. The survey-based measure BBSt is highly influ-
enced by past performance as momentum Granger-causes the bull–bear spread. The volatility
regime is also responsible for the conviction of the measure. Weekly BBSt regression results are
unconvincing; proceeding to daily data, results between the probability measure pRNDt , η
3
t , the
VIX and σsmirkt , are consistent across market regimes.
In response to positive daily log-returns as well as positive momentum, the VIX declines and the
skew η3t becomes less negative. As this occurs, the probability measure increases. The σ
smirk
t
decreases as η3t increases. Thus, the implied volatilities as well as option prices which yield the
RND, and in particular the probability pRNDt and robust moment η
3
t , seem to be consistent with
the VIX as well as the smirk when establishing perceptions about future stock market movements.
These variables may serve as an indication of whether supply or demand factors are responsible
for movements in the skew, and therefore the probability attached to attaining (or exceeding) the
ATM futures level. Positive daily returns serve to increase both the skew η3t and p
RND
t . Both the
VIX and the smirk decrease; the latter failed to indicate a direct relationship to either returns
or momentum, but rather to η3t . Short-term movements in the skew may be a result of spread
betting and therefore this in conjunction with other RND implied measures may serve to be more
useful as a sentiment indicator.
The RND is a numerical construct and, naturally, altering the input grid parameter is likely
to effect the quantitative element of the relationships. However, the qualitative results remain
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intact over the period January 2005 to October 2010. The option-implied measures of the RND
present a dynamic relationship which is consistent across time and can be used as a means to
understand how market participants react to past and current market movement. The extent of
such measurements relative to historical levels can be used as a means to establish the extent of
bullish or bearish sentiment on a daily basis.
Sentiment is often used as relative measure to gauge perceptions regarding future market move-
ments. The value is only ever meaningful in relation to the history. Practical applications for such
measures are often limited to extracting a perception of the aggregate conditional outlook of such
investors. In order to use the information content of any sentiment-related measure, one requires
a strategy based on possible differences between the option-implied and actual sentiment which
can be exploited for financial gain. The latter measure is often a subjective or forecasted value of
the movement in the underlying. In particular, the moments of the RND have been previously
sighted in a similar vane with reference to the impact of macro data releases on such measures.
Ederington & Lee (1996) find that the uncertainty, as measured by the standard deviation of
ATM options within the T-Bond, Eurodollar, and Deutschemark options markets, decreases af-
ter scheduled information releases. They find “...that market participants apparently do take
into account the schedule of upcoming announcements in forming their expectations of likely
future volatility.” Given that implied standard deviations consistently fall following earnings
announcements, they explore the possibility of a profitable trading strategy based on this. With
respect to unscheduled announcements, implied standard deviations rise. Fornani & Mele (2001)
examine prices of options and futures on Italian 10-year bonds with shortest maturity traded on
LIFFE between 199 and 1997. The impact of news on the terminal points of the volatility smile
are selected from the deepest ITM and OTM options, as opposed the the ATM options. News
belongs to two categories: (i) scheduled news: CPI, PPI, at-issue yield of the T-bills ,repo rate of
the Bank of Italy; (ii) unscheduled news: headline news from the Italian leading newspaper; news
pertaining to the volatility of the exchange rate. The study was conducted in accordance with
Ederington & Lee (1996) – they examine the effect of news on the implied standard deviation of
options written on futures contracts with the shortest available maturity. Daily rates of change of
the implied volatility (IV) of each moneyness level are regressed on the dummy variables which
record the arrival of scheduled and unscheduled news; in general, the results are as expected.
The (un)scheduled news coefficient takes a (positive) negative sign. In particular, the arrival of
unscheduled bad news tends to increase the IV over the life of the option; good news does not
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alter the IV. For the case of scheduled news, only the release of the CPI was significant for ITM
and OTM options, and reduced the expected variance on days of scheduled announcements. The
slope and skewness of the volatility smile is affected by this news release: there’s a reduction
in the difference between OTM and ATM, as well as between the ITM and ATM options. In
conclusion, the three extreme points of the volatility smile - ITM, ATM and OTM volatility - are
affected by the arrival of news.
Of relevance here is the research of Bebera & Brandt (2006). The authors examine the state price
density (SPD) of US Treasury bond markets shortly before and after macro news announcements.
Regardless of content, the announcements reduce uncertainty in the second implied moment
shortly after news release. The changes in the higher moments depend on the news content. Their
results are consistent with time-varying risk aversion (habit formation) - they disentangle changes
in beliefs from changes in preferences. Asset prices are a reflection of cash flows and discount
rates. Riskfree government bonds have fixed cash flows and therefore, only the discount rates are
relevant. The state price density is distinct from the objective probability density function (PDF)
since it combines beliefs of market participants about the likelihood of certain states and their
preferences towards these states. A high value might indicate that market participants believe the
state to be relatively likely and/or dislike the state. Changes in the SPD due to macroeconomic
announcements can be related to changes in either beliefs or preference. Thus, they examine
how the SPD of bond prices changes in response to information releases and then disentangle the
two components to infer the changes specific to beliefs and preferences respectively. Data: US
Treasury bond futures prices from transactions from CBOT over a 5-year period (1995-1999).
The SPDs are from the Edgeworth expansions around log-normal densities short before and after
scheduled announcements are considered. Results indicate that news content is immaterial to the
implied second moment of the SPD; the higher moments are not innocuous to such content. The
direction and magnitude of the changes in higher order moments is contingent upon such content.
They find“The SPD becomes less (more) negatively skewed and less (more) fat-tailed in response
to bad (good) news for the bond market. Furthermore, the results are asymmetric, in that bad
news has a greater impact on the higher-order moments of the SPD than does good news”.
They show that the changes in the higher-order moments are consistent with time-varying risk
aversion. Bad news for the bond market leads market participants to become less risk averse and
for the SPD to be more similar to the PDF. Bad news for the bond market implies good news for
economic prospects. News announcements consists of the set of the following ten announcements,
138
and is fairly complete: inflation, measured by the consumer price index (CPI) and producer price
index (PPI); the situation in the labour market measured by the civilian unemployment rate
(CUR) and non-farm payrolls (NFP); the dynamic of consumption by the retail sales (RS); the
state of the economy by the industrial production (IP); the perceived state of the economy by
consumer confidence (CC) and the national association of purchasing managers index (NAPM);
the conditions of the money market by the Federal Open Market Committee federal funds target
rate (FOMC) and the situation in the real estate market by housing starts (HS). Thus, the higher
moments of the RND which have been used to infer sentiment of those investors that participate
in the particular markets can be used to find strategies which exploit superior knowledge or
forecasts of such macro data releases.
139
Chapter 4
Sentiment Propagation and Portfolio
Insurance
4.1 Introduction
Sentiment within an economy need not be subject to influences which pertain exclusively to that
domestic environment; the integration of financial markets and cross-border activity has become
a conduit for current and forward-looking opinions, often resulting in capital flows based on
these preferences. This is analogous to, and very much linked with, financial crises which tend
to spread across borders due to the globalisation of economies. Global sentiment propagation
has received little attention as most sentiment studies focus on specific financial markets; the
measures are often representative of certain groups of investors. The focus of this research is to
explore how sentiment (pertaining to financial markets) propagates. As mentioned in Chan, Faff
& Hwang (2009), understanding sentiment contagion is important from an investment perspective
as investors are concerned about adverse stock price movements, excess volatility, and increased
correlation. The latter is particularly relevant as this reduces the benefits of diversification.
Sentiment propagation is likely to be closely related to financial contagion.
Given that measuring sentiment within a specific financial market is subject to much debate,
further investigation into the channels through which it filters across markets is therefore non-
trivial. Survey-based measures and direct stock market activity attempt to merge often divergent
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opinions into an all-encompassing quantum. Thus, sentiment measures of a reference country may
either be captured by responses of the demographic that partake in consumer/investor confidence
surveys or are derived from domestic trading, respectively.
Consumer confidence indices exist for a number of developed and emerging markets. The results
thereof are indicative of the general macroeconomic outlook and, given the monthly frequency,
cannot readily be used as an accurate indication of investor sentiment pertaining to current
and expected near-term market movements. The causal relationship between the stock market
and consumer confidence has been established: momentum tends to positively affect confidence.
Sentiment is ultimately an amalgamation of opinions which are then transformed into actions.
Low-frequency macro news releases – output, trade and inflation data – establish the general
perception of the current and expected macroeconomic environment. Stock markets tend to
react to macroeconomic news of both the domestic and US economy, the dominant economy.
This serves to enhance or refute investors’ bullishness or bearishness. Within the context of
financial markets, sentiment refers to the aggregation of attitudes of a select group of investors,
retail or institutional. This will be discussed further in section 4.2.1.
Henceforth, sentiment will refer exclusively to the participants within financial markets as the
trading activity therefrom provokes almost immediate effects due to the frequency of the trans-
actions. High-frequency investor fund flows (trading activity) are thereby the direct means to
observe investor sentiment with respect to asset class or region, with capital flows being the ulti-
mate drivers of asset prices. This is crucial in order to understand financial crises and contagion.
There are multitudes of measures which are constructed in order to capture the current sentiment
of investors.
Fund flow data has been increasingly referenced as a viable means to gauge sentiment of a
reference investor group, retail or institutional. Fund flows have been empirically shown to propel
performance; it is also the case that superior performance of assets tends to draw funds. Due to
this interplay, fund flows may exhibit inertia and therefore contain momentum information. There
are however differences contingent upon which group of investors are under scrutiny. Results
reported are based on either individual funds (micro level) or on those examined in aggregate
(macro level), the latter being of primary concern henceforth.
Fund flows within US markets have been examined fairly extensively as a means to establish these
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relationships. Warther (1995) investigates aggregate equity inflows with respect to concurrent
and subsequent market-wide price movements using monthly Investment Company Institute (ICI)
aggregate mutual fund flow data. 1 Further to this, the fund flows are examined to determine
whether they can be considered to be those of feedback or contrarian traders. The research is
novel in the attempt to bridge fund flows and sentiment which is measured using the closed-end
fund discount (CEFD) of Lee et al. (1990). Warther rationalises price moments in response to
mutual fund flows: information revelation by such flows (directional trading based on common
new information, propelling markets which results in a positive correlation), and price pressures
or investor sentiment. The latter is particularly relevant here. Fund flows are alluded to as
an indicator of unsophisticated investor sentiment. Should sentiment be a significant factor in
financial markets, and if flows into mutual funds are indeed an appropriate measure of that
sentiment, it then follows that flows into funds should have a compelling positive correlation with
returns. Aggregate inflows are found to be strongly correlated with contemporaneous aggregate
returns. The evidence indicates that aggregate fund flows are not positively related to past
returns; the failure to detect price reversals is inconsistent with the presence of price pressures.
To the contrary, flows are negatively related to past monthly returns. Thus, mutual fund investors
appear to be somewhat contrarian. However, using the CEFD (noise trader sentiment measure),
no such evidence was found, which either invalidates the use of the CEFD as a sentiment measure
or may imply that fund flows capture a different aspect of sentiment.
Ben-Rephael, Kandel & Wohl (2010) investigate a proxy for monthly shifts between bond funds
and equity funds in the US using ICI aggregate fund flow data. Their sample covers a longer
period than that of Warther (1995). The derived flow measure labelled ‘net exchanges’ captures
shifts into equity funds. It is positively contemporaneously correlated with aggregate stock mar-
ket excess returns and negatively related to subsequent excess market returns. Given that net
exchanges reflect asset allocation decisions between bonds and equity, the authors assume it is
related to demand or supply shocks driven by economic conditions or investor sentiment. They
find that net exchanges are related to stock market risk, yielding a sentiment measure which
forecasts excess aggregate market returns. Thus, sentiment is then captured by examining flows
between asset classes.
Investor sentiment measures beyond the direct survey-based indices tend to be illusive. The means
1http://www.ici.org/
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to gauge whether mutual funds can be used as a sentiment measure are limited to exploring the
time series relation to such survey results, as in Indro (2004), and the CEFD. Further studies
which explore fund flows and sentiment within the US are presented in section 4.2.4. These studies
are concerned exclusively with those funds domiciled within the US. Expanding the investor base
(both retail and institutional) to funds domiciled globally enables further exploration to either
validate or refute the use of fund flows as a sentiment measure. Due to the US being considered
a dominant market force, dedicated US funds from investors domiciled globally are likely to
measure global sentiment.
Fratzscher (2011) analyses cross-border fund flows to as a means to establish global capital flow
determinants using a dataset provided by Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR) Global,
a US-based firm that tracks the flows and allocations of funds domiciled globally. Specifically,
Fratzscher examines the surge in capital flows with regards to the sub-prime crisis and finds that
key events, as well as changes to global liquidity and risk, exerted a large effect on capital flows
in both the crisis and recovery. The effects were heterogenous across countries, which can be
explained by the strength of domestic fundamentals, country risk and differences in the quality
of domestic institutions. An overall combination of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors were at play. ‘Push’
factors refer to common shocks and effect all countries whereas ‘pull’ factors are country-specific
determinants and refer to real divergences between emerging market economies (EMEs) and
advanced economies (AEs). The crisis period was marked with capital flows into bonds within
developed economies whilst the recovery period was characterised by a surge of capital flows into
emerging economies. The paper analyses the different drivers of global capital flows in order
to establish the significance of global shocks for capital flows. A factor model is developed to
distinguish between global shocks (liquidity, risks and macro news shocks) and country-specific
shocks. The findings suggest it is in fact the global factors which are accountable for a large
proportion of the global capital flows observed during the crisis. Comprehension of both the
causes and effects of capital flows is heralded as being crucial in order to determine how future
crises may pan out.
Capital is allotted to various categories of assets, most notably equities and bonds, contingent
upon risk aversion as well as macroeconomic conditions. Hakkio & Keeton (2009) propose a
financial stress index comprised of key variables which correspond to episodes of heightened
angst in the economy. Recurring key phenomena have been associated with financial stress,
143
the presence and relative strength thereof may differ across episodes. Increased uncertainty
about the fundamental value of assets results in increased volatility in financial markets, the VIX
being considered the prime ‘fear gauge’. Prospective cash flows from stocks, bonds and loans
all depend on future economic conditions. Thus, uncertainty about the fundamental values of
these assets reflects greater uncertainty about the outlook for the economy. Another relevant
indication of financial stress is a decreased willingness to hold risky financial assets as investors’
risk appetite falls. Financial distress has also been associated with capital flows shifting from
equity to bonds, known as the ‘flight-to-quality’ (‘flight-to-safety’) phenomenon. This change in
preferences commands a higher expected return on risky assets and a lower return on safer assets
(bonds).
Given that funds tend to abide by the flight-to-safety hypothesis, with the US and other ad-
vanced economies being regarded as safe-havens, global capital flows adjust to account for global
macroeconomic conditions as well as country-specific factors. With regard to the US, fund flows
of US-domiciled investors have been analysed to find relationships between the flows, aggregate
market returns and sentiment. However, these studies have yet to incorporate capital flows into
the US from non-US domiciled investors. Doing so grants access to the investment decisions of
those investors which are concerned with both the US economy and associated expected returns,
as well as the global macro environment and relative returns of other markets.
Research which examines how sentiment propagates to various markets is limited. Baker, Wurgler
& Yuan (2011) examine whether investor sentiment is contagious across countries. They use US
capital flows to the five other countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the UK) to quantify
the extent of integration between these markets. Based on the supposition that high sentiment
forecasts low returns in the cross-section, their research affirms that sentiment is a contrarian
indicator. They propose that ‘countries with high absolute flows may be subject to sentiment
propagation’. By virtue of the US being a dominant market force, the authors demonstrate that
high US sentiment will predict negative returns to a greater extent if capital flows from the US
are high. Low US sentiment is deemed to predict positive future returns to a greater extent if
capital flows back to the US are high. Cross-border capital flows appear to be a channel through
which sentiment propagates, further influenced by macroeconomic conditions and policies, as well
as financial market conditions.
Having briefly introduced the concepts to be further explored, it is clear that sentiment with
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respect to a particular investor group and market is transient and contingent on the definition
of sentiment. Most often, sentiment within financial markets is quantified from numerous data
which include IPO activity, CEFDs, option volume ratios and equity share in new issues; it is also
the case that such measures are combined to remove common information contain within all such
measures (Baker & Wurgler 2006, Lemmon & Ni 2008). Thereafter, the nature of the sentiment
measure is determined by inspecting the behaviour with respect to one period-ahead aggregate
returns, or with that to the cross-section of returns. Most often, irrespective of frequency, senti-
ment is deemed contrarian. Thus, optimism precedes downwards market movements. In order to
proceed, the means with which to capture sentiment within a given market is assumed to be fund
flows. The current research commences with an in-depth theoretical review of related literature
in an attempt to further consolidate the use of cross-border capital flows as a means to propagate
sentiment (Part I). Once this has been accomplished, the assumption derived therefrom serves as
the basis for the subsequent empirical section (Part II) in which the relation between global in-
stitutional investor sentiment (as measured by capital flows) and portfolio insurance is explored.
Hence the question of whether global sentiment has a ‘spillover’ effect into US aggregate equity
options markets is addressed by examining lagged relationship with related variables.
Put options are tantamount to insurance and pay off in adverse conditions; conversely, call
options provide access to upside. Index options are appropriate to identify institutional investor
portfolio insurance, as pessimistic perceptions of near-term aggregate equity market performance
necessitates the use of put options to insure against market declines (Bates 2003). Prices of
these options vary according to supply and demand, thereby resulting in the implied volatility
skew for equity options since out-the-money index put options are relatively expensive. This
research employs S&P 500 European index (SPX) options, as the aggregate US equity market
will be represented by the underlying index. Index options markets have been considered a
primary avenue wherein investor sentiment manifests (Shefrin 1999). Specifically, the risk-neutral
distribution (RND) of an underlying index is essentially the market’s opinion of the underlying’s
expected returns, adjusted for risk aversion. Option-implied skewness provides an indication of
whether institutional investors are indeed concerned with market declines. Han (2007) examines
whether investor sentiment about the stock market affects the prices of SPX options. Han finds
that the index option volatility smile is steeper (flatter) and the risk-neutral skewness of monthly
index return is more (less) negative when market sentiment becomes more bearish (bullish). The
non-parametric skew is measured using the method of Bakshi et al. (2003); they demonstrate the
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index option volatility smile complementary to the negative skewness of the RND index return.
The method to be applied here is that of Bondarenko (2000) wherein the option-implied skew is
defined as the third robust moment of the RND of the index returns, η3t , where t refers to the
current date, and it is assumed that the nearest option maturity is selected. The daily implied
skew using SPX options data over the period January 2005 to October 2010 (Chapter 3) yielded
a consistent relationship to the VIX and the underlying S&P 500 index. Empirical evidence in
Chapter 3 finds that an increase in the equity index tends to be accompanied by a decrease in
the VIX, and an increase in the option-implied skew (it becomes less negative). Assuming that
the option-implied measure may be indicative of ex ante forward-looking sentiment, we therefore
exploit the information contained in SPX options. The nearest maturity will be selected (up
to eight days before expiry) as sentiment is likely to impact investors’ perceptions of immediate
market movements more so than those with maturities thereafter. Thus, option-implied skewness
can be considered another means with which to gauge investors’ perceptions regarding future asset
returns.
The second part of this chapter empirically explores the precise relation of institutional investor
sentiment to portfolio insurance. Assuming that sentiment is propagated via capital flows (Part I)
and option-implied skewness is related to institutional forward-looking sentiment, it is conceivable
to expect recent positive aggregate equity fund performance to result in a contemporaneous
increase in the index skew (less negative) as investors become more optimistic about near-term
returns; it may also be the case that increases in bond flows are associated with a decrease in the
skew (more negative) as investors become more risk averse.
In essence, we seek to establish whether global institutional investor sentiment which comprises
the sentiment of both US and non-US domiciled investors, the latter being propagated via cross-
border flows, is attuned to the sentiment within US options markets, and analogously, institu-
tional portfolio insurance. Dedicated US equity and bond fund flows of both US and non-US
domiciled funds from EPFR Global are employed to determine whether weekly increases in bond
flows result in a decrease in the skew (Hypothesis 1) and whether this decrease is proportional to
the increase that may result from recent consistent positive equity fund performance (Hypothe-
sis 2).
This chapter is organised as follows. Part I is a purely theoretical account of the literature which
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seeks to substantiate the use of cross-border fund flows as a vein for sentiment propagation.
Therein, section 4.2.1 discusses sentiment in relation to the macroeconomy and equity returns,
section 4.2.2 discusses macroeconomic fundamentals and aggregate returns, and section 4.2.3
briefly examines the integration of financial markets. Thereafter, fund flows and their relation
to aggregate market returns and investor sentiment are discussed in section 4.2.4. Part I is the
justification for the assumption upon which the basis of Part II is formed.
Part II then uses the results of Part I to determine whether global institutional investor senti-
ment infuses into the index options market. The hypotheses are formally stated in section 4.3.
Section 4.3.1 discusses the S&P 500 index European options and gives a brief account of the
method to be employed to calculate the skew of the RND, section 4.3.2 details the EPFR Global
fund flow dataset as well as all other financial market data to be incorporated. Monthly flow
data is briefly reviewed in section 4.3.3 whilst the bulk of the empirical analysis is discussed in
section 4.3.4.
Section 3.7 concludes and summarises the analysis and results.
4.2 Part I: Sentiment Propagation and Cross-Border Fund Flows
The first part of this research is a purely theoretical account of macroeconomic, sentiment and
financial market integration. It draws upon various strands of finance research as a means to
convincingly establish the premise on which Part II is based. That is, by referencing key ideas
and empirical evidence, it appears to be the case that sentiment propagation is tantamount to
cross-border capital fund flows.
4.2.1 Sentiment, the Macroeconomy and Equity Returns
Equity markets within each country represent corporate wealth and are a reflection of the robust-
ness of the real economy to a large extent. Consumer confidence indices are an aggregation of
responses to standard questions posed which reflect current and expected macroeconomic condi-
tions as well as stock market momentum. Otoo (1999) finds that changes in US equity values are
contemporaneously correlated with changes in consumer confidence using the Michigan Consumer
Confidence index. Consumer confidence is Granger-caused by aggregate market returns in the
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US. Increases in equity prices boost consumer confidence with a (short) lag, however the reverse
does not hold. In principle, higher stock prices may boost consumption via the confidence chan-
nel. Positive stock price movements translate into more wealth and therefore increased optimism.
This direct confidence effect, which is related to the traditional wealth effect, is deemed to be less
important in continental Europe than in the US since European households invest a smaller share
of their wealth in stocks. In addition to this, higher stock prices may be interpreted by economic
agents as a sign of future favourable economic conditions. The leading indicator property of
stock prices provides a channel through which equity prices may influence the behaviour of all
consumers, regardless of whether they directly invest in the stock market. Granger causality from
the aggregate market to confidence has also been established to hold in 11 European countries
at very short horizons of two weeks to a month (Jansen & Nahuis 2003). Jansen and Nahuis find
that the stock market–confidence relationship is driven by expectations about macroeconomic
conditions rather than personal finances, thereby distinguishing the confidence channel from the
traditional wealth effect.
Deteriorating macroeconomic data (core CPI, inflation, productivity and consumer sentiment to
a large extent) for any major economy for an extended period of time leads to a deterioration in
confidence. Matsusaka & Sbordone (1995) note that all recessions for the postwar period were
preceded by a decline in confidence; this was seen to hold in Chapter 2 for both the US and UK.
This can be interpreted as either that consumers accurately predicted recessions or that declining
confidence resulted in a reduction in output. Examining the US economy between 1953 and 1988,
Matsusaka and Sbordone explore the relationship between sentiment and gross national product
(GNP). The uncertainty of whether confidence causes or anticipates GNP forms the basis of
the vector autoregression (VAR) after controlling for fundamentals 2 and other publicly available
predictors of output. They find causality running from confidence to GNP.
International evidence regarding confidence and the aggregate stock market is researched in
Schmeling (2009) across 18 industrialised markets. Motivation is based on the statistically and
economically significant contrarian nature of the relationship between sentiment (consumer con-
fidence) and returns: periods of higher investor optimism tend to be followed by lower returns
for the aggregate market; sentiment therefore predicts future aggregate market returns. The
consumer confidence time series data is autocorrelated (highly persistent) but stationary. Con-
2Control variables include the Index of Leading Indicators, government expenditure, the difference in interest
rate between six-month commercial paper and the six-month Treasury bill rate, termed ‘default risk’.
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fidence correlation coefficients are not significant. More precisely, several countries exhibited a
large correlation, almost no correlation or a negative correlation. The results hold for both levels
and changes of consumer confidence series. Bivariate Granger causality tests between sentiment
measures and stock returns indicated a two-way ‘causality’: sentiment depends on previous re-
turns and returns depend on previous sentiment movements. Higher sentiment tends to forecast
lower returns. Cross-sectionally, the impact of sentiment on stock returns is higher for those
countries with less market integrity and those that are culturally more prone to herd-like be-
haviour and over-reaction. The tests control for fundamental factors which include inflation, the
annual percentage change in industrial production, the term spread, the dividend yield and the
detrended (six months) short rate. Conducting panel regressions, a significantly negative relation
between sentiment and returns is established, which is congruent with theoretical expectations
of the impact of noise traders as well as prior empirical findings for the US. Furthermore, the
effect of sentiment on average future returns declines with the forecast horizon and varies across
countries. The predictive power of sentiment is most noticeable for short- and medium-term
horizons of one to six months and is diluted over longer horizons of 12 to 24 months.
Thus consumer confidence has been shown to be a monthly contrarian sentiment measure of
aggregate market returns. Evidence suggests that market returns Granger-cause confidence.
Confidence within the US Granger-caused GNP within a VAR framework. Aggregate investors
react to macro news in the near term, as can be evidenced by Ratanapakorn & Sharma (2007),
thereby shifting prices away from fundamental values which revert back over time. This is
explained by under- and over-reaction to earnings news in the behavioural model of Barberis,
Shleifer & Vishny (1997). Consumer confidence indices are relatively low-frequency and likely
unable to capture these behavioural traits. Weekly sentiment indices are therefore more suited
for this purpose.
Further to consumer confidence, Fisher & Statman (2003) examine the difference between retail
(small), medium and large investor sentiment survey-based measures between 1985 and 1998.
Large investors are defined as Wall Street sell-side strategists; the relevant sentiment measure is
compiled using monthly data from Merrill Lynch, defined as the mean allocation to stocks in their
recommended portfolios. Medium investor sentiment is represented by the Investors Intelligence
(II) weekly survey data from Chartcraft. The sentiment data is considered a contrarian indicator:
investors are advised to sell when the proportion of bullish writers is high. Sentiment of small
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investors is from the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII). They further seek
to establish whether investor sentiment forecasts stock returns. In particular, they investigate
whether positive equity returns precede sentiment exuberance. More importantly, they hope to
determine whether individual investors follow their sentiment with consistent investment action.
The ramifications thereof may ultimately invalidate the use of these measures as the trades
ultimately determine sentiment within financial markets.
Fisher and Statman find that the relationship between the AAII and II measures is significant
over the period, whereas the relationship between the Wall Street strategists and the other two
investor groups is not. Individual investors become bullish as newsletter writers become so, yet
not in sync. Analysing the relationship between the level of sentiment and future returns of the
S&P 500 (large cap stocks), the level of AAII and that of Wall Street strategists are reliable
contrarian indicators of future S&P 500 returns: there is a negative and statistically significant
relationship between the sentiment level both groups of investors and returns in the following
month. Regarding monthly II data, Fisher and Statman find that the relation between the level
of sentiment of newsletter writers and S&P 500 returns in the following month is negative, but not
statistically significant. No evidence of a significant relationship between the change in sentiment
in one month and stock returns in the subsequent month exists.
Considering that stock returns are paramount among those factors that affect sentiment, it is
unclear whether momentum or reversals are expected. Fisher and Statman find a positive and
statistically significant relationship between returns and future changes in II sentiment. 3 They
also find a positive and statistically significant relationship between returns and changes in both
II and AAII sentiment during the month. Returns had an insignificant effect on the sentiment
of the Wall Street strategists. Addressing the question of whether individual investor (AAII)
sentiment is in agreement with their actions, they examine the monthly AAII asset allocation
survey: individual investors did follow their sentiment with investment action, as was depicted by
a positive and statistically significant relationship between the monthly change in the sentiment
of individual investors and the monthly change in the stock allocation in their portfolios.
Consensus regarding measures of sentiment is largely absent. The above brief review, primarily
concerned with survey-based measures and in particular consumer confidence, serves as a means
3Clarke & Statman (1998) found that II sentiment is based on expected continuations of short-term stock
returns and reversals of long-term returns.
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to determine whether the aggregate attitude of those at large can be used to forecast returns.
Sentiment is often viewed as a contrarian indicator. Thus high sentiment is perceived to fore-
cast low returns, at the relevant frequency. Channels have been proposed which link consumer
confidence to the stock market as a means to justify the observed relationship. Confidence is
also closely related to macroeconomic data. Studies of confidence and aggregate returns which
extend research globally seem to yield similar results to that within the US, albeit at varying
intensities based on cultural and institutional quality as in Schmeling (2009). However, sentiment
of the dominant economy (the US) is destined to affect those economies that it is both highly
dependent on and integrated with. Countries are linked through capital flows and trade, both of
which affect the country’s financial welfare. The more fiscally secure a country appears to be and
the better the fundamental macroeconomic data are, then the greater the chances of that country
withstanding exogenous shocks. Ultimately, more confidence will be bestowed upon that coun-
try. This is often expressed as greater fund flows to that country as investment prospects appear
favourable, contingent upon quality of financial institutions and policies. Real macroeconomic
variables are indicative of the current and expected near-term state of the economy and therefore,
consumer confidence is likely to capture this. Naturally, this is closely tied to the stock market
of the relevant country. The following section explores the linkages between the macroeconomy
and the stock market.
4.2.2 Macroeconomics and Equity Returns
There is a substantial volume of literature which endeavours to explain the relationship that
exists between macro variables and equity returns. Chen & Ross (1986) examine whether certain
macroeconomic variables present risks that are priced in the stock market. Specifically, they
examine the spread between long and short interest rates, expected and unexpected inflation,
industrial production (IP) and the spread between high- and low-grade bonds. Asset prices
react to news pertaining to the economy, with some news events having a more pervasive effect
than others. The comovements of asset prices suggest the presence of underlying exogenous
influences. 4 Only general economic state variables will influence the pricing of stock market
aggregates. Such variables have no direct impact on current cash flows yet describe the changing
investment opportunity set. Unanticipated changes in the risk-free interest rate influences pricing
4All economic variables are endogenous in some sense. Macro variables are considered to be exogenous with the
stock market being endogenous.
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through the time value of future cash flows as well as the risk premium. On the demand side,
changes in the indirect marginal utility of real wealth (real consumption changes) will influence
pricing indirectly though unanticipated changes in risk premia. Expected cash flows change due
to real and nominal forces. A change in the expected rate of inflation affects nominal expected
cash flows as well as the nominal rate of interest. Innovations in the rate of productivity should
have an influence on stock returns through their impact on cash flows. Using the value- and
equal-weighted NYSE index, their results confirm the relevance of several economic variables in
explaining expected returns, namely IP, changes in the risk premium, twists in the yield curve
and more weakly, measures of unanticipated inflation as well as changes in expected inflation
during periods when these variables were highly volatile. The rate of change of consumption
did not seem to be significantly related to asset pricing. Hence, stock returns are exposed to
systematic macroeconomic news and they are priced in accordance with their exposures.
Flannery & Protopapadakis (2002) establish which macroeconomic variables are responsible for
stock price movements. Given that the data affect the future investment opportunity set or
level of consumption in a non-linear and time-invariant manner, they are priced-in risk factors
in equilibrium in multifactor asset pricing models. Securities affected by undiversifiable risk
factors should necessarily earn risk premia in a risk-averse economy (Ross 1976). Hence macro
risk factors seem to be natural candidates as they influence firms’ cash flows as well as the risk-
adjusted discount rate. Flannery and Protopapadakis note that the various research has yet to
yield a consensus view regarding the impact of macro variables on equity returns; agreement
lies in the negative impact of inflation and money growth on equity values. They estimate
a GARCH model of daily equity returns in which both equity returns and their conditional
volatility are allowed to vary with a range of macroeconomic series announcements from 1980
to 1996. Macroeconomic developments vary with the economy, in contrast to previous research,
which thereby captures the underlying economic conditions. They identify three nominal variables
(CPI, PPI, and monetary aggregate – M1 or M2) and three real variables (employment report,
balance of trade and housing starts) as candidates for risk factors. Results indicated that an
increase in trading volume is associated with these factors in the returns model. IP, personal
income and sales did not significantly affect returns, conditional volatility or trading volume.
More recently, Ratanapakorn & Sharma (2007) examine the long-term and short-term relation-
ships that exist between the US stock price index (S&P 500) and six macroeconomic variables
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over the period 1975 to 1999 using monthly data. Findings indicate that Granger causality runs
from macroeconomic variables to stock prices in the long run. The selection of variables en-
compasses those of the money, goods, securities, and labour markets. 5 Short-term and long-term
interest rates have a negative impact on stock returns since an increase in interest rates may raise
financing costs, and thereby reduce future corporate profitability and stock prices. 6 The money
supply 7 affects stock prices through portfolio substitution or inflationary expectation. In the
case of the portfolio balance model, as suggested by the quantity theory of money, an increased
money supply may re-balance other assets including securities in the portfolio. An increased
supply of money may raise the discount rate through inflationary expectations, which ultimately
reduces stock prices. Alternatively, an increased money supply might enhance stock prices via
the liquidity effect. That is, higher liquidity in the economy reduces the interest rate, and con-
sequently raises stock prices. Changes in the money supply lead to increased output, and since
the money supply and output are positively correlated, the money supply and the stock prices
have a positive relationship. Thus, the relationship between the money supply and stock prices
is still uncertain. The effects of inflation on stock prices are empirically controversial. A positive
relation between stock returns and inflation has been found because equity is a hedge against
inflation. However, a negative relationship of stock returns to inflation is generally accepted. The
quantity theory of money and money demand theory result in the negative inflation-real activity
relationship. Stock returns are positively related to real variables like capital expenditures and
output which then gives rise to the negative relationship. Alternatively, increased inflation may
enhance the nominal risk-free rate, and ultimately the discount rate. This may then lead to a
decrease in stock prices which are approximated as the discounted value of expected dividends.
Earlier studies suggest that stock returns are positively related to real economic activity mea-
sured using IP. However, some studies note that asymmetric causation runs from stock returns
to real economic activity, concluding that stock prices are a component of the leading economic
indicators. Major stock fluctuations affect consumption, investment components and investment
goods and, thus, may lead to an increase in output. Alternatively, increased output may enhance
cash flows (profitability) which then results in higher stock prices.
5The authors note that the interest rate and the money supply represent the money market, whereas the inflation
and IP represent the goods market. Both stock prices and foreign exchange rates belong to the securities market.
In addition, the foreign exchange rates provide a means to explore the international effects of foreign countries on
the US economy.
6The Treasury Bill rate and the 10-year government bond rate are reflective of the short- and long-term rates.
7The narrow money supply, M1, is used.
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The study also considers the effects of the exchange rate. To incorporate the influence of foreign
countries on the US market, the yen/dollar rate (JY) is employed to represent the foreign exchange
rate. Under a free-floating exchange rate regime, the volatility of the exchange rate is greater,
creating related risks. Stock-price–exchange-rate relationships are explained on different levels.
According to micro foundations, changes in exchange rates may affect the value of firms’ portfolios
(an increase in the real dollar exchange rate serves to decrease firms’ profits and, hence firms’
stock prices). In the macro framework, the existence of a negative relationship between stock
prices and the domestic currency is predicted. 8
Ratanapakorn and Sharma find that all macroeconomic variables have an impact on the US stock
market to some extent, suggesting that the US stock prices could be predicted by these state
variables.
Interest rates are key in the stock, exchange rate and bond markets. Further examination indi-
cated that stock prices are relatively exogenous in relation to other variables because almost 87%
of its own variance is explained by its own shock even after 24 months. This implies that stock
prices are more dependent on themselves than macroeconomic variables; the causality findings
were such that there is no evidence of short-run causality from the stock prices to any other
variables, however indirect causality runs from stock prices to the exchange rate, IP and money
supply. Among six macroeconomic variables, the movement of the government bond rate seems
to have the most powerful impact on the stock prices. In conclusion, under a floating exchange
rate regime, Ratanapakorn and Sharma find a negative relationship between stock prices and
long-term interest rates, and a positive relation between stock prices and the money supply, IP,
inflation, the exchange rate and the short-term interest rate. The mixed results pertaining to in-
terest rates may be explained by considering either the improvement in the profit outlook which
increases the aggregate demand and hence investment, which thereby raises the interest rate,
or that the long-term rate is more closely related to stock prices than the short-term rate. No
short-run causality running from either macroeconomic variable to stock prices is found; all vari-
ables had influences on the stock price in the long run. Stock prices did Granger-cause interest
rates, IP, the money supply and the exchange rate either directly or indirectly in the short run.
Ratanapakorn and Sharma conclude: ‘The presence of cointegration and the causality suggests
8Under a floating exchange rate regime, if a country is export dominant, exchange rate appreciation lowers
competitiveness and negatively affects domestic stock prices. To the contrary, if a country is import dominant,
exchange rate appreciation reduces input costs and creates a positive effect on domestic stock prices.
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that the US stock market does not seem to be efficient. As such, future fluctuations of stock
prices can be forecasted by the information set provided by the macroeconomic variables.’
A range of macroeconomic variables have been examined extensively over differing time periods.
Although consensus regarding the extent to which the data affect stock prices and vice versa
differs, one may conclude that key real economic data are not insignificant when forecasting index
returns. The aggregate stock market is also considered a leading indicator, and although stock
markets have experienced excessive depreciation in a matter of days, deviation from fundamental
value in general and perceived volatility is often indicative of uncertainty regarding the future
investment opportunity set which is then classified as ‘sentiment’. Economies are generally not
closed, and therefore it is often the case that macro data news from those countries that are
closely related to the domestic economy in question will affect the stock market of the domestic
economy. Specifically, the US is regarded as a dominant force globally. The following section
discusses financial market and macroeconomic integration.
4.2.3 Globalisation and Integration of Financial Markets
Given the onset and development of globalisation, understanding the economic and financial
linkages that exist internationally is pertinent. Macroeconomic data for any economy is not only
relevant for that particular economy; its significance pertains to all those countries which have
strong economic ties to the source country. The customer countries of major exporters that
experience negative growth will impact the exporter country and ultimately the relevant real
economy, thereby altering the macroeconomic environment.
Ammer & Mei (1996) investigate the interactions among 15 industrialised countries in the post-
Bretton Woods era. They affirm that markets move in response to news regarding future dividend
growth, and are correlated across countries. They examined real and financial linkages as they
treat aspects of the stock market, the money market, the goods market, and the foreign exchange
market in the context of a single unified system. The authors state: ‘In a fully integrated economic
system, labor and capital would be able to move freely across national borders. International
differences in technology and production costs should vanish. Accordingly, a common shock would
have a similar impact on economic growth, and thus corporate earnings and dividends, in different
countries.’ They rely more on financial market data than on macroeconomic data, thereby
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removing measurement errors. Real economic integration, and therefore the degree of financial
integration of two national economies, is measured as the correlation of dividend innovations
(innovations in future expected stock returns) between different countries. Financial markets that
are highly integrated should yield high correlations between future expected return innovations
in different countries. Variations in equity risk premia were the principal source of stock return
variance in both the US and UK. Ammer and Mei also find that the US and UK real and financial
economies are highly integrated, the degree of integration increased after the Bretton Woods
system was abandoned: that is, since the US moved to floating rates in the early 1970s and, for
the UK, the removal of exchange controls. Future dividend growth in the two countries is more
highly correlated than contemporaneous output measures which is also confirmed in the multi-
country application of the methodology. Thus there are lags in the international transmission
of real economic shocks. Ammer and Mei conclude by stating that contemporaneous output
correlations may in general understate the magnitude of real international integration.
Dickinson (2010) examines international linkages (cointegration 9 and causality) to identify the
underlying economic variables which cause stock market movements as well as the impact of the
US on other markets. Differences arise across different areas of the world; the US market being a
primary source of movement elsewhere. In particular, Dickinson considered the extent to which
correlations between international stock markets are either a result of globalisation of financial
markets or are a reflection of the increasingly integrated nature of the world real economy, as
represented by comovements between key macroeconomic variables. The study concentrates on
the US (New York) and three European Stock markets (London, Paris and Frankfurt). Both
deregulation and the appeal of portfolio diversification are cited as candidates for market inte-
gration when examined in isolation. Substantial evidence exists which suggests that stock prices
are affected by a number of key macroeconomic variables. Since these macroeconomic risks will
not be diversified away, market indices will be similarly affected. Hence Dickinson approaches
the issue of stock index behaviour by reference to the key economic fundamentals which influence
prices. Since indices may be influenced by international factors beyond those which have an
impact upon the state of the domestic economy, Dickinson develops a framework which examines
the extent to which the international linkages between stock indices are a result of linkages across
the real economy relative to the transmission of financial disturbances. Cointegration analysis
9Stock market indices are non-stationary, and therefore cointegration techniques are required. Referencing
previous research, Dickinson confirms the integration of markets which hold for daily, weekly and monthly market
data.
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yields evidence of long-run linkages between macroeconomic variables and stock indices via in-
terest rates; this relationship appears to hold in reverse. This is agreement with Ammer & Mei
(1996) who find that the stock market performance is an indicator of future economic activity.
Additionally, Dickinson finds clear short-run international linkages between stock indices, thereby
concluding that this may be reflective of the transmission of sentiment and not fundamentals.
Thus a long-run relationship between the stock market and macroeconomy is evident, however
its specific form is complex and not easily disentangled. Short-run relationships between market
indices have been accounted for in terms of sentiment.
Forbes & Rigobon (2002) examine the concept of contagion of financial shocks from one market
to others based on extreme comovements perceived after the fact. Such correlation coefficients
are contingent upon market volatility. Thus, adjusting for this bias, they find virtually no in-
crease in unconditional correlation during the 1997 Asian crisis, the 1994 Mexican devaluation
and the 1987 US market crash. These periods of highly correlated stock market movements are
considered periods of ‘contagion’. This is clearly relevant to the topic of investor sentiment propa-
gation, as panic tends to spread across borders during heightened periods of fear and uncertainty
in financial crises. This is often reflected in increased market volatility. Four methods are pro-
posed in prior research to quantify contagion: cross-market correlation coefficients which is the
method applied, 10 ARCH and GARCH models, cointegration techniques 11 and direct estimation
of transmission mechanisms. In the latter instance, it was found that trade linkages are important
predictors of a firm’s stock returns. Forbes and Rigobon define contagion as ‘a significant increase
in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country (or group of countries).’ Thus, this refers
to the instance in which cross-market comovement increases significantly after a shock to one
market; it excludes comovement during periods of stability. Interdependence refers to markets
which display strong linkages during all states of the world. Forbes and Rigobon acknowledge
various transmission mechanisms for shocks which includes real linkages (such as trade). The
focus is to measure the cross-market linkages as opposed to the propagation mechanisms (or to
differentiate between them) which transmits the shocks. Their definition of contagion therefore
incorporates multiple types of cross-market linkages such as the correlation in asset returns or
the probability of a speculative attack. In particular, they establish that heteroscedasticity biases
10This method tests for correlation in returns between two markets during both stable periods and post-shock.
11By examining changes in the cross-market cointegrating vector over extended periods, an increase in correla-
tions implies that international linkages have increased, possibly due to higher capital mobility or greater trade
integration.
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cross-correlation coefficients which are indicative of contagion in this context. After correcting
for the increase in volatility, tests based on unconditional correlation do not find an increase in
cross-market correlation during such crises.
Integration extends beyond financial markets. Rizova (2010) explores how gradual information
diffusion occurs across the stock markets of trade-linked countries, and finds that stock market
returns of a country’s major customers or suppliers predict the subsequent stock market returns
of that country. Trade links are established using bilateral exports and imports of goods. The
economic channel which enables this predictability is from a shock to the stock market of the
major customer country which subsequently predicts higher exports to that country. From July
1981 to March 2009, Rizova finds that ‘a monthly strategy of buying indices of countries whose
equally weighted portfolio of customers had the highest returns in the previous month and selling
short indices of countries whose equally weighted portfolio of customers had the lowest returns
yields an average abnormal return.’ A positive shock to the stock market of a major customer
results in an increase in the purchasing power of equity holders in the customer country, with the
likelihood of a subsequent rise in the purchases of imported goods due to the wealth effect. An
increase in financial wealth in any country is accompanied by optimism and therefore positive
consumer sentiment. Hence sentiment is likely to be ‘exported’ by trade linkages.
The effects of macroeconomic news extends beyond stock prices to options markets. A¨ijo¨ (2008)
examines the effect of scheduled US and UK macroeconomic new announcements on the returns
distribution of the FTSE-100 European options prices. Macroeconomic data not only affects
underlying asset price movements; the content thereof clearly influences investors’ perceptions
of the future economic environment and market performance. Index put options are primarily
used as a means to hedge such exposure by institutional investors and are clearly an effective
means with which to protect against market declines. The study is relevant in that it focuses on
news pertaining to not only to the domestic economy but also the US economy, which is highly
influential in financial markets. Empirical results indicate that asset prices and volatilities react
almost instantaneously to macroeconomic news announcements, with employment and inflation-
ary news having the greatest impact. The consensus view is such that implied volatility tends
to increase prior to the announcement and decreases thereafter as uncertainty is resolved by
market participants. Considering increased market integration and the dominant role of the US,
there is clearly reason to believe that both macro news pertaining to the domestic market and
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that of the US will effect the implied returns distribution of index options in the UK. Domestic
macroeconomic variables include inflation, GDP, employment, IP and money growth. US macro
variables included in the study are inflation, GDP, employment, IP and the National Association
of Purchasing Management Index.
Aijo also distinguishes between the effect of good versus bad news with respect to time-to-
maturity. Results indicate that volatility tends to decrease after good news and increase after
bad news. Hence quality of the news is a determining factor. The entire distribution is affected
by the quality of news: after bad news, implied volatility increases, skewness decreases (more
left-skewed) and kurtosis decreases. The reverse is true for good news. The interpretation is
that when the news is favourable, market participants attach greater weight to the possibility
of positive future returns (outcomes according to the returns distribution), risks are lower and
the market is more confident. This was the case for both domestic news and for news arising
from the US economy. Implied volatility of the shorter maturity options were more sensitive
to the news announcements. The results are consistent with the behavioural model of Barberis
et al. (1997) in which good news is succeeded by good news. Hence index options can be used
to gauge investor sentiment as the effects of macro news announcements, both domestic and
international, are incorporated into the returns distribution. The news announcements affect the
entire distribution, with shorter maturity options being more susceptible. This will be relevant
in section 4.3.1 in order to justify the use of index options within the US as a means to determine
whether institutional investor sentiment can be inferred therefrom and is consistent with fund
flows into the US.
The above literature review is by no means exhaustive, however it does provide sufficient evidence
of real and financial linkages across markets, the former due to trade and news flow and the latter
due to cross-border capital flows into financial markets. To proceed, the relationship between
fund flows, aggregate stock markets and sentiment within the US is summarised. Capital flow
is extended to global markets, and in particular the most recent sub-prime crisis, as sentiment
contagion is seemingly related to the contagion of shocks across global markets.
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4.2.4 Fund Flows
Fund Flows, Returns and Sentiment
Individual and aggregate mutual fund flows have been studied as a means to capture both investor
sentiment and forecast returns. Warther (1995) examines the relationship between aggregate
mutual fund inflows and contemporaneous market price movements. In particular, Warther
attempts to decipher whether traders follow positive feedback or contrarian strategies. Micro
studies focus specifically on the allocation of capital between funds. However, at the macro level,
flows between funds cancel out. It is then the aggregate flows into and out of the entire market
which remain. Using monthly and weekly data published by ICI from January 1984 to December
1992, Warther separates fund flows into anticipated and unanticipated flows. The results show
monthly returns to be strongly correlated with concurrent unexpected flows, yet uncorrelated
with concurrent expected flows. Specifically, stock returns are correlated with flows into stock
funds, and bond returns are correlated with flows into bond funds; there is little or no cross-
correlation between the categories. Warther finds that returns are positively related to past flows
using weekly data; the evidence disputed a positive relationship between aggregate fund flows
and past returns in the weekly, monthly, quarterly, or yearly data. Thus, the results failed to find
support for positive feedback strategies, in contrast to the micro studies at the individual fund
level.
To determine whether sentiment affects fund flows, Warther uses the CEFD as a sentiment
measure, as discussed in Lee et al. (1990) wherein results indicate that investor sentiment affects
small stocks more than large stocks. Warther rationalises that ‘if the relation between fund flows
and returns is due to investor sentiment, then it can be argued that flows should be more strongly
related to small-stock returns than to large-stock returns.’ Addressing the link between aggregate
fund flows and sentiment, the heightened sensitivity of small-stock returns to inflows is analysed;
no convincing evidence could be found. These results extended to the relation between mutual
funds and closed-end funds, implying that the oft-cited mutual funds are preferable to closed-end
funds as a sentiment measure and may in fact reveal a contrasting aspect of sentiment.
Edelen & Warner (2001) examine the relation between market returns and aggregate flow into US
equity funds using daily fund flows. Their study relates to the impact of an institution’s trades
in a stock on the stock’s price, noting that such trading causes both permanent and temporary
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daily price effects. Their study focuses on the aggregate level over the period from February
1998 to June 1999. Daily aggregate net flows of equity mutual funds are from Daily Liquidity
Trim Tabs/Heads Up Alert (TT). Flow (new subscriptions less redemptions) is reported daily and
defined as the one-day percentage change in assets under management less the one-day percentage
change in net asset value (NAV). Distributions are not accounted for in these data. Returns are
the percentage change in the NYSE Index, excluding dividends. A positive association between
aggregate daily flow and concurrent market returns can be interpreted as price impact, feedback
trading (returns driving flow) or a response to information revelation. This is further addressed
by Jank (2011), to be discussed below. High-frequency daily data are employed to address these
issues. Examining lead–lag daily flow–return relations and also using intraday returns, Edelen
and Warner conclude that flow responds to (information driving) returns, with a one-day lag.
Within the trading day, the main relation appears to be that of returns responding to flow
(flow-induced trades), thus implying an aggregate price impact.
Indro (2004) examines the relationship between net aggregate equity fund flow and investor
sentiment using weekly flow data from AMG Data Corporation. 12 Indro seeks to determine
whether mutual fund investors react to sentiment and, if so, which group of investors’ sentiment
can be measured using these flows. To establish the relationship between equity fund flows
and market returns, Indro regresses the weekly Wilshire 5000 log-return on the percentage net
aggregate equity fund flow. The results indicate that the returns are positively and significantly
related to net aggregate fund flows. The fund flow in the prior two weeks also seems to affect
the returns. After decomposing the flows into expected and unexpected components due to high
autocorrelation present within the monthly data, the coefficient of the concurrent expected fund
flow was not significantly related to the returns data whilst that of the unexpected fund flow
was, at the 1% level. This indicates that higher fund flows in current and previous weeks leads
to higher market returns.
Using the AAII and II weekly survey results, Indro finds that current and lagged (by one week)
bullish individual investors gives rise to positive net aggregate equity fund flows. It is also the
case that positive net equity flows in the current week, lead to bullish news letter writers in
the following week. The relationship exists after controlling for inflation 13 and the equity risk
12Weekly fund flows have been collected since 1992 from 500 sources which represent 16 900 open-end mutual
funds. To this date, this reflects 93% of all equity funds and 60% of net assets under management. Fund flows
excluding distributions (reinvested dividends and capital gains) are used.
13Expected inflation is gauged using the 90-day Treasury bill. The high correlation of T-bills with expected
161
premium (the difference between the S&P 500 weekly return and the 10-year Treasury yield). A
lagged return is also included, as investors may respond to market movements. The equity risk
premium has a positive and statistically significant coefficient which indicates that an increase
in the equity risk premium leads investors to move capital into equity mutual funds. Inflation
has no impact on the direction of fund flows. The lagged return is also positive, which indicates
positive feedback trading. Thus, equity fund investors are influenced by fundamentals as well as
sentiment. Highlighting the propensity of investors to ‘pour money into the stock market’ as a
means to propel stocks higher, Indro cites previous research (Neal & Wheatley 1998, Edelen &
Warner 2001, Warther 1995) which documents the predictability of returns using fund flows. Since
mutual fund investors are considered the least informed as they delegate their investment decisions
to fund managers, in aggregate they are deemed suited as candidates to measure unsophisticated
investor sentiment. Fund flows are usually invested or divested as a result of bullish or bearish
sentiment. Warther (1995) uses the CEFD as an indirect measure of sentiment whereas the
current study uses the survey-based measures, thereby linking investors’ responses to their actions.
Connecting investor sentiment to mutual fund flows confirms that investor behaviour associated
with mutual funds is influenced by more than just economic fundamentals. Warther’s results
confirm that ‘mutual fund investors move more money into equity funds in the current week
when individual investors were more bullish the previous week. Contrary to this, a higher net
aggregate equity fund flow in the current week induces newsletter writers to be more bullish
the following week.’ The results using the II sentiment are statistically stronger than the AAII
sentiment. Thus, individual sentiment in the current or previous week is positively related to
aggregate equity fund flow in the current week. Sentiment of newsletter writers in the subsequent
week is positively related to net aggregate equity fund flows in the current week. Hence, mutual
fund investors react to the sentiment of individual investors when investing or divesting into
equity mutual funds. This trading behaviour subsequently affects the sentiment of newsletter
writers (institutional investor sentiment).
Ben-Rephael et al. (2010) examine monthly ICI data which reflect flows and asset values of
aggregate US mutual fund categories. They divide the fund population into two groups: the
inflation rates reflects the nature of these securities - short-term, government-guaranteed debt with virtually no
credit risk. T-bills are frequently considered a ‘risk-free’ asset which deems them appropriate as instruments to
approximate inflation. Nominal interest rates generally represent the sum of the real rate of interest and expected
inflation. Cash returns (T-bills) have had a strong tendency to rise with expected inflation. Asset prices have
tended to reflect consensus inflation expectations. Thus, if all investors believe future inflation will be high, then
they will not be rewarded if correct (Bhardwaj et al. 2011).
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equity group, which includes domestic equity, international equity and mixed funds, and the
bond group, which includes bonds and money market funds. The data are divided into four
categories: ‘exchanges in’, ‘exchanges out’, sales and redemptions. These combine to form the net
flows. Sales and redemptions are actual cash flows which enter or exit a fund family; ‘exchanges
in’ or ‘exchanges out’ are transfers between different funds in the same family. To find a value
which reflects the flows between equity (funds which are either domestic or international equity
or mixed funds) and bonds (all bonds and money market funds), they define ‘net exchanges’ as
‘exchanges in’ minus ‘exchanges out’. This value by definition equates to zero over the all-fund
population, with ‘net exchanges’ of equity funds being equivalent to ‘net exchanges’ of the bond
funds, with the opposite sign. The authors exclude sales minus redemptions which are deemed to
reflect long-term savings and withdrawals. Their sample covers the period of 1984–2008; Warther
(1995) uses these data over a different time period and defines ‘net flows’ as ‘net exchanges’ plus
sales minus redemptions, yet failed to find a relation between net aggregate monthly flows and
subsequent market returns.
After normalising by fund assets, Ben-Rephael et al. find that one standard deviation of the nor-
malised net exchanges (NEIO) is positively related to 1.95% of the excess market return. There is
also a negative relation between net exchanges and subsequent excess market returns: 85% of the
contemporaneous relation between excess returns are reversed within four months, the remainder
within ten months. The relationship between NEIO and the VIX is negative and significant for
both the level and difference. Changes in the VIX are negatively and contemporaneously cor-
related with excess market returns; excess market returns are not related to lagged changes in
VIX. The market excess returns are positively contemporaneously related to the NEIO, followed
by a reversal.
Ben-Rephael et al. rationalise the use of net exchanges as a proxy of investor sentiment since the
price reversal pattern of aggregate market returns is too large to be attributed to time-varying
risk premiums. Hence net exchanges are related to stock market risk. Their proposed sentiment
measure appears to forecast the aggregate excess market return. Further justification to capture
noise trader sentiment is that the price noise correction takes approximately 10 months. This is
in agreement with the behavioural model of Shleifer & Vishny (1997) and De Long et al. (1990)
which state that limits to arbitrage result in the persistence of such noise. Hence Ben-Rephael
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et al. specifically refer to the measurement of noise traders or retail investors. 14 NEIO is further
found to be weakly negatively related to the short interest rate and weakly positively related to
the consumer sentiment index of the University of Michigan Survey Center. NEIO is not related
to the sentiment measure of Baker & Wurgler (2006).
Jank (2011) examines whether the concurrent relation between equity returns and mutual funds
can be explained by macroeconomic news. Several explanations of the results in Warther (1995)
(positive returns generate flow) have been proposed: the feedback trader hypothesis which implies
that returns cause fund flows since rising prices may yield more purchases. Alternatively, the
causality can be explained in reverse: the price pressure hypothesis justifies higher prices resulting
from sentiment-based demand for stocks (optimism or pessimism unrelated to fundamentals),
thereby rendering mutual fund flows a sentiment measure. The author attempts to prove the
information response hypothesis which states that both stock market returns and fund flows
together react to new information about the real economy. Under the price pressure hypothesis
and the information response hypothesis, the mutual fund investors’ demand for equity, hence
fund flows, fluctuates. The crucial difference is that in case of the price pressure hypothesis,
fund flows are unrelated to fundamentals. In contrast to this, preferences within the information
response hypothesis are driven by fundamentals pertaining to the real economy.
Given that the stock market responds to business cycles which can be seen from time-varying
expected returns as well as equity risk premia, recessions necessitate higher expected returns as
a means to compensate for higher risk. Hence, information pertaining to the macroeconomy will
ultimately affect the perceived risk in holding certain stocks, thereby inducing mutual fund flows
to react to price adjustments from news content. Positive news leads to an increase in prices, and
ultimately flows into mutual funds. Jank examines the link between aggregate mutual fund flows,
time-varying equity premium and asset prices. Mutual fund investors are retail investors, and
therefore have different preferences since they are more risk averse than other investors, and are
less willing to hold equity in adverse economic conditions. They might also have a higher exposure
to idiosyncratic income shocks than other private or institutional investors. The hypothesis tests
whether changes in news variables, which reflect higher risk and thus a higher equity premium,
should result in outflows from equity funds. If fund flows and market returns react to like news
about the real economy, then mutual fund flows and stock market returns might possibly both
14In 2007, 86% of mutual fund assets were held by retail investors.
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predict economic activity. Specifically, if mutual fund flows react to developments within the real
economy, then such flows should necessarily predict real economic activity.
Examining monthly data from ICI, 15 the results indicate that mutual fund flows do indeed react
to variables that forecast the equity premium and the dividend yield16. Changes in the dividend–
price ratio explain fund flows beyond the information contained in returns. The market return is
proxied by the return of the S&P 500. An increase in default spread (the end-of-period difference
between Moody’s BAA and AAA Seasoned Corporate Bond Yield) or consumption–wealth ratio,
both indicating a rise in equity premium, leads to mutual fund outflows; an increase in the
relative T-Bill rate (the three-month T-Bill rate minus its 12-month moving average), indicating
a decrease in equity premium, leads to inflows into equity funds. If mutual fund investors are
on average correct regarding the future state of the economy, then those variables indicative of
this state should deteriorate after outflows and improve after inflows. To test this hypothesis,
a bivariate VAR framework of mutual fund flows and economic activity growth is explored.
Empirical results indicate that mutual fund flows predict future economic activity as measured
by real GDP, IP, consumption and labour income. These findings support the theory that market
returns and mutual fund flows simultaneously react to macroeconomic news.
Given that Jank provides evidence linking the real economy with mutual fund flows, which are
induced by the decisions of private (retail) investors, one can further conclude that fundamentals
as well as sentiment appear to be a determining factor of fund flows. Consumer confidence has
been shown to reflect past stock market performance as well as forecast future macroeconomic
variables. Those individuals that partake in mutual fund trading activity are not mutually
exclusive from those that are representative of confidence within the economy. Hence the positive
relationship between stock market returns and mutual fund flows (the unexpected component
thereof in Warther (1995)), may be reflective of past good performance as well as a response to
macroeconomic news. Sentiment is often associated with trading decisions which are not based
on fundamentals and is responsible for the difference between the observed price of an asset and
its fundamental value. Given the positive and significant relationship with excess market returns,
the reversal being too great to be justified by a time-varying risk premium, mutual fund flows
15Following Warther (1995), quarterly net flows are calculated as new sales minus redemptions plus exchanges-in
minus exchanges-out; this is then standardised by the total market value of the previous quarter using the total
market index from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Fund flows are measured over the period of one quarter in order
to link them to macroeconomic data.
16The dividend yield of the S&P 500 is measured by the ratio of average annual dividends and end-of-quarter
prices, taken in logs.
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are thereby believed to be a suitable sentiment measure. Contingent on the dataset, this may
pertain to either retail or institutional investors. The shifts between bond and equity funds are
also related to excess market returns and deemed a contrarian sentiment measure. Ultimately,
variables derived from aggregate fund flows are clearly related to stock market returns, real
economic activity and investor sentiment. Concluding that capital flows do capture the sentiment
of those investors, it then is not inconceivable that cross-border capital flows are a conduit for
sentiment propagation.
Baker et al. (2011) explore the idea of sentiment contagion based on US capital flows to a selection
of developed markets, namely Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the UK. Indices of investor
sentiment for each country are initially formed using the first principal component of several time
series proxies for sentiment. 17 These are further decomposed into a global and six local indices,
based on the methodology of Baker & Wurgler (2004). Their premise is such that if sentiment
drives prices too far from fundamental value, corrections may be observed to manifest in return
predictability.
Baker et al. find that total sentiment, and particularly the global component thereof, is a contrar-
ian predictor of country-level market returns. When a country’s total sentiment is high, future
returns are relatively low for its small, high-return volatility, growth, and distressed stocks. This
is intuitive since global investors which seek diversification tend to invest in index funds rather
than specific international stocks; domestic investors are also biased toward their local markets18
and can trade at lower costs than international investors. Empirically, not only do their measures
of local and global sentiment predict returns, but also that of the US which is linked by capital
flows. They allude to capital flows as being a key mechanism through which global sentiment
develops and propagates.
Having established that high global and local sentiment forecasts low returns, Baker et al. con-
clude that global sentiment may be contagious. Either investors in the source country (from
whence the capital originates) are optimistic about the local (receiver country) investment prospects
and economy at large, or the sentiment within the source country is optimistic and spills over
into receiver countries, thereby increasing their shares of risky assets. In the first instance, an
17Validation of their indices is based on dual-listed shares; these shares are pairs of securities that claim equal
cash flows but trade in different markets and sometimes at substantially different prices. They find that the shares’
relative prices are positively related to the relative local sentiment indices of their respective markets.
18French & Poterba (1991) note that cross-border investment is growing. Given the date of publication, the
results are likely not applicable.
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appreciation of local sentiment will be seen instantaneously, as asset prices tend to increase. In
the second instance, the optimism in the source country will lead to an increase in the local
sentiment via capital flows, after the shares of risky assets are bid up. The authors hypothesise
that countries with high absolute flows will be subject to sentiment propagation.
Fund flows are determined by the collective trading behaviour of the individuals of the reference
group. Pertaining to micro differences in investor behaviour, Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn &
Satterfield (2000) discuss the social/cultural argument with respect to gender differences in risk
taking. They examine how gender and race are related to a range of sociopolitical factors thought
to influence risk perceptions. Their data suggest that general attitudes toward the world and its
social organisation and stigma are different for white males compared with other groups. Olsen &
Cox (2001) documented that cultural factors had non-trivial effects on how assets were managed;
investment managers made different decisions based on identifiable cultural differences, even with
equivalent training, experience and information. Cultural differences may be largely responsible
for differences in investor behaviour. Thus, counties are subject to investor sentiment as financial
market participants exhibit biases and therefore, exhibit specific trading patterns. Sentiment
propagation is determined on a macro level due to fundamentals and aggregate performance yet
it is the accumulation of those country-specific investors which determine the fate of fund flows.
Fund flows within the US have been examined at varying frequencies using different datasets
in order to quantify sentiment and explain the relation to market returns and fundamentals.
Examining cross-border flows, the following sections present research which make use of the
EPFR Global dataset. In particular, a factor model is developed to discern global capital flow
determinants. Thereafter, the flow–returns relationship evident in previous research is extended
across regions and countries – relative flow information is examined as a means to forecast returns.
Global Capital Flows
Examining the EPFR global database for 50 countries, 19 Fratzscher (2011) examines heterogene-
ity of flows across regions and time periods in an attempt to understand whether common or
idiosyncratic shocks were largely responsible for observed flows during the sub-prime crisis. This
dataset will be further discussed in Part II, section 4.3.2. Given the imbalance in trade and
19The EPFR portfolio flows and those stemming from total balance-of-payments data have been shown to match
convincingly.
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capital flows in deficit countries, most notably the US, prior to the latest financial crisis (2007–
2009), Fratzscher asserts that many observers believed that an adjustment would be achieved
through a reduction in capital flows as well as a fall in asset prices and exchange rates. However,
capital flows into the US during the crisis period were largely unaffected. During the recovery
period, a large portion of portfolio flows were directed at EMEs, thereby raising concerns about
the respective domestic economy, capital and exchange rate markets. Examining stylised facts
of high-frequency (weekly) capital flows during the crisis, Fratzscher finds that on aggregate ad-
vanced economies (AEs) experienced net capital outflows from the start of the crisis in August
2007 20 which slowed after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Net portfolio
flows to emerging market economies (EMEs) were largely unaffected as net inflows were positive
at the beginning of the crisis through July 2008. They then dropped substantially after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers, up to early 2009.
There was a divergence of net flows between equities and bonds; the latter underwent much larger
swings as the Lehman event triggered substantial outflows out of EME bonds (30% excluding
valuation changes over a period of 4–5 months). Equities throughout were relatively stable; EME
equities declined slightly following the Lehman event but recovered strongly in 2009 along with
the EME bonds. Among AEs, the US experienced very little change in either equity or bond flows
during the height of the crisis. The AEs in the Euro area experienced major outflows, particularly
from bonds. EM Europe experienced the strongest outflows in both bonds and equities, amongst
the EMEs and recovered slowest. Latin American economies did not fare much better. Fratzscher
notes that cross-country heterogeneity or dispersion in net capital flows (the standard deviation
of weekly net capital flows across countries over a centred moving window of six months) was
vastly different for AEs and EMEs. In particular, dispersion amongst advanced Europe and
other AEs was not particularly high during the height of the crisis; this is in contrast to the
EMEs. Following the 2007–2008 crisis, there has been a substantial net capital inflow to the
EMEs since April 2009. The total assets under management, net of valuation changes (AUM),
for both equities and bonds in late 2010 exceeded both those before the crisis. Most notably,
in the early period of the 2007–2008 crisis, most advanced economies experienced net outflows
whilst EMEs recorded balanced flows into the summer of 2008. The collapse of Lehman resulted
in capital repatriating to the US and some advanced economies after exiting EMEs; this was
stronger for bond flows than for equity flows. Secondly, heterogeneity increased across countries
20The start of the liquidity crunch is dated 7 August 2007.
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during the height of the financial crisis.
The empirical examination pertaining to the global dynamics of capital flows during the crisis and
the heterogeneity thereof is captured in a factor model using weekly flows. This is to determine
whether portfolio capital flows reflect common (global) shocks and/or idiosyncratic (domestic)
shocks, aiding the comprehension of the overall drivers and transmission channels of the crisis. Net
capital flows are aggregated at the level of the recipient country at the aforementioned frequency
between October 2005 to November 2010. Doing so alleviates any uncertainty regarding different
trading times of various regions of daily data which may have arisen from shocks; weekly data is
also preferred to monthly data as the effects of specific events are harder to identify. The analysis
aggregates equities, the dominant holding, and bonds. The US represents the majority of the
equity and bond portfolios. 21 A set of global and common shocks are incorporated as factors.
The US is a recipient country of capital and therefore excluded from all model estimations. Most
of the common shocks are therefore US macroeconomic news variables, expressed as a composite
measure. US (and domestic) equity market returns are specifically included due to their asserted
relationship. The results indicate that only EMEs experienced a negative effect from crisis events.
Worsening liquidity, as measured by a rise in the TED spread (the difference between the three-
month T-bill interest rate and three-month LIBOR), induces net portfolio outflows. The effect
thereof was dampened during the crisis period. The response to changes in global risk as proxied
by the VIX, yields heterogeneity across countries during the crisis at heightened risk levels. Prior
to the crisis, a rise in the VIX led to outflows from AEs to EMEs. During the crisis, the sharp
increase in global risk induced net inflows to AEs and outflows out of EMEs. This is indicative
of the ‘flight-to-safety’ phenomenon as a key driver of capital flows.
During non-crisis periods, Fratzscher finds that a positive US macro shock induces capital outflows
from the domestic economy as capital is repatriated back to the US, whilst a positive domestic
macro shock results in net capital inflows. During the crisis period, the sign for domestic macro
shocks changes in the crisis for AEs: negative domestic shocks triggered net capital outflows out
of EMEs and net inflows into AEs (a repatriation of capital from abroad of investors based in
the AEs), thereby conforming to the flight-to-safety hypothesis. Positive US equity and domestic
equity returns resulted in greater net capital inflows during both non-crisis and crisis periods.
21The total net assets recorded at 31 December 2010 stood at 1768 654.07 and 934 699.52 billions of USD respec-
tively.
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There is a sensitivity of flows to crisis events: crisis events triggered capital outflows of equities
in both AEs and EMEs, as well as EME bonds, but induced net inflows into AE bonds. It was
also found that an increase in risk during the crisis led to a strong response of net outflows of
EME bonds into some AE equities. EME bonds appeared to be far more sensitive to these shocks
(including TED spreads) as can be seen by larger net outflows. Having restricted the analysis
to the post-Lehman period between September 2008 to March 2009 for robustness, it was found
that net total capital outflows were sharpest (out of EMEs in particular) as a result of sensitivity
to both common and idiosyncratic shock. The coefficients to liquidity shocks (TED spread) were
higher in this period. Correlation coefficients for all common and idiosyncratic shocks between
crisis and non-crisis periods were negative: countries with large negative coefficients for risk
shocks in the non-crisis period were those with the least negative or positive coefficients during
the crisis period. Hence countries which were sensitive to common shocks prior to the crisis saw
the sharpest reductions or reversals during the crisis.
Extending the analysis to the European sovereign debt crisis in 2009, and the issue of whether
the increase in flows to EMEs were due to push (global or common) or pull (domestic) factors,
Fratzscher found that those events pertaining to the crisis had not affected the flows. In con-
clusion, the flight-to-safety phenomenon characterised global capital flows during the 2007–2008
financial crisis, with global shocks having exerted a large effect on EMEs. Country-specific in-
stitutions and fundamentals were largely responsible for heterogeneity of capital flows. Those
countries which display strong macroeconomic fundamentals and a high institutional quality in-
sulated themselves from common and idiosyncratic shocks. External exposure through finance
and trade appears to have played a minor role for cross-country differences in the transmission
of global shocks. Examining the economic significance of push versus pull factors over the 2005–
2010 period, it was found that both had equal importance. However from 2009 onwards, the
pull factors were slightly more important for EMEs in Latin America and Asia in the 2009–2010
capital flows to the EME region. Common factors accounted for roughly 73% of global net capital
flows during the crisis.
Predictive Returns
Meyer et al. (2006) seek to establish the predictive ability of weekly flow data using the EPFR
Global database regarding the relative performance of regions. Fund flow data is expressed as a
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percentage of total assets as this allows for a clearer comparison between regions. Funds investing
in EMEs tend to be smaller than those investing in developed markets such that weekly flows in
dollar terms do not accurately reflect the flow momentum across regions. Flows in US dollars are
also dependant on foreign exchange movements. As the dollar strengthens or weakens relative
to the funds’ respective local currencies, fluctuations in the overall funds are not necessarily the
result of equity investor behaviour. The fund flow data for both AEs and EMEs did not display
seasonality. Since fund flows should positively impact performance and positive performance
should attract fund flows, inertia in fund flows is expected. Autocorrelation of fund flows on a
weekly basis was found to be high: inflows or outflows in any one week seem likely to be followed
by inflows or outflows in the following week thereby suggesting that fund flows can be used as
a gauge of investor sentiment. 22 Meyer et al. also find that correlations are positive in general,
even between International Bond funds, the safest asset class, and EME equity funds, the most
risky asset class. These results hold true for one-week flows as well as for average four-week flows.
Remarkably, US equities are the only fund class for which the flows seem to be uncorrelated with
other flows.
Meyer et al. then examine whether knowledge of fund flows can be used to account for equity
market performance. In particular, they seek to determine whether the change in the direction of
the fund flows is an indicator for subsequent performance and can be used in trading strategies.
A comparison between the fund flow data and the performance of the relevant MSCI indices 23 is
made in order to establish the possibility of predictability. The total global weekly equity flows as
percentage of NAV as well as the global four-week moving average of these flows, are compared to
the global MSCI Equity Index. The global data is an aggregation of all the flows across the regions
in the universe. They find that a rising equity market index is strongly correlated with inflows and
vice versa. This relationship is particularly strong in the fund flows of Europe, GEM (general
emerging markets), the US and Japan. A strong positive correlation between performance as
given by the relevant MSCI index and lagged fund flows exists, providing clear evidence that
performance attracts flows. Even with a two-week lag, flows tend to follow performance. Flows
do not appear to lead performance in the following weeks. Thus, there is a concrete relationship
between equity market performance and fund flows.
22According to the analysis, the highest first-order autocorrelation was for funds investing in EMEA equities,
with a correlation coefficient of 0.54, compared to an average of 0.27.
23http://www.msci.com/
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The direction of fund flows in a rising market yields incorrect signals on average, indicating that
a simple long–short strategy based on lagged weekly flows is not successful. They define the
‘liquidity pulse’ as a measure of rising or contracting liquidity, which compares the size of the
current flow (four-week average as % of NAV) to the average size of the flow in the last 13 weeks.
The relative size is given in standard deviation from the mean. Flows might still be positive
(negative) yet the size of the inflows (outflows) might be dropping off, indicating a declining
(rising) investor conviction or sentiment. An increase in this value tends to be associated with
a strong performance of the asset class. Common trends can be perceived when comparing
liquidity pulse data with equity performance. Trends of the US liquidity pulse versus the US
MSCI equity index performance from April 2004 to July 2006 are similar during periods of
consistent liquidity momentum expansion and contraction. Thus fund flows are a momentum
indicator. However, if liquidity momentum is signalled to be very strong (or very weak) the
subsequent performance tends to be negative (or positive). This suggests that the liquidity pulse
becomes a contra-indicator when momentum has become too strong in either direction. These
contradictory results are applicable to other regions. Using the liquidity measure with one-week
and the four-week moving average as a % of NAV was inconclusive, mainly due to historical limits
to the dataset, and was especially poor during bull markets. A cross-sectional analysis shows that
the relative strength of fund flows for different regions contains explanatory power for subsequent
relative performance of the regions, thereby adding value to models of regional equity allocation.
This is a brief account of the usefulness of cross-border fund flows as a means to forecast relative
aggregate equity market performance. Monitoring flows is insightful as one may monitor high-
frequency investment decisions based on global and domestic fundamentals as well as sentiment.
Investors’ risk profiles are paramount to the execution of these decisions. Yet, to disentangle
relationships between fund flows, fundamentals and sentiment is complex. At best, identification
of the push versus pull factors which dictate the allocation of capital according to asset class and
fund type/geographic sheds some light on this topic. However, it is also clear that investors chase
performance and allocate funds to those economies and asset classes that are favourable in this
respect. Sentiment is tantamount to active investment decisions based on fund flows. Given that
fund flows are considered sentiment measures, it follows that cross-border flows are the means
by which sentiment propagates. Part II is the empirical section which determines whether global
sentiment and portfolio insurance are aligned.
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4.3 Part II: Empirical Results
Part I of this chapter has covered a broad range of literature, amalgamating empirical results
which link the macroeconomy, financial markets, confidence and fund flows. The integration of
economies, and in particular that of financial markets, leads to the flow of sentiment within the
reference domestic economy to all those that are associated with it. This high-frequency process,
herein referred to as sentiment propagation, occurs via cross-border capital flows. The US is
considered a dominant economy and therefore associated flows are a global measure of sentiment.
This part of the research means to establish whether portfolio insurance and institutional investor
sentiment coincide. The main results are addressed in section 4.3.4. The hypotheses are as follows:
• Hypothesis 1: Increases in institutional dedicated US bond flows signal a decrease in the
aggregate market skew;
• Hypothesis 2: Positive equity fund performance leads to (or is accompanied by) an increase
in the skew.
The section begins with a review of institutional portfolio insurance. Thereafter, data are dis-
cussed in section 4.3.2. The empirical analysis begins with a brief review of monthly flows and
performance in section 4.3.3. The majority of the analysis is performed using weekly flows. Given
that common global shocks are captured using the VIX and TED spread in Fratzscher (2011),
these variables are on occasion included within the analysis. Section 4.3.4 examines time se-
ries properties of flows and performance as well as examines the relationship to the II bull–bear
spread. Thereafter, the option-implied skew is analysed and regressed on relevant time series to
establish or refute the hypotheses.
4.3.1 Portfolio Insurance – SPX Options
Index options insure against aggregate market declines. Henceforth, the S&P 500 total returns
index will represent the aggregate US equity market. Volatility is that input parameter into
the Black–Scholes option pricing formula (Black & Scholes 1973) which in theory should be the
same for all options of a given maturity. However, observed prices can be used to obtain the
implied volatility by inverting the option pricing formula. Doing so results in a ‘volatility smile’
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as the parameter varies according to strike for each maturity of options available. The option-
implied volatility skew/smile has been a much-debated topic, leading to a plethora of research
which seeks to model the underlying price process and find a more suitable returns distribution
than that of the log-normal distribution. Using European options data to extract a RND has
been employed to determine the probability of attaining a certain return at that specific expiry,
given current market conditions. Shefrin (1999) notes that option markets are likely conduits for
investor sentiment. Quantifying heterogeneity of opinions using the call–put option volume ratio
(CPR), 24 the author finds differences when compared to the survey-based measured of AAII and
II (the ratio of bullish investors to the sum of bullish plus bearish investors). A high CPR has
been associated with positive investor sentiment. A salient market trend which is tantamount
to ‘irrational exuberance’, often yields divergent opinions amongst individual and professional
investors; the former predict continuation whereas the latter forecast a reversal. Examining the
movements post Greenspan’s speech (5 December 1996) 25, it was the CPR which was in decline
prior to as well as after, indicating a movement into puts. Each SPX contract is for 250 times
the value of the index, hence institutional investors’ heterogeneity of beliefs can be quantified
using these index options. The AAII and II indices were both bullish in November 1996 as the
market soared, although newsletter writers increasingly believed a correction to be due. Options
markets clearly incorporate the sentiment regarding future market movements more immediately
than survey measures.
Bollen & Whaley (2004) find a transitory positive relationship between changes in the level of
an option’s implied volatility and the time variation in demand for the option. With an upward
sloping supply curve, implied volatility will exceed actual return volatility – the difference is due
to costs associated with the hedging portfolio or risk exposure. Their overall results suggest that
net buying pressure is an important determinant of the shape of the implied volatility function,
particularly for SPX options where public order imbalances are greatest. Therefore, prices of SPX
options will fluctuate as demand and supply varies. Since there are no natural counter-parties,
market makers absorb the imbalance.
The premise is such that institutional investor portfolio insurance requirements render the index
returns distribution negatively skewed. Options markets have been shown to react to macro news.
24The put–call ratio is the ratio of open daily call-option volume to open daily put-option volume aggregated
across all exchange-traded options in the US.
25http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm
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Fund flows are also susceptible to the global (US) as well as domestic fundamental factors. Hence
one should expect global sentiment to be present within US index option markets. Sentiment
research has yet to examine dedicated US equity and bond flows for all domiciled investors. These
funds assimilate both US and non-US investors’ perceptions of global macroeconomic conditions,
as measured by such capital flows. The CBOE VIX is based on the 30-day implied volatility of
SPX options and is one of the global shocks, along with liquidity which is gauged from the TED
spread, to affect cross-border capital flows. Therefore, the inclusion of options data may be crucial
to consolidate evidence linking mutual fund flows to investor sentiment. With reference to SPX
options, institutional investors buy index puts as portfolio insurance; bearish investors will pay
more for state contingent claims that pay off when the index level is low. A shift from equity to
bonds or an increase in the absolute level of bond holdings is associated with a flight-to-safety. It
follows that an increase in US bond flows should result in a decreased skew. Positive performance
of equity funds which is generally associated with positive aggregate market performance, should
result in an increase in the skew. This forms the basis of the empirical section.
In order to proceed, the method of Bondarenko (2000) is applied to the nearest maturity European
options as they tend to be most affected by macro news. Details describing this procedure is in
Chapter 3. After having estimated the returns RND, the third robust moment or equivalently
the risk-neutral skew is calculated. This measure is fairly intuitive as it is a ‘crude’ measure of
the mass of the distribution:
η3t =
(U90 − U50)− (U50 − U10)
U90 − U10 ,
where U50 is the median of the return distribution and, in general, Ux is the xth percentile of the
returns distribution. Bondarenko finds a time series relationship between η3t and both past and
contemporaneous daily returns. Having estimated the RND using positive convolution approxi-
mation, results indicate that the index return is positively related to the third robust moment.
When the index advances, η3t becomes less negative. Since the RND is determined by investors’
subjective probability of the asset’s future returns as well as their risk preferences, investors’ be-
liefs as well as attitude towards risk may vary in response to the recent index movement. Thus,
decreases in the index may results in a less optimistic (pessimistic) market and investors’ may
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become more risk averse in the near future. This may warrant a demand for more portfolio
insurance (contracts which pay off in unfavourable states of the world) which leads to fatter left
tails of the RND. To the contrary, recent good performance may result in less risk aversion and
a higher degree of optimism. Hence the implied RND will be less skewed. Thus, η3t should be
less negative which results in a greater proportion of the probability to the right of the mean.
The following section begins with a description of the fund flows dataset. Thereafter, the data
required to find η3t are explored, along with the remaining sentiment variables that will be used
to further support or refute the findings.
4.3.2 Data Selection
Fund Flow Data
EPFR Global provides access to institutional and individual investor flows and fund performance
data which are sourced directly from fund managers and administrators. The universe covers
over $15 trillion in globally domiciled funds. Flows are available at the asset class aggregate,
fund group, investment manager, individual fund or share class levels. Datasets are either core
(direct from the source) or derived; the latter is based on flows and allocations data. The core
datasets are the Fund Flows: the amount of cash flowing into and out of funds world-wide, and
Fund Allocations: fund manager allocations at month-end across the countries or sectors they
invest in. These are combined to give rise to the derived dataset, Country and Sector Flows:
distribution of fund flows by country or sector. Fund types can be further dissimilated according
to the following:
– asset class: dedicated country funds versus global, general emerging market (GEM), and
regional mandates;
– investor type: institutional versus retail, US domiciled versus non-US domiciled;
– fund type: mutual funds versus ETFs, active versus passive.
The prospectus/fact sheet determines whether a fund is actively or passively managed. The
fund’s mandate is specified therein, which may be to follow a particular benchmark or index.
Passive funds may have a small turnover (10–15% annually) to adjust for indices being updated
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with new companies/stocks. For the split between retail versus institutional flow, EPFR Global
follows three guidelines. Institutional funds fulfil the following:
– minimum entry to gain access into the fund is at least 100 000 USD;
– share class - if it is an institutional share;
– prospectus confirms the fund’s main target audience.
All ETFs are regarded as institutional; since ETF share creation units typically start at 1 million
USD, the creation units themselves are only sold to institutional investors. They do not track
secondary market trading activity in ETFs.
The flow percentage is derived by dividing flow over the week by assets in the start of the period.
The Fund Flow (FF) Dataset is the primary source of data to be used. The Country Flow (CF)
dataset combines the FF and country weightings (CW) data to track the flow of money into world
stock markets. The FF reports track the amount of cash flowing into and out of investment funds
that are monitored globally. The CW report tracks monthly fund manager allocations across the
various markets they invest in. At each month-end, the average manager weighting for each of the
fund groups that can invest in the reference country is then the country weighting (allocation).
Thus, the fund flow (at the required frequency) multiplied by the country allocation yields the
country flow. For dedicated country funds, 100% of the allocation is invested in the reference
country.
The FF dataset – tracks daily, weekly and monthly data:
– equity, bond and specialty fund groups;
– calculate net flows (investor contributions/redemptions) for individual funds and for various
fund groups;
– net flows calculations exclude portfolio performance and currency fluctuations;
– data is organised by fund group;
– covers funds registered for sale in most major developed market jurisdictions and offshore
domiciles, including USA, UK, Canada, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Australia, Hong Kong,
Channel Islands, Germany, Austria, France and others.
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– historical data shows daily/weekly/monthly aggregate flows by fund group.
The CF dataset – tracks daily, weekly and monthly data:
– equity and bond fund groups;
– data tracks the flow of money into and out of world stock markets;
– combines FF and country allocations data to estimate the flow of cash into and out of
various stock markets;
– for equity funds, covers 104 emerging and developed markets;
– for bond funds, covers 108 emerging and developed markets;
– historical data shows daily/weekly/monthly aggregate flows by fund group.
The weekly data are measured from Thursday to Wednesday, with the data released on Thursday
at 16:00 ET. So the lag is one day (T+1). The variables which are of specific interest are fund
flows (measured in millions of USD) expressed as a percentage of NAV. The fund flows are defined
as
Fund Flows = End of Week Assets - Beginning of Week Assets - Portfolio Change.
Net flow calculations exclude portfolio performance and currency fluctuations. Percent change in
NAV is defined as the return on assets (performance). The portfolio change is calculated as the
beginning of week assets multiplied by the NAV performance. To further clarify,
Change in Net Asset Value = Change in Total Net Assets−Net Flow− FX effect,
Net Fund Flows = Change in Total Net Assets− Change in Net Asset Value.
The total net assets (TNA) is recorded at the start of the period. For the CF dataset, we have
that
Estimated Allocation = Total Net Assets× Country Allocation.
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For dedicated country funds, the country allocation is 100% and TNA equates to the estimated
allocation in USD. New allocation data is released on the 23rd of each month; hence CFs will nor-
mally be impacted after the 23rd of the month. Weekly institutional and retail flows of dedicated
USA equity and bond funds 26 over the period January 2005 to December 2010 are analysed.
These flows (FF core dataset) are the sum of US and non-US domiciled investors. With regard
to portfolio insurance, the analysis is restricted to institutional investors. The following section
briefly discusses monthly flows, presenting a graphical depiction thereof which is accompanied by
summary statistics. Further to this, correlation coefficients for monthly US benchmark data are
provided: the University of Michigan consumer confidence index, The Conference Board leading
economic indicator and the ISM purchasing managers index.
Financial Market and Sentiment Data
The total S&P 500 represents the aggregate equity market – the best single gauge of large cap
US equities. 27 The fund flow portfolio performance includes dividends, and therefore the total
returns index is used. The total return index of the S&P 500, the TED spread, and the CBOE
VIX are obtained from DataStream; the weekly data are on the last business day of each week
(Friday). II and AAII survey data are released on Tuesday of the week. The bull–bear spread for
both II and AAII is the difference between bullish and bearish investor opinions, expressed as a
percentage, of any given week. The SPX options data and US risk-free yield curve are obtained
from OptionMetrics, Wharton Research Data Services. SPX options which trade on the Chicago
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) are one of the most actively traded European index options
worldwide. The risk-free rate is approximated (linearly interpolated) using Treasury bill rates
from the yield curve. For any given maturity, there are usually more options traded below the
current spot level than above, implying that options contain more information about the left tail
than the right. Out-the-money options are more liquid than in-the-money options and puts are
more liquid than calls. The following exclusion filters are applied to the data when calculating
the RND to avoid any micro-structure related bias:
26All Bond Funds can be further dissimilated into Long Term Bond Funds, Long Term Corporate Funds, Long
Term Government Funds, Mortgage Backed Funds, Municipal Bond Funds, Short Term Bond Funds, Short Term
Corporate Funds, Short Term Government Funds, Total Return Funds, All Emerging Markets Funds (local, hard,
blend currency funds), Floating Rate Funds, High Yield Funds, Inflation Protected Funds, Intermediate Term
Corporate Funds, Intermediate Term Funds, and Intermediate Term Government Funds.
27http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-500/en/us/?indexId=spusa-500-usduf--p-us-l--
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– Eliminate options with zero trading volume and prices below 1/8 (this is the average of the
bid and ask);
– Eliminate options with extreme far-from-the-money strikes if they are separated from the
main group of strikes by 25 points or more;
– Eliminate all options with maturities of eight days or less.
In order to estimate η3t where t refers to the current date (week), the third robust moment
of Bondarenko (2000) is estimated for daily data and averaged from Monday to Friday of the
relevant week t. Further details are in Chapter 3.
Notation
With regard to notation, ffyx,t refers to the monthly/weekly FF dedicated USA fund flows ex-
pressed as a percentage of NAV for a given month/week t, where y refers to asset class as either
equity or bond y = e, b respectively, and x indicates which group of investor flows are being
examined. That is, x = i or r where i refers to institutional investors and r refers to retail
investors for the combined US and non-US domiciled funds. CC refers to the University of Michi-
gan consumer confidence index, LEI denotes the Conference Board leading economic indicator
and PSM is then the ISM purchasing managers index. All flows over the week are expressed as
a percentage of NAV (as of the beginning of the week). The percentage change in NAV over the
week is also examined with respect to flows as a measure of fund performance. This is denoted as
Nff
y
x,t. II refers to the bull–bear spread. AAII is analogous to the bull–bear spread, however it
refers to individual (retail) investor sentiment. The aggregate market weekly return Rt is given
by
Rt = 100 · ln St
St−1
,
where St is the total returns index level of the S&P 500 on the Friday of week t.
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4.3.3 Monthly Flows
This section briefly examines monthly ffei,t, ff
e
r,t, ff
b
i,t and ff
b
r,t, expressed as a percentage of
NAV. The data are taken between January 2005 and December 2010. Summary statistics in
Table 4.1 and time series properties for the fund flows are provided. The correlation of these
time series with the three indices CC, LEI and PMI are also provided in Table 4.2. This is
a rough indication of whether fund flows are attuned to confidence and the macro PMI. The
summary statistics are for 72 monthly observations of fund flow data expressed as a percentage
of NAV. Institutional investors have a much higher average flow into bonds as well as equities.
On average, retail investors seem to have withdrawn capital from equities. Jarque–Bera is a test
statistic for testing whether the series is normally distributed. The test statistic measures the
difference of the skewness and kurtosis of the series with those from the normal distribution. The
reported probability is the probability that a Jarque–Bera statistic exceeds (in absolute value)
the observed value under the null hypothesis, i.e. a small probability value leads to the rejection
of the null hypothesis of a normal distribution.
Table 4.1: Summary statistics for dedicated monthly US fund flows as a % of NAV. These time series are
the bond and equity fund flows for institutional and retail investors as defined.
Summary statistics ff bi,t ff
b
r,t ff
e
i,t ff
e
r,t
Mean 0.9471 0.0849 0.7993 –0.4729
Median 0.9143 0.0915 0.4815 –0.3776
Maximum 3.7311 2.1625 4.4377 0.6600
Minimum –3.0091 –2.218 –2.2743 –1.6165
Std. dev. 0.9485 0.9724 1.2368 0.4209
Skewness –0.6479 –0.2056 0.4810 –0.7442
Kurtosis 6.4057 2.5694 3.3646 3.7548
Jarque–Bera 39.8331 1.0633 3.1755 8.3556
Probability 0 0.5876 0.2044 0.0153
Within the same asset classes, Table 4.2 indicates that the ffei,t and ff
e
r,t are negatively correlated
over the entire period. Hence there are divergences between institutional and retail investor equity
fund flow behaviour. With respect to bonds, the investor groups are highly correlated. This may
imply that investors are subject to similar sentiment when allocating capital to bonds, however
equity fund flow may be based on differences in behaviour. Retail investors are considered to
be ‘noise traders’, as defined in (De Long et al. 1990), and in particular, subject to under- and
over-reaction. There may be a difference in trading activity based on momentum or contrarian
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Table 4.2: Correlations for dedicated monthly US fund flows as a % of NAV. Included are the macro
variables of the LEI and PMI, and consumer confidence CC.
Correlation ff bi,t ff
b
r,t ff
e
i,t ff
e
r,t LEI PMI CC
ff bi,t 1
ff br,t 0.6270 1
ffei,t –0.1704 –0.3975 1
ffer,t 0.1279 0.3562 –0.2667 1
LEI –0.4644 –0.1915 0.0589 –0.1912 1
PMI 0.1460 –0.1757 0.1172 0.0461 –0.3540 1
CC –0.2797 –0.4223 0.1076 0.3153 0.1693 0.3719 1
views. ffei,t is negatively correlated to ff
b
r,t and ff
e
r,t; ff
e
r,t is positively related to ff
b
i,t. Thus
ffei,t appears to be the single flow variable that is negatively related to all other flows. Further
scrutiny is possible using weekly flow and performance data.
CC is negatively correlated to both ff bi,t and ff
b
r,t which implies that bond flows tend to decline
when confidence increases and vice versa. The reverse relationship holds for ffei,t and ff
e
r,t;
both groups of investors increase equity fund flows when confidence increases. The correlation is
noticeably stronger for retail investors. Neither macro benchmark indices, LEI nor PMI, displayed
the same conviction. CC has previously been shown to be Granger-caused by past positive equity
performance and has also been shown to be a contrarian sentiment indicator for the aggregate
stock market. At first blush, in the period under consideration, investor sentiment is seemingly
attuned to CC. To explore the relationship further, weekly II data are used. Thereafter, the
question pertaining to portfolio insurance will be addressed.
Autocorrelation in retail and institutional time series of dedicated US equity and bond fund flows
is next examined to determine whether flows are persistent. A correlogram for the time series
estimates Ljung–Box Q-statistics and their p-values for the autocorrelation and partial autocor-
relation coefficients. The Q-statistic at lag k is a test statistic for the null hypothesis that there
is no autocorrelation up to order k. The institutional investor time series data is autoregressive
of order one, with AR(1) coefficient 0.22 (Q-statistic and p-value of 3.63 and 0.06 respectively).
Retail equity fund flow monthly data over the entire period appears to be autoregressive of up
to two lags with an AR(1) coefficient of 0.47 (Q-statistic and p-value of 16.2 and 0.00), and
AR(2) coefficient of 0.24 (Q-statistic and p-value of 20.48 and 0.00). Monthly bond flows were
highly autoregressive of up to six and eight lags in the case of institutional and retail investors
respectively. Graphically, it is much clearer to comprehend the movement of flows and fund
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Figure 4.1: Monthly FFs of dedicated US equity funds expressed as % of NAV for institutional investors,
% change NAV and total assets over the period.
Figure 4.2: Monthly FFs of dedicated US equity funds expressed as % of NAV for retail investors, %
change NAV and total assets over the period.
performance. Clearly, US bond flows increased substantially in 2008 for both retail and institu-
tional investors, as defined according the EPFR Global. It appears that the percentage change in
NAV and flows are positively correlated for the entire duration for institutional investors. This
relationship is mirrored for retail investors from approximately 2008; prior to this date, the flows
and performance seem to be negatively related.
The following section addresses time series properties as well as the relationship to respective fund
performance and aggregate market performance. Summary statistics, correlations and Granger
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Figure 4.3: Monthly FFs of dedicated US bond funds expressed as % of NAV for institutional investors,
% change NAV and total assets over the period.
Figure 4.4: Monthly FFs of dedicated US bond funds expressed as % of NAV for retail investors, %
change NAV and total assets over the period.
causality for all variables are examined.
4.3.4 Weekly Flows
Weekly data are extracted from the FF dataset between January 2005 and December 2010 for
dedicated (100% allocation) US equity and bond funds of combined US and non-US domiciled
institutional and retail investors. As discussed in Fratzscher (2011), the time period from January
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2005 to December 2010 will be split into pre-crisis and post-crisis regimes in some instances.
The pre-crisis period extends from January 2005 to the end of July 2007 and the post-crisis
period is then the remainder which includes the crisis, the commencement and termination of
which is inexact. Dividing the period is also a means to establish whether certain relationships
are robust across all such periods. The entire sample period is from 1/07/2005 to 12/31/2010
(314 observations), the pre-crisis sample is from 1/07/2005 to 7/27/2007 (134 observations) and
the post-crisis sample is from 7/27/2007 to 12/31/2010 (180 observations). The number of
observations for regressions differ depending on whether lagged dependent variables are included
on the right hand side. Time series models are estimated using traditional Box–Jenkins ARMA
models in Eviews.
Flow and Returns
Given that there is much debate regarding the relationship between flows and aggregate market
returns, it is necessary to determine the relationships that are present within these specific funds.
Funds may attract flows due to superior performance and associated sentiment; depending on
the nature of the fund in question, investors may require a relatively safe investment, thereby
shifting the appeal to specialised bond funds.
Summary statistics over the entire period are provided in Table 4.3. The weekly and monthly
statistics are dissimilar for corresponding time series, regardless of the difference in reporting
frequency. This tends to arise due to some weeks being split at the end of one month and the start
of the next. Thus the data is fairly reliant on reporting periods; caution should be applied when
examining across reporting frequencies. Clearly retail equity and bond flows are both negative on
average whilst institutional equity and bond flows are in agreement with mean monthly flows, and
are positive. Performance of all funds is positive and greater than Rt. The standard deviation
of ffei,t was the largest within the sample of flows, followed by ff
b
i,t. Interestingly, ff
e
r,t had the
lowest sample standard deviation.
Correlations are displayed in Table 4.4. Considering flow relationships, a similar yet clearer
account of monthly data can be seen. With regard to bonds, ff bi,t is positively related to all flows
with the exception of ffei,t: there is a slight positive relationship which then reverts to being
negative in the post-crisis period. This might imply capital reallocation between asset classes
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics of weekly fund flow, respective fund performance and aggregate market
return (in percent) over the period.
Summary statistics ff bi,t Nff
b
i,t ff
b
r,t Nff
b
r,t ff
e
i,t Nff
e
i,t ff
e
r,t Nff
e
r,t Rt
Mean 0.18 0.08 –0.04 0.06 0.14 0.09 –0.09 0.10 0.04
Median 0.22 0.11 –0.02 0.12 0.12 0.33 –0.07 0.36 0.22
Maximum 3.26 1.48 3.11 3.33 4.37 10.52 0.50 9.65 11.41
Minimum –3.20 –2.58 –3.41 –4.93 –2.58 –16.06 –0.87 –15.67 –20.02
Std. dev. 0.60 0.52 0.40 0.67 0.92 2.68 0.16 2.60 2.86
Skewness 0.13 –0.91 –0.74 –1.38 0.78 –0.90 –1.40 –0.98 –1.03
Kurtosis 11.25 5.91 31.08 15.00 6.17 8.60 9.34 8.46 11.96
Jarque–Bera 888.78 153.62 10310.30 1978.26 162.85 451.41 625.74 438.74 1101.59
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
contingent upon risk aversion or fund performance. ff br,t follows suit given the slightly stronger
negative correlation with ffei,t in the post-crisis period. Hence retail investors allocate capital to
both asset classes in tandem. With respect to equity, ffei,t appears to be negatively related, in
varying degrees, to all other flows with the exception of ff bi,t in the pre-crisis period. It follows
that ffer,t is slightly negatively correlated to ff
e
i,t over all periods and is positively correlated to
all flows (over all periods) which is in agreement with monthly data. Thus, institutional equity
flow data appear to be negatively related to retail flows, and display alternating yet equivalent
mild correlation to institutional bond flows. The negative correlation arises in the latter half of
the sample.
Regarding fund flows and respective fund performance, ff bi,t and Nff
b
i,t are consistently posi-
tively correlated over all periods. ff br,t is negatively correlated with the fund performance in
the pre-crisis period; this then reverts to significant positive correlation in the post-crisis period.
ffei,t displays zero correlation to respective fund performance which is then followed by positive
correlation in the post-crisis period. There is an insignificant negative, then positive, correlation
between ffei,t to Rt over respective periods. ff
e
r,t are positively correlated to its performance and
slightly negatively related to Rt over all periods. Institutional and retail bond fund performance
are highly correlated. The equity fund performance of both groups is perfectly correlated, and
highly correlated to Rt. It appears that the time series ff
e
i,t and ff
e
r,t react to performance in
differing manners, considering that fund performance is perfectly attuned. Hence each group
may be subject to different behavioural biases considering that both groups attain essentially the
same fund performance. The relationship between retail bond flows and associated performance
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further supports this notion. Thus it is the institutional equity fund flow–performance as well as
the retail bond fund flow–performance correlation which tend to alter in the post-crisis periods.
Finally, fund performance across asset classes and investor groups are all positively correlated
over all periods.
It is also conceivable that each group of investors might alter fund flow based on performance
of the alternative asset class. Examining such correlations, ffei,t does not display any significant
correlation (mildly negative in the post-crisis period) to Nff
b
i,t. ff
b
i,t is fairly positively related to
both Nff
e
i,t and Rt in the post-crisis period. The former may be a result of positive correlation
between Nff
e
i,t and Nff
b
i,t. ff
b
r,t displays positive correlation to Nff
e
r,t and slightly less so to
Rt in the post-crisis period; this is also evident and significant between ff
e
r,t and, Nff
b
r,t and
Rt. The cross-asset correlations which pertain to each investor group provide further clarification
with regard to the flow–performance relationships in sub-periods. Specifically, it seems that
institutional investor equity fund flows are not concurrently driven by respective fund performance
in the pre-crisis period, however this alters in the post-crisis period. These fund flows also display
a slight negative correlation to all other flows during the latter period. Bond flows seem to be
concurrently positively related to performance for both groups of investors in the post-crisis
period. To establish lead or lagged flow–performance relationships, Granger causality is next
examined.
In order to ascertain the direction of information flow, Granger causality (using two lags) over the
entire period between all pairs of series (flows as well as percent change in NAV) are examined.
The results which reject the null hypothesis of no causality are displayed in Table 4.5. Certain
causality relationships may require further clarification. ff br,t appears to Granger-cause ff
b
i,t
which might be a behavioural response to bond fund performance. Noting that Nff
b
r,t Granger-
causes ff bi,t and Nff
b
i,t Granger-causes ff
b
r,t, the flow behaviour is credible. Of note is that
institutional equity flow is exclusively Granger-caused by its respective fund performance; Rt has
no causality implications thereto. Retail investors responded to aggregate market performance
Rt as well as performance of all funds.
Continuing with time series properties, a correlogram to establish autocorrelation is examined for
the level of each flow variable. ffei,t displays no autocorrelation (in agreement with the monthly
data) however ffer,t results in a positive first-order coefficient AR(1) of 0.30 (Q-statistic 29.2,
p-value of 0.00) and second coefficient AR(2) of 0.14 (Q-statistic 35.5, p-value 0.00). Weekly
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Table 4.4: Correlations of weekly flow variables and performance for all three periods: pre-crisis (January
2005 to July 2007), post-crisis (August 2007 to December 2010) and the entire period. Included here is
the aggregate market return Rt.
Correlation ff bi,t Nff
b
i,t ff
b
r,t Nff
b
r,t ff
e
i,t Nff
e
i,t ff
e
r,t Nff
e
i,t Rt
ff bi,t 1
Nff
b
i,t pre-crisis 0.15 1
post-crisis 0.29
2005–2010 0.17
ff br,t 0.37 0.17 1
0.65 0.28
0.44 0.17
Nff
b
r,t 0.06 0.83 –0.15 1
0.40 0.81 0.41
0.17 0.82 0.08
ffei,t 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.01 1
–0.08 –0.07 –0.15 –0.18
0.01 –0.04 –0.05 –0.13
Nff
e
i,t –0.02 0.36 0.07 0.41 0.00 1
0.26 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.15
0.10 0.23 0.08 0.19 0.11
ffer,t 0.04 –0.01 0.06 –0.04 –0.05 0.06 1
0.37 0.40 0.32 0.50 –0.10 0.22
0.13 0.29 0.09 0.36 –0.08 0.19
Nff
e
r,t -0.03 0.36 0.07 0.41 –0.03 0.99 0.05 1
0.27 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.14 1.00 0.23
0.10 0.23 0.09 0.21 0.10 1.00 0.20
Rt 0.02 0.08 –0.02 0.15 –0.02 0.53 –0.08 0.52 1
0.21 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.60 –0.01 0.60
0.09 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.59 –0.01 0.59
equity fund flows are displayed in Figure 4.5. It is clear that institutional flows are far more
volatile than those of retail investors, particularly between 2007 and 2009, as indicated by the
standard deviation over the entire sample period.
Bond fund flows display higher autocorrelation in general with the correlogram of ff bi,t indicating
a third-order autoregressive process. The AR(1) coefficient is 0.15 (Q-statistic of 7.14, p-value
0.01), AR(2) coefficient is 0.17 (Q-statistic of 16.10, p-value of 0.00) and AR(3) coefficient is 0.19
(Q-statistic of 28.70, p-value of 0.00). The institutional bond flow behaviour is characterised by
extremely volatile flows in the first half of the series as shown in Figure 4.6 along with ff br,t. This
may be attributed to specific funds being monitored, as some data points pertain to trades of
a few large funds, clearly visible in the ff br,t series. ff
b
r,t is highly persistent as autocorrelation
188
Table 4.5: Granger causality using two lags for fund flow variables and fund performance over the period.
Dependent variables considered pertain to all possible combinations, the null hypothesis being tested. A
low p-value implies the null hypothesis is rejected.
Null hypothesis F -statistic Prob.
Nff
b
i,t does not Granger cause ff
b
i,t 5.3146 0.0054
ff bi,t does not Granger cause Nff
b
i,t 2.3224 0.0998
ff br,t does not Granger cause ff
b
i,t 6.4517 0.0018
Nff
b
r,t does not Granger cause ff
b
i,t 4.9924 0.0074
ff bi,t does not Granger cause Nff
b
r,t 3.0032 0.0511
ffei,t does not Granger cause ff
b
i,t 3.5113 0.0311
Nff
e
i,t does not Granger cause ff
b
i,t 4.8765 0.0082
Nff
e
r,t does not Granger cause ff
b
i,t 5.3114 0.0054
Nff
b
i,t does not Granger cause ff
b
r,t 8.2781 0.0003
Nff
b
i,t does not Granger cause ff
e
r,t 4.5428 0.011
Nff
b
r,t does not Granger cause ff
b
r,t 11.7823 1.00E-05
Nff
b
r,t does not Granger cause ff
e
r,t 3.4058 0.0344
Nff
e
i,t does not Granger cause ff
e
r,t 27.4849 1.00E-11
Nff
e
r,t does not Granger cause ff
e
r,t 27.9587 7.00E-12
Rt does not Granger cause ff
b
r,t 3.9032 0.0212
Rt does not Granger cause ff
e
r,t 54.9588 4E-21
coefficients and partial autocorrelation coefficients extend beyond the 5% confidence intervals for
up to 38 lags.
To summarise:
– Institutional Investors
* Bond Flows – ff bi,t: These bond fund flows are positively correlated to all flows with
the exception of the slight negative relationship to institutional equity fund flows in
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Figure 4.5: Weekly FFs of dedicated US equity funds expressed as % of NAV for retail and institutional
investors over the period.
the post-crisis period. Flows are positively contemporaneously related to own fund
performance; two-way Granger causality exists. Flows seem to be fairly persistent and
appeared to be Granger-caused by performance in general. This flow variable has the
highest positive correlation to aggregate market returns in the post-crisis period.
* Equity Flows – ffei,t: These flows are unique in the sense that there is no causality
associated with own fund performance. Past flows do not appear to persist as there is
no autocorrelation over the whole sample period. It is only in the
pre-crisis period that there is a slight positive correlation to institutional bond fund
flows. During the latter half of the sample period, these flows are slightly negatively
related to all other flows. There is zero correlation with its own fund performance
in the pre-crisis period, followed by a positive concurrent correlation to own fund
performance, as well as (very slightly) to aggregate market returns in the post-crisis
period.
– Retail Investors
* Bond Flows – ff br,t: These flows are very much in line with institutional bond fund
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Figure 4.6: Weekly FFs of dedicated US bond funds expressed as % of NAV for retail and institutional
investors over the period.
flows. The only difference is that the contemporaneous correlations to own-fund per-
formance is negative in the pre-crisis period; this then reverts to being positive in the
post-crisis period. Granger causality is from fund performance to flows and uniquely
from aggregate market performance to retail investor flows. Positive correlations ex-
ist between these flows and aggregate returns in the post-crisis period. This series is
extremely persistent.
* Equity Flows – ffer,t: Retail equity funds are positively correlated to both institutional
and retail bond flows in the latter period. There is also a slight correlation to insti-
tutional equity flows over all periods. These flows are Granger-caused by own fund
performance, Nff
e
i,t as well as that of aggregate market returns. These flows are very
slightly negatively contemporaneously correlated to Rt over all periods. The series is
fairly persistent.
Having explored the relationships between flow, performance and aggregate market performance
over each sub-period, in general it appears that performance Granger-causes flows which conforms
to the feedback trader hypothesis. Flows did not appear to Granger-cause performance with the
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exception of the two-way causality of institutional bond funds. Uniquely to retail investors, ag-
gregate market performance Granger-causes flows over the entire period. Institutional equity
fund flow tends to differ as performance, over the entire period, is unrelated to flow. However, a
zero contemporaneous correlation, followed by a slight positive correlation, exists between these
fund flows and own-fund performance over the pre- and post-crisis periods. There is no autocor-
relation (over the whole period) present, and therefore it appears that institutional equity flows
may be determined by factors other than performance. All other flows appear to be consistent
with respect to correlations to each other as well as performance measures.
Given that flows are tantamount to sentiment, the following section examines the relationship
between fund flows and sentiment measures. The fund flows are an aggregation of US and non-
US domiciled fund flows (global sentiment) whereas the II measure is based on the opinions of
US newsletter writers. In this section, the VIX and TED spread which are global measures of
risk and liquidity will also be examined along with the SPX option-implied skew and AAII. The
latter is included due to the close relationship that has been shown to exist between these indices.
Henceforth, retail flows will be excluded from the analysis as the principal hypothesis pertains
to institutional sentiment.
Investor Sentiment
This section begins with a detailed comparison between the US survey-based sentiment measures
and the common global risk factors, in addition to the option-implied skew; these are all deemed
sentiment-related variables. Data consist of the AAII and II bull–bear spread, the VIX, the TED
spread, and the index option-implied skew η3t .
II and AAII surveys are released on Tuesdays, the VIX and TED spread are recorded on the
Friday of the week and η3t is averaged over the week, calculated on the Friday of each week. All
units are expressed as a percentage, with the exception of the skew η3t and the TED spread which
is expressed in basis points (1 bp = 1% of 1%). As in the previous section, summary statistics,
correlations and Granger causality are displayed for sentiment-related variables. This is followed
by time series analysis of II. In particular, II is regressed on the VIX, TED spread, η3t and the
AAII.
The summary statistics are reported in Table 4.6 over the period 7 January 2005 to 31 December
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2010 on a weekly basis, followed by correlations in Table 4.7. Results indicate that the VIX and
TED spread are negatively correlated to II and AAII over all periods, as expected. Since the VIX
increases after the aggregate market declines, investors are likely to become less optimistic. II is
positively correlated to AAII (retail investor sentiment), regardless of the difference in fund flow
behaviour of these groups. The skew is also positively related to II and AAII, thereby indicating a
less negative skew (this is clearly on average negative for SPX options), is concurrently related to
more bullish than bearish investor opinions. 28 As the TED spread widens and liquidity decreases,
a more negatively skewed returns distribution is observed. Results are robust across periods.
Table 4.6: Summary statistics of weekly sentiment variables which include survey-based as well as option-
implied measures over the period.
Summary statistics AAII II η3t VIX TED
Mean 1.43 16.77 –0.13 21.64 65.44
Median 1.93 19.60 –0.12 18.61 38.97
Maximum 46.87 42.40 0.14 79.13 463.61
Minimum –51.35 –32.20 –0.41 10.02 11.06
Std. dev. 17.51 16.13 0.09 11.78 63.43
Skewness –0.16 –0.79 –0.13 2.00 2.44
Kurtosis 2.72 3.02 2.98 7.94 11.23
Jarque–Bera 2.35 32.75 0.85 526.64 1193.21
Probability 0.31 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.00
Table 4.7: Correlations of weekly sentiment variables, as in Table (4.6), for all three periods: pre-crisis
(January 2005 to July 2007), post-crisis (August 2007 to December 2010) and the entire period.
Correlation AAII II η3t VIX TED
AAII 1
II (pre-crisis) 0.42 1
post-crisis 0.57
2005–2010 0.56
η3t 0.19 0.22 1
0.25 0.30
0.30 0.39
VIX –0.48 –0.41 –0.49 1
–0.35 –0.67 –0.23
–0.41 –0.70 –0.39
TED –0.18 –0.04 –0.30 0.28 1
–0.37 –0.57 –0.42 0.59
–0.37 –0.59 –0.45 0.66
28The skew here has been measured on the Friday of the week, hence it appears that there is a lag of three days.
Checking the skew averaged over the week from Wednesday to Tuesday does not alter the results.
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Granger causality is also examined as this establishes information flow pertaining to known
relationships. This too serves to illustrate established results of previous research. Table 4.8
reports only those results which lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis. It appears that the
VIX, TED spread and the skew precede information from survey results for both II and AAII.
The VIX and TED spread are particularly responsible as causality runs from both these series
to the skew. However, the VIX and the skew when both linearly interpolated to reflect a 30-day
measure, are contemporaneously correlated given they are derived from the same options data,
as in Chapter 3. The difference here may arise due to the maturity of options. The skew pertains
to the nearest maturity, since macro news is most likely to affect these options. There are two
two-way causality relationships between the skew and both survey measures. This instils further
confidence in the use of the skew as an institutional sentiment measure. Figure 4.7 displays the
VIX and the TED spread. The series are highly correlated as indicated in Table 4.7.
Table 4.8: Granger causality for sentiment-related variables over the entire period. Results which indicate
a rejection of the null hypothesis are shown, reflected in the low p-value.
Null hypothesis F -statistic Prob.
TED does not Granger cause VIX 12.2884 7.00E-06
TED does not Granger cause II 4.1446 0.0167
TED does not Granger cause η3t 12.2268 8.00E-06
VIX does not Granger cause II 6.4170 0.0019
VIX does not Granger cause AAII 18.5030 3.00E-08
VIX does not Granger cause η3t 5.6313 0.0040
II does not Granger cause AAII 22.4507 8.00E-10
η3t does not Granger cause II 3.4324 0.0336
II does not Granger cause η3t 3.9452 0.0203
η3t does not Granger cause AAII 12.4464 6.00E-06
AAII does not Granger cause η3t 2.7673 0.0644
Individual relationships are examined by regressing II on the following: the VIX, TED spread,
η3t and the AAII. The first three variables are recorded on the Friday of week t whereas II and
AAII are from week t + 1 to avoid look-ahead bias. Over the period 2005–2010, weekly II data
fit an AR(1) model with lagged coefficient 0.93 (t-stat 38.14, p-value 0.00, adjusted R-squared is
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Figure 4.7: The CBOE VIX (left axis) in percent, and TED spread (right axis) measured in basis points
over the period.
0.90) and constant term 1.25 (t-stat 2.32, p-value 0.02). The residuals fit an AR(1). The AIC is
minimised when selecting the best fit. A lag of one is included in all regressions. All equations
are fit using appropriate AR and MA terms for errors. In an AR(p) model, the autocorrelations
decay to zero for long lags, while the p + 1 partial autocorrelation (and beyond) goes abruptly
to zero. The reverse is true for an MA model. EViews estimates AR models using nonlinear
regression techniques with HAC standard errors and covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey–West
fixed bandwidth = 6.0000). Regression statistics for the entire period under consideration are
reported.
The OLS regression of the survey-based institutional variable IIt to be estimated is as follows:
IIt = α+ β1IIt−1 + β2xt−1,+t (4.1)
where xt−1 is the exogenous time series and t are the residuals which are fitted according to
an ARMA model to ensure that no autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity is present. In the case
of AAII, the data are available at the same weekday as II thus xt will be used. Results are
displayed in Table 4.9. Each column represents the coefficients to the variables which are in
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the regressions equation. This format will be retained throughout. All variables are statistically
significant however the adjusted R2 does not improve when exogenous variables are added. The
results serve to confirm that if the VIX increases by 1%, the II variable decreases by 0.33%. A
1 basis point increase in the TED spread results in a decrease in the II of 0.02%. If the skew
increases by 0.01 units, the II will then increase by 0.06%.
Table 4.9: Regressions of weekly II data over the entire period 2005–2010, as given by equation (4.1).
The t-statistic and p-value are reported below each coefficient as indicated adjacent to α.
IIt Variable (2005–2010)
Value α 1.25 1.78 16.31 4.31 2.51
t-stat. 2.33 4.37 5.27 2.76 3.13
p-value 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
IIt−1 0.93 0.88 0.46 0.83 0.91
38.14 46.23 4.64 14.00 35.98
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AAIIt 0.12
7.12
0.00
V IXt−1 –0.33
–4.31
0.00
TEDt−1 –0.02
–2.24
0.03
η3t−1 7.57
2.07
0.04
Adjusted R2 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90
Flow and II Sentiment
Dedicated institutional US bond and equity fund flow and performance data are examined in
relation to the US survey-based measure of II. This serves to gauge whether the fund flows (global
sentiment), performance and this measure of US institutional investor sentiment are consistent.
Fund-related data are measured from Thursday to Wednesday and reported on the Thursday of
the week. Given that Indro (2004) established a positive and statistically significant relationship
between lagged fund flows and II bullish sentiment, caution is to be applied when comparing
results as there are stark differences from the outset: the funds flow data (ICI) tracks only those
funds that are registered in the US. This omits a large universe of US equity and US bond funds
196
which are domiciled in Europe or Asia, but invest in the US market. The use of all domiciled
funds aggregates the opinions of investors globally, regarding the state of the US, as well as non-
US economies. It is also the case that the data capture different groups of investors. The variable
used in this research is the II bull–bear spread as opposed to the percentage of bullish opinions.
Granger causality for institutional fund flows, performance and II are in Table 4.10; only those
results which lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis are displayed. Clearly, institutional fund
performance Granger-causes II. II Granger-causes bond fund flows. Performance of both asset
classes tends to Granger-cause II. Examining regressions more closely with II as a dependent
variable and either flows or performance as independent variables, no further relationships were
perceived. In particular, II did not display any statistical significance when flows were regressed
on II or lagged II.
Table 4.10: Granger causality for the bull–bear spread II, institutional fund flows and fund performance.
Null hypothesis F -statistic Prob.
II does not Granger cause ff bi,t 3.1038 0.0463
Nff
b
i,t does not Granger cause II 3.3667 0.0358
Nff
e
i,t does not Granger cause II 7.2165 0.0009
Hence II is a momentum variable and appears to be Granger-caused by other sentiment-related
variables. II is not significantly related to institutional sentiment, as measured by fund flows.
II is however Granger-caused by the VIX, TED spread and the skew, the former two variables
being highly correlated. The following section examines the option-implied skew and relationship
to institutional fund flows.
Flow and Portfolio Insurance
Henceforth, the skew is the primary sentiment-related variable to be examined. It is related to
the VIX by construction, the TED spread, and daily data suggests it is positively correlated
to movements in the underlying (Chapter 3). The slope of the implied volatility smile of index
options for a given maturity is an indication of institutional investors’ requirements for insurance;
the steeper the smile, the greater the demand for such insurance. This manifests in the option-
implied skew. Therefore, it is necessary to establish whether global institutional sentiment, as
measured by dedicated US institutional fund flows, is aligned with the option-implied skew of
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the aggregate market index. Fund flows have been shown to be preceded by returns given that
performance Granger-causes flow, as in Table 4.5, with the exception of institutional equity flow.
Regressing η3t on institutional fund-related variables a means to establish whether flow variables
are consistent with views regarding possible downwards market movements in the immediate
future.
Data to be examined in this section are the skew η3t , the VIX, the TED spread, ff
b
i,t, Nff
b
i,t, ff
e
i,t,
Nff
e
i,t and the aggregate market weekly percentage performance Rt. Table 4.8 indicates that the
VIX, TED spread and the skew precede information from survey results for both II and AAII.
It is also the case that II Granger-causes ff bi,t. From these simple relationships, information flow
and Granger causality can be expected in the case of the VIX, TED spread, the skew and flow.
Reporting statistically significant Granger causality in Table 4.11, it is evident that institutional
bond flows Granger-cause skew. This provides initial insight into the hypothesis pertaining to
equity portfolio insurance and bond fund flows. Additionally, equity fund performance Granger-
causes skew which is then relevant for the second hypothesis regarding performance and insurance.
It is also the case that both skew and TED spread Granger-cause institutional equity flow –
this will be further discussed. In the instance of fund performance Granger-causing the VIX
or TED spread, the complexity of the relationships between financial markets may give rise to
feedback, and thereby create an appearance of precedence when in fact, the variables are reflecting
coincidental information.
In light of this information, it is clear that index option markets are a useful vein wherein
sentiment of institutional investors manifests. Thus far, the skew has been shown to be related to
both II and AAII as well as the global factors (VIX, TED spread). The risk-neutral distribution
embodies forward-looking sentiment pertaining to the underlying index at the relevant maturity.
These simple causality relationships indicate that the skew is a manifestation of both aggregate
market momentum as well as the markets perception of near-term equity market performance.
The skew also Granger-causes ffei,t, and hence may be useful as an indicator to forecast equity
fund flows. The stock market is highly integrated with, and reacts to, the real economy; options
markets have also been shown to react to fundamental macro news. The skew is then that single
measure which appears to be all-encompassing.
Proceeding, the time series properties of the skew are established over the weekly period January
2005 to July 2007, followed by August 2007 to December 2010. To ensure that η3t is not a unit
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Table 4.11: Granger causality for the VIX, TED spread, skew, fund flows and performance.
Null hypothesis F -statistic Prob.
ff bi,t does not Granger cause η
3
t 4.4195 0.0128
η3t does not Granger cause ff
e
i,t 6.8208 0.0013
Nff
e
i,t does not Granger cause η
3
t 4.8119 0.0088
Nff
b
i,t does not Granger cause VIX 2.6121 0.075
TED does not Granger cause ff bi,t 6.9550 0.0011
TED does not Granger cause ffei,t 4.7556 0.0092
TEDt does not Granger cause Rt 8.9868 0.0002
Nff
e
i,t does not Granger cause TED 4.7956 0.0089
root process over the entire period, an ADF test including a constant is performed. The t-statistic
of –4.38 (p-value of 0.00) is smaller than the critical values at the 1% (–3.45), 5% (–2.87) and 10%
(–2.57) levels which leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root. The
best fit is an ARMA(1,1) which is also consistent over individual periods. The errors displayed
neither heteroscedasticity, nor autocorrelation. 29 Results are provided in Table 4.12. AR and
MA Roots are the inverted roots of the equation.
• The next set of regressions address Hypothesis 1: Increases in institutional dedicated US
bond flows signal a decrease in the aggregate market skew.
The regressions estimated are
η3t = α+
k∑
i=1
βiη
3
t−i +
p∑
j=1
ϕjxj,∗ + θt−1 + t, (4.2)
where βi refers to the AR(i) coefficient, ϕj is the coefficient of the exogenous variable xj,∗
which may be lagged by one week or current. Thus xj,∗ = xj,t−1, xj,t respectively. θ
refers to the MA(1) coefficient. In the second period, the model best suited is adjusted
by including an AR(4) term and removing the MA(1) term when necessary. Included
are the contemporaneous aggregate market return Rt and the TED spread. The VIX
contains relatively similar information to the TED spread as expressed in the correlation
as well as precedence of information in the Granger causality, and therefore is not included
here. Results are in Tables 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15. Regressions are performed using the HAC
29If the autocorrelation is within the two standard error bounds computed as ±2/√N , where N is the sample
size, it is not significantly different from zero at (approximately) the 5% significance level.
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Table 4.12: Regression results for the weekly option-implied skew η3t , averaged over the week on Friday.
Sample Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob. AR roots MA roots
1/14/2005– α –0.1027 0.0161 –6.3997 0 0.87 0.69
7/27/2007 AR(1) 0.8726 0.0946 9.2294 0
MA(1) –0.6918 0.1354 –5.1097 0
Adj. R-squared 0.1095 AIC –2.4696
F -statistic 9.1182
Prob(F -stat.) 0.0002
7/27/2007– α –0.1267 0.0293 –4.3197 0 0.96 0.85
12/31/2010 AR(1) 0.9628 0.0216 44.5866 0
MA(1) –0.8474 0.0519 –16.3407 0
Adj. R-squared 0.2933 AIC -2.2608
F -statistic 38.1370
Prob(F -stat.) 0
7/29/2005– α –0.1352 0.0223 –6.0653 0 0.95 0.74
12/31/2010 AR(1) 0.9466 0.0281 33.5766 0
MA(1) –0.7433 0.0575 –12.9167 0
Adj. R-squared 0.2720 AIC –2.2764
F -statistic 53.8773
Prob(F -stat.) 0
coefficient covariance estimator (Newey–West). Regressing the skew on institutional bond
flows over pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, it appears that the relationship is statistically
significant for lagged flows ff bi,t−1 in the pre-crisis period and concurrent flows ff
b
i,t in the
post-crisis period. There are also stark differences pertaining to the signs.
Under standard market conditions (pre-crisis period), positive dedicated US institutional
bond fund flows ff bi,t in a week result in a decease in η
3
t+1 in the following week between
2005 and mid-2007. In particular, a 1% increase of ff bi,t in week t leads to a –0.018 decrease
in the skew in week t+ 1 over this period. Upon inclusion of Rt and TEDt, results indicate
that positive weekly returns, an increase in liquidity (a decrease in the TED spread) as
well as flows out of bond funds, lagged by one week, tend to result in an increase in the
skew (less negative). The TED spread is measured in bps, Rt and ff
b
i,t−1 are percentages
and η3t is in units. Positive equity market performance may lead to bond outflows into
equity funds as risk aversion decreases and sentiment increases, the latter measured by
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the index option-implied skewness. Lagged positive bond flows preceded a decrease in the
skew. Granger causality runs from both bond and equity fund performance as well as Rt
to ff bi,t over the entire period. In section 4.3.4, it can be seen that ff
b
i,t is very slightly
positively correlated to ffei,t during the initial period; the relationship alters sign during
the post-crisis period. However ffei,t is not correlated to its own fund performance in this
period. ff bi,t did not display a significant correlation to Rt in the initial sample period
either. Similarly, this reverts to a significant positive correlation during the post-crisis
period. These flows are significantly positively related to their own fund performance,
equity fund performance and Rt in the second period. In the first period, these funds do
not display any significant correlation to bond or equity fund performance. Hence during
this period, there are no obvious relationships which should lead to this result. Granger
causality exists between II, the skew and ff bi,t over the entire period. Thus during the pre-
crisis regime, positive institutional bond flows which are fairly persistent yet uncorrelated
to own-fund performance over this period, result in an increase in portfolio insurance in
the following week, evidenced by a decrease in the skew. Institutional investor behaviour
appears to be consistent, albeit with a lag of one week. This serves to confirm the hypothesis
and reinforces the use of fund flows as a global sentiment measure. However, institutional
investor behaviour appears to adapt to the heightened risk levels and decreased liquidity in
the latter half of the sample.
In the post-crisis period, the relationship has altered to yield a positive and statistically
significant coefficient for current bond flows. Hence regardless of near-term equity market
perceptions, bond flows adhered to the flight-to-safety hypothesis. From mid-2007 to De-
cember 2010, there is a positive contemporaneous relationship between η3t and ff
b
i,t. Bond
flows and portfolio insurance appear to move in the same direction over this period. Having
explored numerous flow–performance relationships, it is clear that ff bi,t over the post-crisis
period displays positive contemporaneous correlation with all fund performance measures
as well as Rt. It is also Granger-caused by performance. One possible clue for the alter-
nation of sign between skew and bond flows is to observe that bond flows and equity flows
are slightly negatively correlated over this period. Bond flows and equity performance are
however positively related. Equity flows are only slightly positively correlated to own-fund
performance over this period. Positive fund performance in general Granger-causes bond
flows, however institutional equity flows remain elusive. Positive lagged and contempo-
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raneous equity fund performance may lead to an increase in the skew as there is less of
a requirement for portfolio insurance as institutional investors become more bullish as a
result of market momentum. This then accounts for the shift in dynamics and forms the
empirical analysis to confirm the second hypothesis. It is also the case that during the
latter period, the relationship between skew and bond flows alters as a result of market
conditions. This is supported by Fratzscher (2011) wherein the author finds the Lehman
event to have triggered capital repatriation to the US and some advanced economies after
exiting EMEs, which was perceived to be stronger for bond flows than for equity.
Lagged bond flows did not improve as inclusion yielded weak regression results; including
Rt then TEDt served to decrease the statistical significance. Thus the relationship that
existed prior to August 2007 seems to be relevant for the period in which global risk –
the VIX – was relatively low and liquidity was well below the maximum (464 bps). The
relationships with Rt and TEDt are of the same inclination as the pre-crisis period, however
the econometric significance is decreased.
Over the period 2005–2010, the lagged bond flows tend to dominate, as regression results
did not improve upon inclusion of current bond flows. What can be seen is that 1% increase
in one-week lagged institutional investor bond flows results in a decrease in the skew of –
0.01 over the entire period; this relationship is statistically significant. The results over the
separate periods appear contradictory, however the latter half was characterised by flows
into all AE funds and particularly US bond funds.
• The next set of regressions addresses Hypothesis 2: Positive equity fund performance leads
to (or is accompanied by) an increase in the skew.
Contemporaneous and lagged positive daily aggregate market returns are associated with
an increase in the skew, as is shown in Chapter 3 and Bondarenko (2000) where η3t refers
to the 30-day implied skew that is linearly interpolated from appropriate option maturities
on a given business day. It therefore follows that positive institutional equity fund perfor-
mance over a period may render institutional investors optimistic, and therefore reduce the
requirement for portfolio insurance. The regression results pertaining to Hypothesis 1 indi-
cate that skew is positively contemporaneously related to weekly aggregate market returns.
Rt is also positively correlated to Nff
e
i,t which therefore implies that a similar relationship
between skew and weekly institutional equity fund performance should exist across all sub-
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Table 4.13: Regression results for the weekly option-implied skew and institutional bond fund flows from
January 2005 to July 2007, as described in equation (4.2).
η3t Variable (2005 to mid-2007)
value α –0.0993 –0.1011 0
t-stat. –6.6206 –7.2808
p-value 0 0
AR(1) 0.8545 0.8652 0.7500
7.5349 8.3012 3.8127
0 0 0.0002
MA(1) –0.6704 –0.7062 –0.5622
–4.1366 –4.8442 –2.3217
0.0001 0 0.0218
ff bi,t−1 –0.0185 –0.0197 –0.0202
–3.3465 –3.1877 –3.4646
0.0011 0.0018 0.0007
Rt 0.0115 0.0104
2.9367 2.7706
0.0039 0.0064
TEDt –0.0025
–9.5055
0
Adjusted R2 0.1367 0.1891 0.2347
periods. Hence one can expect consistent past positive equity fund performance to lead to
an increase in the skew. Institutional equity fund flows display zero correlation, followed
by a slight positive correlation to own-fund performance in the pre- and post-crisis periods
respectively. This and the lack of persistence deems the use of such flows for exposition
purposes futile. Interestingly, the skew and TED spread Granger-cause ffei,t over the en-
tire period; thus the skew during week t may be relevant to institutional equity fund flow
in week t + 1 as causality is interpreted as information precedence. The skew is directly
related to equity market performance, and therefore the bond fund flow post-crisis results
of Hypothesis 1 can be justified as being a crisis phenomenon given the correlations which
arise between flows and performance during this period. Thus equity performance possibly
trumps that of bond flows in this instance. To prove Hypothesis 2, a momentum variable
m
Nff
e
i,t is defined as the four-week rolling average of Nff
e
i,t. η
3
t will be regressed on the
momentum variable, adding in Rt, the VIX and ff
b
i,t−1 separately. Lagged bond flows are
included to establish the strength of the combined relationships. As before, regressions
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Table 4.14: Regression results for the weekly option-implied skew and institutional bond fund flows from
August 2007 to December 2010, as defined in equation (4.2).
η3t Variable (mid-2007 to 2010)
value α –0.1353 –0.1618 –0.1374
t-stat. –4.6973 –8.5380 –7.4322
p-value 0 0 0
AR(1) 0.9647 0.3607 0.3295
40.1539 5.1084 4.7884
0 0 0
MA(1) –0.87
–17.5026
0
AR(4) 0.3100 0.2985
6.8127 5.578
0.00 0.00
ff bi,t 0.0392 0.0367 0.0246
2.0314 2.1072 1.4151
0.0437 0.0365 0.1588
Rt 0.003 0.0026
1.7603 1.4368
0.0801 0.1526
TEDt –0.0003
–1.7951
0.0744
Adjusted R2 0.3045 0.3409 0.3468
estimated are of the form
η3t = α+
k∑
i=1
βiη
3
t−i +
p∑
j=1
ϕjxj,t + θt−1 + t, (4.3)
where k = 1, 2, 3 depend on the fitted equation and xj,t refers to the momentum variable
as well as other exogenous variables to be included.
Results are in Tables 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18. The TED spread performed poorly when included
with mNff
e
i,t hence results are omitted. It is also the case that
m
Nff
e
i,t together with both
V IXt and Rt did not yield any statistically significant results.
The above results in accordance with Granger causality establish that the skew, which is a
reflection of institutional investors perceptions of near-term aggregate market performance
as well as the demand for insurance, is positively contemporaneously related to the momen-
tum variable mNff
e
i,t. When included in the regressions, ff
b
i,t−1 clearly has an opposite sign
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Table 4.15: Regression results for the weekly option-implied skew and institutional bond fund flows from
January 2005 to December 2010.
η3t Variable (2005–2010)
value α –0.1300 –0.1302 –0.1003
t-stat. –6.3088 –6.4297 –6.8606
p-value 0 0 0
AR(1) 0.9400 0.9426 0.8977
37.6183 38.3657 20.1501
0 0 0
MA(1) –0.7180 –0.7312 –0.7098
–11.5369 –11.7572 –9.2728
0 0 0
ff bi,t−1 –0.0193 –0.0185 –0.0207
–3.0749 –2.9175 –3.4267
0.0023 0.0038 0.0007
Rt 0.0037 0.0030
1.9404 1.3683
0.0533 0.1722
TEDt –0.0004
–2.5852
0.0102
Adjusted R2 0.3098 0.3228 0.3384
to that of equity momentum, the degree of which varies depending on the market regime. In
the pre-crisis period, the equity momentum variable appears to dominate, as a 1% increase
in both variables tend to lead to an increase in the skew of 0.02. Over the post-crisis period,
including current bond flows performed poorly. Thus the positive contemporaneous rela-
tionship between η3t and ff
b
i,t in Table 4.14 is imperceptible here. The inclusion of ff
b
i,t−1
with mNff
e
i,t yielded statistically significant results over all periods for both variables, how-
ever the significance of ff bi,t−1 in the post-crisis period is questionable, as indicated by the
t-statistic and p-value. Thus the skew appears to be far more susceptible to momentum in
this period than bond flows thereby indicating that portfolio insurance is determined more
so by positive equity fund performance, using the four-week rolling average as the period
under consideration, than institutional bond flows. Clearly, institutional investors allocated
capital to bonds regardless of perceptions pertaining to equity market performance in this
period, as was established in Fratzscher (2011). This then implies that sustained positive
equity fund performance reduces the requirement for portfolio insurance during all market
regimes and is more relevant to determine movements in the skew. Institutional allocation
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Table 4.16: Regression results for the weekly option-implied skew and equity fund momentum from
January 2005 to July 2007, defined in equation (4.3).
η3t Variable (2005 to mid-2007)
value α –0.1036 –0.1043 0.1153 –0.1030
t-stat. –10.8818 –11.0766 2.9610 –12.7887
p-value 0 0 0.0037 0
AR(1) 0.2260 –0.3547 –0.4727 –0.4144
2.9156 –1.9234 –2.137 –1.8139
0.0042 0.0567 0.0345 0.0721
MA(1) 0.5677 0.6223 0.5449
3.5451 3.1715 2.5968
0.0006 0.0019 0.0105
m
Nff
e
i,t 0.0285 0.02678 0.0019 0.0400
2.1979 1.9869 0.1466 3.5701
0.0298 0.0491 0.8837 0.0005
Rt 0.0103
2.8769
0.0047
V IXt –0.0164
–5.8238
0
ff bi,t−1 –0.0247
–4.1257
0.0001
Adjusted R2 0.1081 0.1457 0.2579 0.1666
to bond funds and the subsequent requirement for portfolio insurance tends to occur during
‘normal’ market regimes whereby liquidity is relatively high (regressions in Hypothesis 1)
and volatility is well within the average plus two standard deviation band (65%). Including
the weekly aggregate market return Rt yielded a positive coefficient, however the statistical
significance varied over periods, the post-crisis being unremarkable. Thus, weekly market
returns might not carry enough momentum to create demand for portfolio insurance. The
daily results in Chapter 3 may not apply here, as the measurement of η3t here is averaged
over the week and Rt is the weekly return. As expected, the VIX is highly related to the
skew: as global fear increases, so too does the requirement for portfolio insurance. Methods
of construction naturally result in differences as the VIX is a 30-day implied volatility mea-
sure and the skew pertains to the nearest set of options, with maturity in excess of eight
days.
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Table 4.17: Regression results for the weekly option-implied skew and equity fund momentum from
August 2007 to December 2010, defined in equation (4.3)..
η3t Variable (mid-2007 to 2010)
value α –0.1225 –0.1229 –0.0644 –0.1113
t-stat. –16.9043 –17.2109 –2.6359 –11.7591
p-value 0 0 0.0091 0
AR(1) 1.1490 1.1585 0.9712 1.1603
18.2177 19.2969 78.0083 21.2947
0 0 0 0
AR(2) –0.3007 –0.3083 –0.1817
–3.0114 –3.2195 –3.4175
0.0030 0.0015 0.0008
AR(3) 0.1254 0.1236
2.1672 2.1734
0.0316 0.0311
MA(1) –0.9922 –0.9925 –0.9157 –0.9880
–116.655 –118.33 –26.9094 –103.7922
0 0 0 0
m
Nff
e
i,t 0.0190 0.01741 0.0104 0.0202
5.7125 4.7651 2.4780 5.2706
0 0 0.0142 0
Rt 0.0021
1.1750
0.2416
V IXt –0.0021
–3.0264
0.0028
ff bi,t−1 –0.0310
–1.7923
0.0748
Adjusted R2 0.3937 0.3970 0.3935 0.3919
Hypothesis 1 established that lagged bond flows were negatively related to skew in the pre-crisis
period. Thereafter, bond flows revert to being positively contemporaneously related to skew. Hy-
pothesis 2 has shown that the skew is positively related to current equity fund performance. In
the post-crisis period, bond flows and equity flows were mildly negatively correlated. Performance
Granger-caused bond flows. In the case of institutional equity fund flows, past own fund perfor-
mance did not appear to generate such flows. There is however a slight positive contemporaneous
correlation in the post-crisis period. An attempt to regress ffei,t on Nff
e
i,t over this period did
not yield favourable results. Hence, institutional equity fund flows appear illusive. Testing for a
unit root process over the entire period leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root
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Table 4.18: Regression results for the weekly option-implied skew and equity fund momentum from
January 2005 to December 2010, defined in equation (4.3).
η3t Variable (2005–2010)
value α –0.1380 –0.1377 –0.0641 –0.1334
t-stat. –6.8038 –6.8489 –2.2088 –6.6792
p-value 0 0 0.0279 0
AR(1) 0.9608 0.9596 0.9676 0.9587
49.5332 47.4341 54.6083 46.8559
0 0 0 0
MA(1) –0.8130 –0.8090 –0.8277 –0.8045
–13.7724 –13.2842 –15.5394 –12.8333
0 0.00 0 0
m
Nff
e
i,t 0.0183 0.0169 0.0092 0.0198
5.2836 4.3789 2.3156 5.5768
0 0 0.0212 0
Rt 0.0027
1.4013
0.1622
V IXt –0.0033
–2.7873
0.0057
ff bi,t−1 –0.0229
–4.0764
0.0001
Adjusted R2 0.3413 0.3469 0.3695 0.3606
present. 30 Having briefly mentioned that the skew as well as TED spread Granger-causes ffei,t,
the following regressions will be evaluated over the sample periods to determine if either variable
may be useful to forecast institutional investor equity fund flow:
ffei,t = α+ βff
e
i,t−1 +
k∑
i=1
γiη
3
t−i +
p∑
j=1
λjTEDt−j + ϕNffei,t + t, (4.4)
where k = 1, 2 and p = 0, 1, 2 depend on the period. Equity fund performance and lagged TED
may be omitted, as best regression results are displayed below. ffei,t is not persistent over the
entire sample, however in the pre-crisis period, the lag coefficient is statistically significant. The
results are reported in Tables 4.19, 4.20 and 4.21 for the relevant periods.
30The ADF test statistic of –19.06 and the associated one-sided p-value of 0.00 is smaller than the test critical
values at the 1% (–3.45), 5% (–2.87) and 10% (–2.57) level.
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Table 4.19: Regression results for the weekly institutional equity fund flows as a dependent variable from
January 2005 to July 2007, defined in equation (4.4).
ffei,t
Sample 1/21/2005–7/27/2007
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
α 0.2530 0.0622 4.0709 0.0001
η3t−1 1.3259 0.5860 2.2624 0.0253
AR(1) –0.4176 0.0878 –4.75395 0
R-squared 0.1953 Mean dependent var 0.1294
Adjusted R-squared 0.1828 S.D. dependent var 0.7685
S.E. of regression 0.6947 Akaike info criterion 2.1319
Sum squared resid 62.2647 Schwarz criterion 2.1974
Log likelihood –137.707 Hannan–Quinn criter. 2.1585
F -statistic 15.6502 Durbin–Watson stat 2.0950
Prob(F -statistic) 0
Although the fit in this sample as indicated by the adjusted R2 value in Table 4.19 is not very
high and tends to decrease in the post-crisis period, the results indicate that an increase in the
skew (becomes less negative) in week t leads to an increase in the subsequent weekly equity
fund flows (as a percentage of NAV). Given that the flows are not measured in absolute USD
values but are referenced relative to the NAV at the beginning of week t, it is the case that
as institutional investors reduce their equity portfolio insurance, more capital is subsequently
allocated to equity in week t + 1. Hence, the skew may indeed be a leading indicator for global
institutional investor sentiment. Positive consistent equity fund performance over the preceding
four-week period tends to increase the skew in week t. In the pre-crisis period, this then leads to
greater flows in the following week to equity funds. Since these flows as expressed as a percentage
of NAV, an increase in the NAV will reduce the flow variable if the USD flow remains unchanged.
Therefore, the numerator is likely to increase for this relationship to hold.
In Table 4.20, the results show an alternating relationship in the coefficient, consistent for both
the skew and TED: ffei,t+1 is positively (negatively) related to both skew and the TED spread in
week t (t−1). The contemporaneous fund flow performance is included due to the slight positive
correlation perceived in this period. The η3t regressions in Table 4.17 result in a negative AR(2)
coefficient, and therefore this relationship is consistent with the alternating sign of coefficients
here. Regardless, it is the week t coefficients which are both larger in magnitude and statistically
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Table 4.20: Results for weekly institutional equity flows from August 2007 to December 2010, defined in
equation (4.4).
ffei,t
Sample 7/27/2007–12/31/2010
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
η3t−1 2.8020 0.8121 3.4502 0.0007
η3t−2 –2.2334 0.7329 –3.0474 0.0027
TEDt−1 0.0105 0.0036 2.957 0.0035
TEDt−2 –0.0078 0.0035 –2.2459 0.026
Nff
e
i,t 0.0604 0.0208 2.8990 0.0042
R-squared 0.1470 Mean dependent var 0.1537
Adjusted R-squared 0.1275 S.D. dependent var 1.023
S.E. of regression 0.9554 Akaike info criterion 2.7741
Sum squared resid 159.748 Schwarz criterion 2.8628
Log likelihood –244.667 Hannan–Quinn criter. 2.8100
Durbin–Watson stat 1.9963
more relevant for both skew and the TED spread. In essence, increased liquidity and skew in
week t tends to result in greater equity fund flow in week t+ 1, which is accompanied by positive
own fund performance.
Table 4.21: Regression results for weekly institutional equity flows defined using equation (4.4), from
January 2005 to December 2010.
ffei,t
Sample 1/21/2005–12/31/2010
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.
η3t−1 2.3236 0.6084 3.8192 0.0002
η3t−2 –1.8778 0.5475 –3.4296 0.0007
TEDt−1 0.0091 0.0035 2.6173 0.0093
TEDt−2 –0.0064 0.0034 –1.8991 0.0585
Nff
e
i,t 0.0529 0.0191 2.7641 0.0061
R-squared 0.0919 Mean dependent var 0.1466
Adjusted R-squared 0.0800 S.D. dependent var 0.9224
S.E. of regression 0.8847 Akaike info criterion 2.6088
Sum squared resid 239.5096 Schwarz criterion 2.6690
Log likelihood –400.673 Hannan–Quinn criter. 2.6329
Durbin–Watson stat 2.2478
Over the entire sample period, the results in Table 4.21 are consistent with the post-crisis results
in Table 4.20. Thus, ffei,t is clearly related to sentiment within US options markets. In fact,
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equity fund flows in week t seem to be determined by the level of the skew as well as those of
liquidity in weeks t− 1 and t− 2. Own-fund performance does not appear to lead to fund flow;
neither does equity fund flow result in positive equity fund performance. Hence, option-implied
skew may well be a measure of forward-looking sentiment, given the relationship to institutional
equity fund flows.
4.4 Conclusion and Practical Applications
This chapter has served to develop a theory of sentiment propagation which has yet to be ex-
amined using a novel data set; the chapter further contributes to literature by providing an
empirical link between institutional investor sentiment, as measured by equity portfolio insur-
ance, and dedicated USA equity and bond fund flows. The movement of fund flows globally
has served to exacerbate financial crises, particularly in emerging markets during the 1990s. By
examining global equity and bond fund flows at weekly frequencies, investors’ risk appetite as
well as preferences can be monitored. The source of fund flow data yields varying relationships
between such flows and returns; thus caution is to be applied should momentum or contrarian
strategies be developed to outperform a global index using country constituent indices.
Part I has established that sentiment propagation is tantamount to cross-border fund flows.
Drawing upon diverse yet complementary strands of the finance literature, the relationships
between financial markets, the macroeconomy and confidence have been explored. Cross-border
and regional capital flows have been shown to be determined by global (US) as well as domestic
fundamentals. Relative flows have also been used to enhance returns as a result of the feedback
trader hypothesis. Empirical evidence which supports the use of fund flows as a sentiment measure
for the relevant investor group within an economy is extensive. The integration of markets implies
that sentiment within a given economy is likely to filter through to those countries which are linked
via capital or trade flows to the source country. The focus of this research has been the former,
with a particular emphasis on financial markets. Hence, cross-border capital fund flows are the
most likely conduits for sentiment propagation.
Assuming this is to be the case, Part II has shown that US institutional portfolio insurance is
consistent with flow-related variables. In particular, Hypothesis I has established that increases
in weekly bond fund flows precede increases in portfolio insurance. Examining data over distinct
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periods allows for the adaptation of investor behaviour to different market regimes. The post-
crisis period (the definition of this period includes the crisis) is characterised by flows into AE
bonds and, in particular, capital repatriation to the US due to the ‘flight-to-safety’ phenomenon.
During this period, it appears that it is in fact persistent positive equity performance which ul-
timately drives the desire or lack thereof, for portfolio insurance. Thus, Hypothesis 2 shows that
an increase in the four-week rolling average of institutional equity fund performance tends to be
accompanied by an increase in the skew over all sub-periods. This effect is in excess of that of
institutional bond fund flows during the post-crisis period. As a corollary and most likely a signif-
icant ramification therefrom, the option-implied skew, alternatively considered a forward-looking
sentiment measure, has been shown to Granger-cause institutional equity fund flows. Given that
the aggregation of US and non-US domiciled funds are considered a global institutional investor
sentiment measure, it is then the case that the index options markets contain forward-looking
information pertaining to equity fund flow. In conclusion, the option-implied skew appears to
contain both lagged and forward-looking information pertaining to institutional bond and equity
fund flows of globally domiciled investors. The response of portfolio insurance (skew) is depen-
dent on market regimes and the macroeconomic environment, as captured by the VIX and TED
spread. Therefore, institutional portfolio insurance appears to be that all-encompassing measure
of global investor sentiment given the perceived relationships with dedicated US bond fund flows,
equity performance and equity flows.
This chapter has shown explicitly the link between institutional investor sentiment as measured by
the third robust moment, and the global dedicated USA bond and equity flows. Thus, monitoring
the nearest maturity index options provides insight into the movement into such equity funds.
At the same time, the bond fund flows of institutional investors preempt an increase in portfolio
insurance. This is conditional on market regime, dictated by the VIX and TED spread. Thus
identifying the market regime is a cursory means to establish whether bond or equity fund
flows can in face be used to provide a forecast of the movement on the moments of the RND
and therefore, the relative cheapness of certain options. Thus, as mentioned in §3.7, superior
information based on fund flows as well as macro data releases can be used to find options which
appear underpriced prior to the release of the information within the public domain.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary and Conclusion
This thesis has presented a number of implications of investor behaviour to financial markets.
Although this field of finance in parlance relates to individual behavioural biases, of relevance
is aggregate behaviour, and therefore the associated sentiment of a particular investor group.
This thesis has aspired to formalise a theory of sentiment propagation across financial markets.
Although much research alludes to the integration of financial markets and the real economy,
there have been few attempts to provide a robust framework in which to establish the effect of
sentiment in those identified relationships. The expanse and content of the literature dictates the
complexity; yet the pertinence of such a framework is clear. Considering both macro sentiment
and investor sentiment measures, this thesis has professed the channels through which both are
likely to propagate across borders, thereby influencing behaviour of the recipient domicile. Yet
feedback effects are also likely to be incurred – this has not been addressed here. The contributions
of this research have been to corroborate the use of macro sentiment as a leading indicator, and
to address sentiment propagation.
In particular, the information content of macro sentiment which is inaccessible though macro
fundamental data has appeared to be a useful leading indicator for financial instability. Funda-
mental data which highlight imbalances within an economy are useful, however the complexity
of these systemic events is non-trivial and further compounded by the inability to identify all
sources of risk. Chapter 2 has shown that macro sentiment conveys expectations regarding the
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future course of the economy, over and above those of related economic time series. Additionally,
the relationship that exists between bilateral trade partners is evident within macro sentiment.
Analogous to the instance of bank runs which often arise from widespread panic independent
of fundamentals, systemic crises are subject to the coalescence of these forces. Countries are
increasingly integrated through both trade and financial markets. The effect of capital mobility
exacerbated the effects of the global financial crisis in 2008 given the volatility and direction of
flow. Financial contagion which is closely tied to sentiment propagation is therefore of conse-
quence as systemic crises are not constrained by nations’ borders: Fund flows are the channels
through which investors’ beliefs and risk appetite are transmitted. The flight-to-safety phe-
nomenon characterised global fund flows during this period; the recovery saw shifts in behaviour
as investors’ redirected capital to emerging markets. Global sentiment is dictated by the largest
economy, as the VIX and the TED are those common shocks emanating from the US which
affected flows. Considering this dominance, dedicated US equity and bond flows of both US and
non-US domiciled investors necessarily embody global sentiment. Thus, establishing the connec-
tion between institutional portfolio insurance and that of global sentiment serves to reinforce the
former as a measure of investor sentiment.
The assumption that trading activity within index options markets embodies institutional investor
sentiment serves as the basis for the empirical analysis in Chapter 3. Examining the dynamics of
daily option-implied measures and returns results in the skew which is consistent with those other
measures, and robust across time periods. Hence this is the reference measure used within Chapter
3. Survey-related sentiment measures have been shown to be Granger-caused by global common
risk factors which is analogous to macro sentiment with respect to economically relevant data.
However, the investor sentiment survey result is derived from the difference between bullish and
bearish investors. The alternative methods in construction between macro and investor sentiment
should render the former more informative.
This thesis has served to identify relationships between various measures of sentiment as defined
in Chapters 3 and 4. Although there is an extensive body of research which seeks to empirically
validate the use of selected sentiment measures in the context of aggregate market reversals, it
is fundamentally challenging to accurately identify mispricings. In the cross-section, sentiment
is an additional factor which is likely to affect stocks, much like the factors of Fama & French
(1996), and the momentum factor of Carhart (1997). The effects of investor sentiment extend
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beyond financial markets. In the extreme, the financial markets suffer consequences equivalent
to natural disasters. Systemic crises tend to impose heavily on real economic activity in the
medium and long term. In some instances, the distortions endure for extended periods as macro
sentiment remains subdued. The affected consumers are those that both perceive and are aﬄicted
by impending crises. Thus, behavioural finance commences and concludes at the individual level.
5.2 Further Research
Having explored the concept of sentiment within real and financial markets, the relevance thereof
is unequivocal. The use of sentiment is twofold: in addition to option trading strategies which
exploit information regarding sentiment derived from the index RND, fund flow data which have
been identified as the medium through which sentiment propagates, can be used within signalling
methods to detect pending financial instability, as discussed in chapter 2. Financial deregulation
and the lack of capital controls have created an environment whereby capital movement has the
ability to destabilise markets. Hence, contagion between financial markets may be accounted
for using cross border equity or bond fund flows since financial instability within a country may
arise due to external influences. Thus, research which incorporates the effects of sentiment as
well as financial contagion should be addressed. Regulatory research which optimises the efficient
functioning of financial markets would also benefit therefrom.
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Appendix
Figure 5.1: The autocorrelation function for the monthly CSUS series from January 1960 to December
2008.
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Figure 5.2: The partial-autocorrelation function for the monthly CSUS series from January 1960 to
December 2008.
Figure 5.3: The autocorrelation function for the monthly CSUK series from January 1974 to December
2008.
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Figure 5.4: The partial-autocorrelation function for the monthly CSUK series from January 1974 to
December 2008.
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Table 5.1: Granger causality for monthly CSUK , CSUS and trade strength for both the US and UK over
the period January 1974 to December 2008, and January 1990 to December 2008.
Sample period (six lags) 1974m01 – 2008m12 1990m01 – 2008m12
Null hypothesis F -statistic Prob. F -statistic Prob.
CSUS does not Granger cause CSUK 2.2651 0.0367 5.1281 6.00E-05
TUK does not Granger cause CSUK 2.9270 0.0083 3.8727 0.0011
CSUK does not Granger cause TUK 1.2489 0.2803 2.0664 0.0585
TUKUS does not Granger cause CS
UK 1.8853 0.0821 2.9538 0.0087
TUK does not Granger cause CSUS 2.4184 0.0262 3.1178 0.0060
TUSUK does not Granger cause CS
US 2.5142 0.0212 1.6418 0.1371
TUKUS does not Granger cause T
UK 6.3323 2.00E-06 4.4130 0.0003
TUK does not Granger cause TUKUS 7.3879 2.00E-07 5.9315 1.00E-05
TUS does not Granger cause TUK 3.7450 0.0012 5.0150 8.00E-05
TUSUK does not Granger cause T
UK 3.5990 0.0017 2.5766 0.0198
TUK does not Granger cause TUSUK 4.2520 0.0004 4.3804 0.0003
TUS does not Granger cause TUKUS 6.6900 9.00E-07 7.5701 2.00E-07
TUKUS does not Granger cause T
US 3.7244 0.0013 3.0260 0.0074
TUSUK does not Granger cause T
US 2.0004 0.0646 2.2893 0.0367
TUS does not Granger cause TUSUK 3.5079 0.0022 9.7481 2.00E-09
Table 5.2: Granger causality for monthly CSUK , CSUS and trade strength for both the US and UK over
the period January 1990 to December 2008.
Correlation CSUK CSUS TUK TUKUS T
US TUSUK
CSUK 1
CSUS 0.71 1
TUK 0.15 0.26 1
TUKUS –0.14 –0.36 –0.51 1
TUS –0.21 0.058 0.72 –0.67 1
TUSUK –0.11 0.15 0.54 –0.79 0.75 1
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Table 5.3: US quarterly data to identify threshold values for indicators.
Year pUSg,t e
US
g,t h
US
g,t c
US
g,t
1984Q1 –1.4% 3.1% 0.3% 18.3%
1984Q2 –0.2% –2.2% 0.5% 10.3%
1984Q3 0.7% 3.2% 0.8% 8.7%
1984Q4 2.4% 1.8% 1.4% 2.0%
1985Q1 2.4% 6.5% 1.8% –0.4%
1985Q2 3.1% 8.3% 1.9% –2.0%
1985Q3 2.9% 0.6% 2.4% –4.3%
1985Q4 4.1% 11.1% 2.6% –6.3%
1986Q1 2.9% 17.9% 2.9% –2.6%
1986Q2 3.6% 16.6% 4.2% –2.2%
1986Q3 3.4% 3.5% 4.6% –4.5%
1986Q4 4.0% 4.2% 5.3% –7.0%
1987Q1 2.1% 16.3% 6.7% –7.9%
1987Q2 1.8% 12.8% 6.4% –6.1%
1987Q3 1.1% 11.5% 5.1% –3.8%
1987Q4 –0.4% –14.6% 3.7% –10.0%
1988Q1 –0.7% –11.0% 2.3% –3.5%
1988Q2 –1.0% –7.5% 3.1% –2.0%
1988Q3 –1.2% –9.1% 2.0% 0.2%
1988Q4 –1.4% –8.0% 0.7% –2.7%
2003Q1 0.1% –19.2% 1.4% –8.8%
2003Q2 0.5% –3.9% 2.0% 2.6%
2003Q3 –1.0% 0.7% 2.6% 3.3%
2003Q4 –1.3% 12.4% 3.1% 6.3%
2004Q1 –1.8% 12.4% 2.8% 11.5%
2004Q2 –1.6% 11.7% 3.4% 5.6%
2004Q3 –1.2% 8.6% 4.1% 7.2%
2004Q4 –0.6% 15.1% 3.7% 4.7%
2005Q1 –1.5% 10.1% 4.0% 4.3%
2005Q2 –0.2% 8.5% 4.2% 0.2%
2005Q3 0.1% 8.9% 3.7% –2.0%
2005Q4 0.8% 8.4% 2.7% –6.1%
2006Q1 0.3% 9.5% 0.9% 1.5%
2006Q2 1.4% 4.5% –1.6% –3.1%
2006Q3 2.0% 7.2% –3.9% –1.9%
2006Q4 2.2% 11.3% –4.5% 6.9%
2007Q1 1.6% 7.6% –6.3% 5.6%
2007Q2 1.8% 8.5% –8.3% –0.1%
2007Q3 1.9% 6.9% –9.2% –1.0%
2007Q4 1.9% 0.7% –12.6% –8.4%
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Table 5.4: Granger causality using two lags for gaps over the period 1960Q1 to 2009Q2 (updated data
included two additional quarters).
Null hypothesis F -statistic Prob.
eUSg,t does not Granger cause c
US
g,t 16.5140 2.00E-07
cUSg,t does not Granger cause e
US
g,t 2.70738 0.0693
cUSg,t does not Granger cause p
US
g,t 5.2406 0.0061
hUSg,t does not Granger cause c
US
g,t 2.5877 0.0778
eUSg,t does not Granger cause p
US
g,t 3.8602 0.0227
eUSg,t does not Granger cause h
US
g,t 2.7114 0.0690
Table 5.5: Quarterly gaps for series indicated prior to crises within the UK. The macro sentiment series
has been shifted by +100 index points.
Year pUKg,t e
UK
g,t h
UK
g,t c
UK
g,t
2003Q1 13% –31% 18% –10%
2003Q2 9% –32% 18% –6%
2003Q3 10% –24% 17% –4%
2003Q4 12% –17% 16% –6%
2004Q1 22% –12% 15% –3%
2004Q2 16% –10% 17% –3%
2004Q3 22% –11% 16% –5%
2004Q4 16% –5% 11% –4%
2005Q1 23% 0% 8% 1%
2005Q2 17% 3% 7% –1%
2005Q3 25% 7% 5% –3%
2005Q4 24% 9% 2% –7%
2006Q1 33% 15% 1% –3%
2006Q2 38% 19% 2% –2%
2006Q3 29% 13% 2% –3%
2006Q4 27% 14% 1% –3%
2007Q1 36% 14% 1% –3%
2007Q2 36% 15% 2% 1%
2007Q3 48% 15% 1% –1%
2007Q4 48% 11% –1% –5%
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Table 5.6: Granger causality using two lags for quarterly gaps in the UK over the period 1974Q1 to
2009Q4 (updated data increased observations).
Null hypothesis F -statistic Prob.
eUKg,t does not Granger cause p
UK
g,t 2.7818 0.0654
cUKg,t does not Granger cause e
UK
g,t 3.2243 0.0428
eUKg,t does not Granger cause c
UK
g,t 3.0945 0.0485
hUKg,t does not Granger cause e
UK
g,t 2.6709 0.0728
hUKg,t does not Granger cause c
UK
g,t 4.3396 0.0149
cUKg,t does not Granger cause h
UK
g,t 2.7987 0.0644
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